Suchergebnisse

Today we find in the most technologically advanced societies, wild conspiracy theories and a broad distrust of science and expertise have created deep political divisions that are splitting nations in two. This book explains this paradox, using history as a guide. B.S. Rabinowitz finds that the turn-of-the 19th century was also a period of exceptional technological innovation that ended with toxic political upheavals. To investigate why, the author combines Karl Polanyi's concept of the 'double movement' with Joseph Schumpeter's theory of innovation. Weaving together a narrative that spans two centuries, the book traces how the rapid transformation of transportation and communications during the Industrial Revolution and the Digital Revolution created economic interdependence and capital flows that induced radical economic, social, and political disruptions.

State development in Africa is risky, even life-threatening. Heads of state must weigh the advantage of promoting political and economic development against the risk of fortifying dangerous political rivals. This book takes a novel approach to the study of neopatrimonial rule by placing security concerns at the center of state-building. Using quantitative evidence from 44 African countries and in-depth case studies of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, Rabinowitz demonstrates that the insecurities of the African state make strategically aligning with rural leaders critical to political success. Leaders who cultivate the goodwill of the countryside are better able to endure sporadic urban unrest, subdue political challengers, minimize ethnic and regional discord, and prevent a military uprising. Such regimes are more likely to build infrastructure needed for economic and political development. In so doing, Rabinowitz upends the long-held assumption that African leaders must cater to urban constituents to secure their rule.

It has been sixty years since the first sub-Saharan nation declared independence. Over the past three decades, the region has undergone significant changes. Though few, if any, would question that colonial histories shaped African societies, it is unclear to what extent these legacies
continue to be relevant to contemporary inter-group relations. Does it still make sense to speak about colonial legacies? And if so, which ones? This article explores these questions by examining whether ethnic groups who were privileged during the colonial period are more likely to hold political
power decades later. To do so, I conduct a multiple case study analysis of twenty-five sub-Saharan countries from which I create an original dataset of how ethnic groups were positioned during the latter stages of colonialism. With these data, I run auto-regressive logistical models correlating
former colonial position to executive power since independence. I find that many of the assumptions made in the scholarship about the importance of colonial privilege are not supported by these models. However, colonial institutional legacies may still help us understand inter-group dynamics
and be the source of contemporary political grievances.

It has been sixty years since the first sub-Saharan nation declared independence. Over the past three decades, the region has undergone significant changes. Though few, if any, would question that colonial histories shaped African societies, it is unclear to what extent these legacies continue to be relevant to contemporary inter-group relations. Does it still make sense to speak about colonial legacies? And if so, which ones? This article explores these questions by examining whether ethnic groups who were privileged during the colonial period are more likely to hold political power decades later. To do so, I conduct a multiple case study analysis of twenty-five sub-Saharan countries from which I create an original dataset of how ethnic groups were positioned during the latter stages of colonialism. With these data, I run auto-regressive logistical models correlating former colonial position to executive power since independence. I find that many of the assumptions made in the scholarship about the importance of colonial privilege are not supported by these models. However, colonial institutional legacies may still help us understand inter-group dynamics and be the source of contemporary political grievances.

Military interventions continue to be pervasive in Africa. Thirty out of forty-eight sub-Saharan states have experienced at least one successful coup. Nor have these numbers abated. In the 21st century alone, thirteen coups have been successfully staged in Africa, thus far. At the same time, several African countries - such as Ghana, Uganda, Burkina Faso and Benin - have managed to escape from seemingly insurmountable coup-traps. Yet, we understand little about what drives countries into a coup-trap and even less about how countries can extricate themselves from one. What explains this divergence? To address these contradictory trends, I focus initially on Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, neighboring states, with comparable populations, topographies, and economies that have experienced contrasting trajectories. While Ghana suffered five consecutive coups from the 1966 to 1981, Cote d'Ivoire was an oasis of stability and prosperity. However, by the end of the 20th century, Ghana had emerged as one of the few stable two-party democracies on the continent, as Cote d'Ivoire slid into civil war. Why was Cote d'Ivoire so much more stable and prosperous than Ghana in the `60s and `70s? And what explains their dramatic reversal of fortunes?I answer these puzzles by examining the political strategies of regimes in both countries, with a particular focus on rural alliances. I find that the leaders who followed a rural political strategy were better able to preserve stability, while those who followed an urban political strategy were more likely to suffer coups. In contrast to the prevalent urban-bias thesis, I contend that traditional elites and producers in rural areas - not the organized urban sectors - are most critical to political stability. To show the wider applicability of my thesis, I extend my argument beyond these two countries. In a systematic review of fifty-eight regimes over eighteen sub-Saharan countries, I demonstrate that the rural/urban dichotomy is pervasive and predictive of the success/failure of regimes. Using formal modeling, I show a strong and robust correlation between supporting rural areas and the likelihood of being ousted in a coup as well as longevity in power

Military interventions continue to be prevalent in Africa. In the 21st century alone, 14 coups have been successfully staged. Whereas most studies of coup risk examine how militaries are organized or what structural conditions are associated with coups, we take a novel approach. We explore how coalition politics relate to coup risk. It has long been observed that regimes try to hold power by buying off urban consumers. We argue that focusing on urban consumers actually makes regimes more prone to military intervention. Instead, leaders who ally with established rural elites are more effective at thwarting coups. To test our hypothesis, we develop a unique data set of rural political strategies, coding regimes in 44 sub-Saharan countries from 1960 to 2000. Using a continuous-time Cox proportional hazards regression model, we find a robust correlation between policies supportive of rural elites and lower coup risk.

Military interventions continue to be prevalent in Africa. In the 21st century alone, 14 coups have been successfully staged. Whereas most studies of coup risk examine how militaries are organized or what structural conditions are associated with coups, we take a novel approach. We explore how coalition politics relate to coup risk. It has long been observed that regimes try to hold power by buying off urban consumers. We argue that focusing on urban consumers actually makes regimes more prone to military intervention. Instead, leaders who ally with established rural elites are more effective at thwarting coups. To test our hypothesis, we develop a unique data set of rural political strategies, coding regimes in 44 sub-Saharan countries from 1960 to 2000. Using a continuous-time Cox proportional hazards regression model, we find a robust correlation between policies supportive of rural elites and lower coup risk.