A global map of amenities: Public goods, ethnic divisions and decentralization
In: Journal of development economics, Band 164, S. 103113
ISSN: 0304-3878
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In: Journal of development economics, Band 164, S. 103113
ISSN: 0304-3878
How to fight petty day-to-day corruption is a question often debated by politicians, by the public and in the economic literature. Early studies have noted that a simple and well-known way to fight day-to-day corruption is to create competition among corrupt officials. This paper shows that even a benevolent government might not encourage competition among officials in a way that eliminates corruption. This is due to a tradeoff between corruption and compliance costs. More differentiated bureaucratic services decrease compliance costs but increase the leeway for extortion. The analysis further reveals that exogenous shocks, for example in the form of foreign aid that aims to improve anti-corruption capacities, may prompt a benevolent government to increase the differentiation of bureaucratic services, thereby leading to an increase in corruption.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5683
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8660
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Working paper
This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental for a revenue-maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.
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In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 63, Heft 4, S. 377-398
ISSN: 1467-9485
AbstractWe analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5322
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 9701
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17220
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In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Band 63, Heft 4, S. 377-398
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In: Europäische Sicherheit & Technik: ES & T ; europäische Sicherheit, Strategie & Technik, Band 61, Heft 8, S. 80-84
ISSN: 2193-746X
Die Gefährdung von Informationssystemen betrifft Unternehmen und Behörden gleichermaßen. Ebenso wie Firmen-und Behördennetzwerke sind auch die Netzwerke der Bundeswehr einer Vielzahl von Gefährdungen ausgesetzt. Neben Zugriffsversuchen von Außenstehenden stellen auch unachtsames Verhalten eigener Mitarbeiter und nie ganz auszuschließende illegale Handlungen sogenannter Innentäter eine Gefahr für das Netz der Bundeswehr dar. (Europäische Sicherheit & Technik / SWP)
World Affairs Online
This data set provides predicted regional GDP per capita and weighted measures of regional inequality for 178 countries between 1992 and 2012. The income predictions are based on satellite night-time light data (stable lights from DMSP-OLS). A detailed description of the data set is available from the corresponding publication. Please quote our paper if you use the data for your research.
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