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The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference investigates the relations of inductive support on the large scale, among the totality of facts comprising a science or science in general. These relations form a massively entangled, non-hierarchical structure which is discovered by making hypotheses provisionally that are later supported by facts drawn from the entirety of the science. What results is a benignly circular, self-supporting inductive structure in which universal rules are not employed, the classical Humean problem cannot be formulated and analogous regress arguments fail.

The earlier volume, The Material Theory of Induction, proposed that individual inductive inferences are warranted not by universal rules but by facts particular to each context. This book now investigates how the totality of these inductive inferences interact in a mature science. Each fact that warrants an individual inductive inference is in turn supported inductively by other facts. Numerous case studies in the history of science support, and illustrate further, those claims. This is a novel, thoroughly researched, and sustained remedy to the enduring failures of formal approaches to inductive inference.
With The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference, author John D. Norton presents a novel, thoroughly researched, and sustained remedy to the enduring failures of formal approaches of inductive inference.

The fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of inductive support and why it is that they are so. The traditional approach is modeled on that taken in accounts of deductive inference. It seeks universally applicable schemas or rules or a single formal device, such as the probability calculus. After millennia of halting efforts, none of these approaches has been unequivocally successful and debates between approaches persist. The Material Theory of Induction identifies the source of these enduring problems in the assumption taken at the outset: that inductive inference can be accommodated by a single formal account with universal applicability. Instead, it argues that that there is no single, universally applicable formal account. Rather, each domain has an inductive logic native to it.The content of that logic and where it can be applied are determined by the facts prevailing in that domain. Paying close attention to how inductive inference is conducted in science and copiously illustrated with real-world examples, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference.