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In: Informatica giuridica. Serie didattica 2
In: Maastricht journal of European and comparative law: MJ, Band 27, Heft 6, S. 705-719
ISSN: 2399-5548
The ethics and law of AI address the same domain, namely, the present and future impacts of AI on individuals, society, and the environment. Both are meant to provide normative guidance, proposing rules and values on which basis to govern human action and determine the constrains, structures and functions of AI-enabled socio-technical systems. This article examines the way in which AI is addressed by ethical and legal rules, principles and arguments. It considers the extent to which the demands of law and ethics may pull in different directions or rather overlap, and examines how they can be coordinated, while remaining in a productive dialectical tension. In particular, it argues that human/fundamental rights and social values are central to both ethics and law. Even though they can be framed in different ways, they can provide a useful normative reference for linking ethics and law in addressing the normative issues arising in connection with AI.
In: Maastricht journal of European and comparative law: MJ, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 564-575
ISSN: 2399-5548
I address the novelties contained in the "Proposal for a Data Protection Regulation", recently advanced by the EU Commission, with regard to providers' liabilities and the right to be forgotten. First I consider how the Proposal regulates the contentious overlap of e-commerce immunities and data protection rules. Then I examine providers' knowledge that illegal personal information has been uploaded on their platform, and discuss whether such knowledge should terminate providers' immunity. Finally, I critically assess the right to be forgotten, newly introduced in the Proposal, and the sanctions for its violation.
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I will address a challenge to mentalistic theories of norms, such as that developed by Cristiano Castelfranchi and Rosaria Conte, namely, the existence of large normative systems, which successfully direct people's thoughts and actions without being, in their entirety, mental contents of individual agents. I will argue that the cognitive attitudes and operations involved in compliance with normative systems are usually different from those involved in complying with isolated social norms. While isolated norms must be stored in the memory of the agents endorsing them, this does not happen with regard to large normative systems. In the latter case, the agent adopts a general policy-based intention to comply with the normative system as a whole, an intention that provides an abstract motivation for specific acts of compliance, once the agent has established that these acts are obligatory according the system. I will show how the endorsement of such a policy can be based on different individual attitudes, ranging from self-interest to altruistic, social or moral motivations. Finally, I will analyse how a normative system may both constrain powers and extend them, relying on this abstract motivation of its addressees.
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Working paper
In: Philosophical Dimensions of Human Rights, S. 293-307
In: Artificial Intelligence and Law, Forthcoming
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I shall argue for a sufficientist understanding of reasonableness in legal decision-making: cognitive or moral optimality are not required for reasonableness; what needed is just that a determination—be it epistemic or practical—is sufficiently good (acceptable, or at least not unacceptable). Correspondingly, judicial review on the ground of unreasonableness requires more than mere suboptimality: it requires failure to achieve the reasonableness threshold. To develop this idea, I shall first analyse the notions of rationality and reasonableness, examining the role they play in cognition. I shall then consider rationality in legal (and in particular legislative) decision-making, focusing on teleological reasoning. I shall consequently develop an idea of sufficientist reasonableness, by combining the idea of bounded rationality with the idea of deference, as required by institutional coordination in the legal process. Finally, I shall consider when a legislative determination can be considered irrational or unreasonable, and how this is related to the violation of constitutional requirements. ; 1. Introduction . 1 2. Reasonableness and Rationality . 1 3. The Process of Rational Problem-Solving in Individuals. 4 4. Rationality and Practical Determinations . 9 5. The Reflective Dimension of Reasoning. 11 6. Teleological Reasoning: Using Reason in the Pursuit of Goals or Values. 13 7. The Evaluation of Plans.15 8. Bounded Rationality and Teleology .18 9. The Evaluation of Outcomes . 19 10. Pareto Superiority. 20 11. Weighing Alternatives.21 12. Simplifying Evaluations. 24 13. The Rationality of Legislative Choices . 26 14. Constitutional Commitments and Legislative Rationality . 28 15. The Constitutional Evaluation of Legislative Choices: Reasonableness and Deference . 34 16. A Sufficientist Understanding of Proportionality.37 17. Constitutional Teleology and Implied Constitutional Norms . 42 18. Conclusion. 44 References . 45
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This paper aims at connecting two ideas that play a fundamental role in Robert Alexy's theory of legal reasoning, namely, on the one hand the idea of a dialogue and on the other hand the idea of a value (a goal to be realised in the political and legal domain). In particular, I shall argue that goal-oriented (teleological) considerations can contribute to determining the structure of dialectical interactions. Correspondingly, it is possible identify a variety of teleologically justified kinds of legal dialogues.
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In: Law, Governance and Technology Series 1
In: Springer eBook Collection
In the study of forms of legal reasoning, logic and argumentation theory long followed separate tracks. `Legal logicians' tended to focus on a deductive reconstruction of justifying a decision, disregarding the dialectical process leading to the chosen justification. Others instead emphasized the adversarial and discretionary nature of legal reasoning, involving reasonable evaluation of alternative choices, and the use of analogical reasoning. Recently, however, developments in Artificial Intelligence and Law have paved the way for overcoming this separation. Logic has widened its scope to defensible argumentation, and informal accounts of analogy and dialectics have inspired the construction of computer programs. Thus the prospect is emerging of an integrated logical and dialectical account of legal argument, adding to the understanding of legal reasoning, and providing a formal basis for computer tools that assist and mediate legal debates while leaving room for human initiative. This book presents contributions to this development. From a logical point of view it covers topics such as evaluating conflicting arguments, weighing reasons, modelling legal disputes as a dialogue game, the role of the burden of proof, the relation between principles, rules, reasons and facts, and the relation between deductive and nondeductive arguments. Written by leading scholars in the field and building on recent developments in logic and Artificial Intelligence, the chapters provide a state-of-the-art account of research on the logical aspects of legal argument
In: Philosophy & technology, Band 33, Heft 3, S. 433-465
ISSN: 2210-5441