Alterity in the Conflict of Laws
In: Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht: The Rabel journal of comparative and international private law, Band 88, Heft NIX, S. 1
ISSN: 1868-7059
28 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht: The Rabel journal of comparative and international private law, Band 88, Heft NIX, S. 1
ISSN: 1868-7059
In: Common Market Law Review, Band 55, Heft 4, S. 1291-1292
ISSN: 0165-0750
This paper attempts to bring the specific insights of conflict of laws to issues challenging contemporary legal theory in its efforts to integrate the changes wrought by globalisation in the normative landscape beyond the nation-state. Indeed, conflicting norms and social systems are now at the centre-stage of jurisprudence. Conversely however, private international legal thinking can benefit from attention to the other legal disciplines that have preceded it in 'going global'. It needs to undergo a conceptual overhauling in order to capture law's novel foundations and features and adjust its epistemological and methodological tools to its transformed environment. It must reconsider the debate about legitimacy of political authority and the values that constitute its normative horizon. From this perspective, societal constitutionalism, as mooted by Teubner, provides a particularly promising avenue for unbounding the conflict of laws, which might then emerge as a form of de-centred, reflexive coordination of global legal interactions. [Abstract editor]
BASE
This paper attempts to bring the specific insights of conflict of laws to issues challenging contemporary legal theory in its efforts to integrate the changes wrought by globalisation in the normative landscape beyond the nation-state. Indeed, conflicting norms and social systems are now at the centre-stage of jurisprudence. Conversely however, private international legal thinking can benefit from attention to the other legal disciplines that have preceded it in 'going global'. It needs to undergo a conceptual overhauling in order to capture law's novel foundations and features and adjust its epistemological and methodological tools to its transformed environment. It must reconsider the debate about legitimacy of political authority and the values that constitute its normative horizon. From this perspective, societal constitutionalism, as mooted by Teubner, provides a particularly promising avenue for unbounding the conflict of laws, which might then emerge as a form of de-centred, reflexive coordination of global legal interactions. [Abstract editor]
BASE
DOI : 10.3366/elr.2014.0225 ; Should -and if so, how should -the international surrogacy market be regulated? Is access to cross-border surrogacy a right attaching to the free movement of persons, or a risk for women in developing countries? Is this an issue of personal ethics or of global economics? Arguments pit personal autonomy against public policy; democracy against sovereignty; the right to a child against the protection of women; anthropology against discrimination. The heated moral, religious and political debates which in recent years have followed spectacular revolutions in reproductive technology are naturally reflected in widely divergent national standpoints, of which international surrogacy agreements - that is, between intended parents issuing (usually) from a surrogacy-hostile jurisdiction and a surrogate in a surrogacy-friendly environment -have become the focal point. The ensuing conflicts of laws are all the more complex in that they also take place in the wake of the liberalisation of same-sex marriage in a growing number of jurisdictions, so that the issue of surrogacy arises as one of the right to a child; restricting its benefit to sterile heterosexual couples then appears as inherently discriminatory. But the backdrop of such conflicts is also one of increasing global economic and social inequality. Whereas the cross-border demand for children tends to come from developed Western (often surrogacy-hostile) countries (such as France), some developing states (such as India), when not strictly prohibitive on religious grounds, have encouraged or abetted a growing surrogacy industry which cannot but take its toll on a generation of young women. [First paragraph]
BASE
DOI : 10.3366/elr.2014.0225 ; Should -and if so, how should -the international surrogacy market be regulated? Is access to cross-border surrogacy a right attaching to the free movement of persons, or a risk for women in developing countries? Is this an issue of personal ethics or of global economics? Arguments pit personal autonomy against public policy; democracy against sovereignty; the right to a child against the protection of women; anthropology against discrimination. The heated moral, religious and political debates which in recent years have followed spectacular revolutions in reproductive technology are naturally reflected in widely divergent national standpoints, of which international surrogacy agreements - that is, between intended parents issuing (usually) from a surrogacy-hostile jurisdiction and a surrogate in a surrogacy-friendly environment -have become the focal point. The ensuing conflicts of laws are all the more complex in that they also take place in the wake of the liberalisation of same-sex marriage in a growing number of jurisdictions, so that the issue of surrogacy arises as one of the right to a child; restricting its benefit to sterile heterosexual couples then appears as inherently discriminatory. But the backdrop of such conflicts is also one of increasing global economic and social inequality. Whereas the cross-border demand for children tends to come from developed Western (often surrogacy-hostile) countries (such as France), some developing states (such as India), when not strictly prohibitive on religious grounds, have encouraged or abetted a growing surrogacy industry which cannot but take its toll on a generation of young women. [First paragraph]
BASE
In: International Arbitration and Global Governance, S. 214-240
Article paru dans le numéro spécial consacré au "Droit international privé et droits fondamentaux / Private International Law and Fundamental Rights". ; International audience ; This article attempts to respond to the question of the editors of this journal, on the implications of fundamental rights and recognition for private international law. It suggests that the paradigmatic transformations which are taking place in post-modern thought in the name of recgntion within the social sciences, have implications for the law which are already apparent in contemporary theories of justice and democracy. In particular, recognition comes with an epistemology and a critical project which may mean that, in the end, there is little that is specific to "international" legal cases ; few grounds on which to distinguish the public (international) from the private (international) as distinct legal disciplines ; and no real sense in separating the need for recongnition as a matter of individual experience or collective transmission. It is likely that the changing fault lines within the law, which are already at work to transform the idea and effects of sovereignty in public international law, will lead to an analogous rethinking of the way in which law governs personal relationships in multicultural - including crossborder - settings. In order to track the demands that recognition is making of the law in the later context, this article begins by examining the focus of the current doctrinal debate on recognition, which concerns the frontiers of the conflict of laws as method. It then explores the deeper epistemological and axiologial implications of recognition, which are brought within private international law through the gateway of human rights. In this light, it seeks finally to show that recognition can also be seen as excavating an unfinished project of methological pluralism.
BASE
1. C'est au nom de l'absence de portée « extraterritoriale » du Alien Tort Statute que la Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis vient de rejeter, à l'unanimité, la demande formée par Esther Kiobel (et d'autres membres du peuple Ogoni) contre Royal Dutch ShellNote de bas de page, au terme d'une bataille contentieuse longue et hautement médiatiséeNote de bas de page. D'autant plus attendu que le parcours procédural de cette affaire a été tortueux - depuis le surprenant jugement de la Cour fédérale d'appel du Second Circuit de 2010Note de bas de page jusqu'à la tournure inédite du débat dans la phase initiale de la procédure devant la Cour suprêmeNote de bas de page - l'arrêt comporte, finalement, peu de surprise tant en ce qui concerne le résultat concret obtenu. Il était devenu apparent depuis l'audience du 1er octobre 2012 que l'affaire était mal choisie pour obtenir l'avancée espérée de la jurisprudence sur le terrain de la discipline des multinationales dans leurs activités délocalisées ; les faits reprochés au conglomérat anglo-néerlandais avaient des liens trop ténus avec les Etats-Unis pour que la brèche voulue par la société civile soit enfin ouverte dans le protectionnisme économique national à la faveur de la protection globale des droits de l'homme. [Premier paragraphe]
BASE
Chapitre de l'ouvrage « Droits fondamentaux, ordre public et libertés économiques », sous la direction de Collart Dutilleul F. et de Riem F., Actes du Colloque de Bayonne Lascaux – CDRE (Bayonne, 17 février 2012), éd. Institut Universitaire Varenne, Bayonne, coll. Colloque & Essais, 2013, pp. 245 – 251 ; International audience ; Comment mener une réflexion critique sur la politique du droit international privé ? La question sera sans doute perçue comme étant iconoclaste, car la matière est elle-même supposée neutre, ou en tout cas, dépourvue de tout agenda politique autre que la promotion d'une forme curieusement éthérée de la justice – souvent qualifiée de « conflictuelle » pour en souligner la distance par rapport au contenu des droits nationaux en conflit. Or, à regarder de plus près, la dimension apolitique du droit international privé est intimement liée à l'idée selon laquelle la répartition des compétences qu'il opère se fait en conformité avec les valeurs indissociables d'une vision libérale, elle-même éminemment politique, du droit privé.
BASE
This article attempts to respond to the question of the editors of this journal, on the implications of fundamental rights and recognition for private international law. It suggests that the paradigmatic transformations which are taking place in post-modern thought in the name of recgntion within the social sciences, have implications for the law which are already apparent in contemporary theories of justice and democracy. In particular, recognition comes with an epistemology and a critical project which may mean that, in the end, there is little that is specific to "international" legal cases ; few grounds on which to distinguish the public (international) from the private (international) as distinct legal disciplines ; and no real sense in separating the need for recongnition as a matter of individual experience or collective transmission. It is likely that the changing fault lines within the law, which are already at work to transform the idea and effects of sovereignty in public international law, will lead to an analogous rethinking of the way in which law governs personal relationships in multicultural - including crossborder - settings. In order to track the demands that recognition is making of the law in the later context, this article begins by examining the focus of the current doctrinal debate on recognition, which concerns the frontiers of the conflict of laws as method. It then explores the deeper epistemological and axiologial implications of recognition, which are brought within private international law through the gateway of human rights. In this light, it seeks finally to show that recognition can also be seen as excavating an unfinished project of methological pluralism.
BASE
Article paru dans le numéro spécial consacré au "Droit international privé et droits fondamentaux / Private International Law and Fundamental Rights". ; International audience ; This article attempts to respond to the question of the editors of this journal, on the implications of fundamental rights and recognition for private international law. It suggests that the paradigmatic transformations which are taking place in post-modern thought in the name of recgntion within the social sciences, have implications for the law which are already apparent in contemporary theories of justice and democracy. In particular, recognition comes with an epistemology and a critical project which may mean that, in the end, there is little that is specific to "international" legal cases ; few grounds on which to distinguish the public (international) from the private (international) as distinct legal disciplines ; and no real sense in separating the need for recongnition as a matter of individual experience or collective transmission. It is likely that the changing fault lines within the law, which are already at work to transform the idea and effects of sovereignty in public international law, will lead to an analogous rethinking of the way in which law governs personal relationships in multicultural - including crossborder - settings. In order to track the demands that recognition is making of the law in the later context, this article begins by examining the focus of the current doctrinal debate on recognition, which concerns the frontiers of the conflict of laws as method. It then explores the deeper epistemological and axiologial implications of recognition, which are brought within private international law through the gateway of human rights. In this light, it seeks finally to show that recognition can also be seen as excavating an unfinished project of methological pluralism.
BASE
1. C'est au nom de l'absence de portée « extraterritoriale » du Alien Tort Statute que la Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis vient de rejeter, à l'unanimité, la demande formée par Esther Kiobel (et d'autres membres du peuple Ogoni) contre Royal Dutch ShellNote de bas de page, au terme d'une bataille contentieuse longue et hautement médiatiséeNote de bas de page. D'autant plus attendu que le parcours procédural de cette affaire a été tortueux - depuis le surprenant jugement de la Cour fédérale d'appel du Second Circuit de 2010Note de bas de page jusqu'à la tournure inédite du débat dans la phase initiale de la procédure devant la Cour suprêmeNote de bas de page - l'arrêt comporte, finalement, peu de surprise tant en ce qui concerne le résultat concret obtenu. Il était devenu apparent depuis l'audience du 1er octobre 2012 que l'affaire était mal choisie pour obtenir l'avancée espérée de la jurisprudence sur le terrain de la discipline des multinationales dans leurs activités délocalisées ; les faits reprochés au conglomérat anglo-néerlandais avaient des liens trop ténus avec les Etats-Unis pour que la brèche voulue par la société civile soit enfin ouverte dans le protectionnisme économique national à la faveur de la protection globale des droits de l'homme. [Premier paragraphe]
BASE
Chapitre de l'ouvrage « Droits fondamentaux, ordre public et libertés économiques », sous la direction de Collart Dutilleul F. et de Riem F., Actes du Colloque de Bayonne Lascaux – CDRE (Bayonne, 17 février 2012), éd. Institut Universitaire Varenne, Bayonne, coll. Colloque & Essais, 2013, pp. 245 – 251 ; International audience ; Comment mener une réflexion critique sur la politique du droit international privé ? La question sera sans doute perçue comme étant iconoclaste, car la matière est elle-même supposée neutre, ou en tout cas, dépourvue de tout agenda politique autre que la promotion d'une forme curieusement éthérée de la justice – souvent qualifiée de « conflictuelle » pour en souligner la distance par rapport au contenu des droits nationaux en conflit. Or, à regarder de plus près, la dimension apolitique du droit international privé est intimement liée à l'idée selon laquelle la répartition des compétences qu'il opère se fait en conformité avec les valeurs indissociables d'une vision libérale, elle-même éminemment politique, du droit privé.
BASE
This monography provides an excellent synthesis of Roger Brownsword's pio-neering scholarship at the interface of bio-technologies and regulation over the past decade (see, among many others, 'What the World needs now: TechnoRegu-lation, Human Rights, and Human Dignity', in R. Brownsword [ed], Human Rights [Oxford, Hart, 2004] 203; 'Bioethics Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell Re-search and the Dignitarian Alliance' 17 University of Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 15, 2003; 'Red Lights and Rogues: Regulating Human Genetics', in H. Somsen [ed], The Regulatory Challenge of BioTechnology [Chelten-ham: Edward Elgar, 2007] 39). Although it is hardly in need of introduction in the English-speaking world, the editors of this Review have thought it important that attention should be drawn to this work, published in 2008, in continental European private law circles, where the prevalence of legal formalism means lesser familiarity with – and greater resistance to – the very concept of regulation and the various strategies by means of which human behavior can be channeled, including through the appropriate design of tools which may or may not be recognizable as 'law'. Moreover, for similar reasons, issues of political philosophy rarely find their way through the mesh of legal technique, even in fields which engage issues of democracy, human dignity or the status of scientific knowledge to the extent that genetical engineering obviously does, particularly in a global market of ever-available technology. In this remarkable book, Roger Brownsword uses the lense of regulation to address the dilemma facing our complex societies as articulated by Habermas (The Future of Human Nature [Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003] 92): should normative foundations be dropped, in favour of bioge-netic steering mechanisms? [First paragraph]
BASE