Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Alternativ können Sie versuchen, selbst über Ihren lokalen Bibliothekskatalog auf das gewünschte Dokument zuzugreifen.
Bei Zugriffsproblemen kontaktieren Sie uns gern.
47 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
SSRN
Working paper
In this thesis I present three essays in which the influence of heuristics on individual decision making is analyzed and two essays dealing with behavioral aspects of moral costs. In chapter two, we investigate the effect a traders' decision can have on the disposition effect heuristic when they decide on behalf of others. In chapter three, the effect of the prenatal androgen exposure on loss aversion, as an essential driver of heuristics in financial economics, is analyzed. In chapter four, we went beyond the heuristics applied by stock investors and experimentally investigate disposition ...
In: forthcoming in Theory and Decision
SSRN
In: Economic Inquiry, Band 58, Heft 4, S. 1689-1706
SSRN
In: Grosch, K., & Rau, H. A. (2020). Procedural Unfair Wage Differentials and their Effects on Unethical Behavior. Economic Inquiry.
SSRN
In: CEGE Working Papers, Number 391 – April 2020
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 336-354
SSRN
In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Forthcoming
SSRN
Working paper
In: CEGE Discussion Paper No. 315
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of Economic Psychology 62, 258-267, 2017
SSRN
In: CEGE Discussion Paper No. 264
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 59, Heft 7, S. 1273-1300
ISSN: 1552-8766
In a step-level public-good experiment, we investigate how the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) and the number of step levels (one vs. two) affects public-good provision in a two-player game. We find that the sequential order of moves significantly improves public-good provision and payoffs, even though second movers often punish first movers who give less than half of the threshold contribution. The additional second step level—which is not feasible in standard Nash equilibrium—leads to higher contributions but does not improve public-good provision and lowers payoffs. We calibrate the parameters of Fehr and Schmidt's model of inequality aversion to make quantitative predictions. We find that actual behavior fits remarkably well with several predictions in a quantitative sense.
In: Journal of economic psychology, Band 102, S. 102710
ISSN: 0167-4870
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 9614
SSRN