Behavioral Contract Theory: Einfluss sozialer Präferenzen auf die Steuerung dezentraler Organisationseinheiten
In: Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse 136
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In: Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse 136
In: Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse v.136
In: International journal of human resource management, Band 32, Heft 5, S. 979-1005
ISSN: 1466-4399
In: FAccT Center Working Paper Nr. 19/2014
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Working paper
Empirical evidence suggests that there is substantial cross-firm variation in the extent of tax avoidance. However, this variation is not well understood. This paper provides a theoretical background for testing, and thus explaining, cross-firm differences in tax avoidance. We develop a formal model with two agents to analyze the incentives that lead firms to engage in tax avoidance. The tax avoidance decision is a function of moral hazard, tax-planning costs, and the potential to increase earnings. If the potential to increase earnings is low, the tax-planning decision is determined by moral-hazard problems. In contrast, when this potential is high, the tax-planning decision is mainly driven by taxplanning costs, such as reputational and political costs. One implication of our model is that moral hazard can (partly) explain why some firms do not engage in tax avoidance: Severe problems of moral hazard make tax avoidance less likely. Our model can be applied to test di� erences in tax avoidance between different types of firms.
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