On the importance of correctly locating content: why and how REC can afford affordance perception
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft S1, S. 25-39
ISSN: 1573-0964
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft S1, S. 25-39
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 191, Heft 15, S. 3639-3648
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, Band 20, Heft 5, S. 971-989
ISSN: 1572-8676
In: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, Band 18, Heft 5, S. 973-997
ISSN: 1572-8676
In: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 241-256
ISSN: 1572-8676
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft 12, S. 12175-12193
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractThe Radical Enactive/Embodied view of Cognition, or REC, claims that all cognition is a matter of skilled performance. Yet REC also makes a distinction between basic and content-involving cognition, arguing that the development of basic to content-involving cognition involves a kink. It might seem that this distinction leads to problematic gaps in REC's story. We address two such alleged gaps in this paper. First, we identify and reply to the concern that REC leads to an "interface problem", according to which REC has to account for the interaction of two minds co-present in the same cognitive activity. We emphasise how REC's view of content-involving cognition in terms of activities that require particular sociocultural practices can resolve these interface concerns. The second potential problematic gap is that REC creates an unjustified difference in kind between animal and human cognition. In response, we clarify and further explicate REC's notion of content, and argue that this notion allows REC to justifiably mark the distinction between basic and content-involving cognition as a difference in kind. We conclude by pointing out in what sense basic and content-involving cognitive activities are the same, yet different. They are the same because they are all forms of skilled performance, yet different as some forms of skilled performance are genuinely different from other forms.
In: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 369-387
ISSN: 1572-8676