Suchergebnisse

This book, first published in 1977, traces the origins of the left-wing Portuguese army rebellion of 1974 that overthrew the 50-year-old authoritarian regime of Prime Ministers Salazar and Caetano to the traditional political independence of the armed forces, their increasingly strained relations with the regime, and finally to the colonial wars which brought professional discontent to boiling point. The Portuguese revolution which followed provides a unique laboratory for the study of an army in crisis, the strains which the attempt by officers to direct the political life of the country after April 1974 placed on military organisation; the traditional career patterns and attitudes of soldiers and on discipline. It examines the role of officers in government and the day-to-day problems which political upheaval created in every barracks. This is a study both of the armed forces in politics and politics in the armed forces, placed within the larger context of the revolution.

This book, first published in 1974, analyses the problems and mechanics of the Revolutionary movement in the army during and after the French Revolution. It charts the transition of the French army from the Revolutionary force of 1815 to the counter-revolutionary army which in June 1848 led the suppression of the European Revolutionary movement. By defining the scope of political of political unrest in the army between 1815 and 1848 - its causes, patterns and remedies - the author demonstrates that republican political ideology had only a limited appeal for the military and served more as a rallying point for discontent with the conditions of service.

Counterinsurgency has staked its claim in the new century as the new American way of war. Yet, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have revived a historical debate about the costs - monetary, political and moral - of operations designed to eliminate insurgents and build nations. Today's counterinsurgency proponents point to 'small wars' past to support their view that the enemy is 'biddable' if the correct tactical formulas are applied. Douglas Porch's sweeping history of counterinsurgency campaigns carried out by the three 'providential nations' of France, Britain and the United States, ranging from nineteenth-century colonial conquests to General Petraeus' 'Surge' in Iraq, challenges the contemporary mythologising of counterinsurgency as a humane way of war. The reality, he reveals, is that 'hearts and minds' has never been a recipe for lasting stability and that past counterinsurgency campaigns have succeeded not through state-building but by shattering and dividing societies while unsettling civil-military relations

The relationship between the French army and the regime provides one of the central themes in the history of the Third Republic. From its foundation in 1870, the republic sought to integrate the army of Louis-Napoleon into a left-leaning, democratic political system. This experiment failed, historians have argued, because the social origins, political attitudes and professional values of the officer corps sabotaged cooperation with the republic. The nation paid a bloody price for this failure on the battlefields of the Great War. Dr Porch's book challenges many standard assumptions about the place of the army in French political life between 1871 and 1914. The events of the 'Dreyfus years' are examined from the army's standpoint. Dr Porch examines the impact of the Dreyfus affair on the crucial tactical and armaments debates of the immediate pre-war years, tracing the origins of the costly 'spirit of the offensive' while providing the answer to the French army's near disastrous failure to the development of the colonial army and its place within the military structure is also assessed for the first time