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On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies
In: Peace economics, peace science and public policy, Band 23, Heft 4
ISSN: 1554-8597
Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 4, S. 787-809
ISSN: 0003-0554
Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 4, S. 787-809
ISSN: 1537-5943
Military expenditures are often funded by debt, and sovereign borrowers are more likely to renege on debt-service obligations if they lose a war than if they win one or if peace prevails. This makes expected debt service costlier in peace, which can affect both crisis bargaining and war termination. I analyze a complete-information model where players negotiate in the shadow of power, whose distribution depends on their mobilization levels, which can be funded partially by borrowing. I show that players can incur debts that are unsustainable in peace because the opponent is unwilling to grant the concessions necessary to service them without fighting. This explanation for war is not driven by commitment problems or informational asymmetries but by the debt-induced inefficiency of peace relative to war. War results from actions that eliminate the bargaining range rather than from inability to locate mutually acceptable deals in that range.
Audience Cost Theory and Its Audiences
In: Security studies, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 376-382
ISSN: 1556-1852
Audience Cost Theory and Its Audiences
In: Security studies, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 376-383
ISSN: 0963-6412
How Wars End. By Dan Reiter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 320p. $65.00 cloth, $26.95 paper. - Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War. By Elizabeth A. Stanley. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009. 408p. $60.00 cloth
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 493-496
ISSN: 1541-0986
Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 493-496
ISSN: 1537-5927
How Wars End
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 493-496
ISSN: 1537-5927
Feigning Weakness
In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 3, S. 357-388
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractIn typical crisis bargaining models, strong actors must convince the opponent that they are not bluffing and the only way to do so is through costly signaling. However, in a war, strong actors can benefit from tactical surprise when their opponent mistakenly believes that they are weak. This creates contradictory incentives during the pre-war crisis: actors want to persuade the opponent of their strength to gain a better deal but, should war break out, they would rather have the opponent believe they are weak. I present an ultimatum crisis bargaining model that incorporates this dilemma and show that a strong actor may feign weakness during the bargaining phase. This implies that (1) absence of a costly signal is not an unambiguous revelation of weakness, (2) the problem of uncertainty is worse because the only actor with incentives to overcome it may be unwilling to do so, and (3) because of the difficulty with concealing resolve, democracies might be seriously disadvantaged in a crisis.
Feigning Weakness
In typical crisis bargaining models, strong actors must convince the opponent that they are not bluffing and the only way to do so is through costly signaling. However, in a war strong actors can benefit from tactical surprise when their opponent mistakenly believes that they are weak. This creates contradictory incentives during the pre-war crisis: actors want to persuade the opponent of their strength to gain a better deal but, should war break out, they would rather have the opponent believe they are weak. I present an ultimatum crisis bargaining model that incorporates this dilemma and show that a strong actor may feign weakness during the bargaining phase. This implies that (a) absence of a costly signal is not an unambiguous revelation of weakness,(b) the problem of uncertainty is worse because the only actor with incentives to overcome it may be unwilling to do so, and (c) because of the difficulty with concealing resolve, democracies might be seriously disadvantaged in a crisis.
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Feigning weakness
In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 3, S. 357-388
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
The Steps to War: An Empirical Study by Paul D. Senese and John A. Vasquez
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 124, Heft 2, S. 386-388
ISSN: 1538-165X
The Steps to War: An Empirical Study
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 124, Heft 2, S. 386-387
ISSN: 0032-3195
Trust and Mistrust in International Relations
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 4, Heft 3
ISSN: 1541-0986