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Preface --1. Credo --2. The Integral View --Preliminaries --3. Emotion --4. Disunity of Virtue --5. Character Traits --Arguments --6. Adverbial Requirements --7. Salience without a Black Box --8. Moral Deference and the Proto-authority of Affect --9. Recap with Courage --Consequences --10. Agents versus Acts --11. Against the Priority of Principle --12. Should Virtue Be Taught? --Acknowledgements --Notes --References --Index

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Credo -- 2. The Integral View -- Preliminaries -- 3. Emotion -- 4. Disunity of Virtue -- 5. Character Traits -- Arguments -- 6. Adverbial Requirements -- 7. Salience without a Black Box -- 8. Moral Deference and the Proto-authority of Affect -- 9. Recap with Courage -- Consequences -- 10. Agents versus Acts -- 11. Against the Priority of Principle -- 12. Should Virtue Be Taught? -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- Index

This book discusses Locke's theory of property from both a critical and an interpretative standpoint. The author first develops a comprehensive interpretation of Locke's argument for the legitimacy of private property, and then examines the extent to which the argument is really serviceable in defense of that institution. He contends that a purified version of Locke's argument--one that adheres consistently to the logic of Locke's text while excluding considerations extraneous to his logic--actually does establish the legitimacy of a form of private property. This version, which is both defensible in contemporary, secular terms and is, essentially, egalitarian, should provoke a reassessment of the nature of Locke's relevance to contemporary discussions of distributive justice.

This book discusses Locke's theory of property from both a critical and an interpretative standpoint. The author first develops a comprehensive interpretation of Locke's argument for the legitimacy of private property, and then examines the extent to which the argument is really serviceable in defense of that institution. He contends that a purified version of Locke's argument--one that adheres consistently to the logic of Locke's text while excluding considerations extraneous to his logic--actually does establish the legitimacy of a form of private property. This version, which is both defens.

AbstractJohn Locke affirms a right to revolt against tyranny, but he denies that a minority of citizens is at liberty to exercise it unless a majority of their fellow citizens concurs in their judgment that the government is a tyranny. In a recent article, Massimo Renzo takes an equivalent position, on which a revolutionary vanguard requires the consent of the domestic majority before being permitted to revolt. Against Locke and Renzo, I argue that a minority of citizens can have a liberty to revolt, whatever the domestic majority may hold. My argument concentrates on the moral force of majority rule, which turns out to presuppose the satisfaction of a number of background conditions. When any of these conditions fails to obtain, no domestic majority can justifiably block a minority's liberty to revolt against tyranny. For the purposes of the theory of revolution, this minority has to be large enough to have a reasonable prospect of (military) success. Without that prospect, the minority will be anyhow forbidden to revolt, on grounds familiar from just war theory. However, for the purposes of the theory of political legitimacy, prospects of success are irrelevant. All that matters are the conditions under which any citizen is released from their ordinary duty not to overthrow the government.

"Injustice and Inequalities in Health" published on by Oxford University Press.

I distinguish four different interpretations of 'equality of opportunity.' We get four interpretations because a neglected ambiguity in 'opportunity' intersects a well-known ambiguity in 'equality.' The neglected ambiguity holds between substantive and non-substantive conceptions of 'opportunity' and the well-known ambiguity holds between comparative and non-comparative conceptions of 'equality.' Among other things, distinguishing these four interpretations reveals how misleading 'equal opportunity for advantage' formulations of luck egalitarianism can be. These formulations are misleading in so far as they obscure the difference between two separate claims about which inequalities are consistent with true equality. Luck egalitarianism claims that inequalities that have been chosen in some suitable sense are consistent with true equality, while the traditional ideal of equality of opportunity only claims that inevitable inequalities that have been determined through fair competitions are consistent with true equality. Obscuring the difference between these two claims therefore serves both to arrogate the rhetorical advantages of the traditional ideal to luck egalitarianism and to cover over a limitation to luck egalitarianism's ambition to provide a comprehensive principle of distributive justice. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

I distinguish four different interpretations of 'equality of opportunity.' We get four interpretations because a neglected ambiguity in 'opportunity' intersects a well-known ambiguity in 'equality.' The neglected ambiguity holds between substantive and non-substantive conceptions of 'opportunity' and the well-known ambiguity holds between comparative and non-comparative conceptions of 'equality.' Among other things, distinguishing these four interpretations reveals how misleading 'equal opportunity for advantage' formulations of luck egalitarianism can be. These formulations are misleading in so far as they obscure the difference between two separate claims about which inequalities are consistent with true equality. Luck egalitarianism claims that inequalities that have been chosen in some suitable sense are consistent with true equality, while the traditional ideal of equality of opportunity only claims that inevitable inequalities that have been determined through fair competitions are consistent with true equality. Obscuring the difference between these two claims therefore serves both to arrogate the rhetorical advantages of the traditional ideal to luck egalitarianism and to cover over a limitation to luck egalitarianism's ambition to provide a comprehensive principle of distributive justice.

In this article, I explore some advantages of viewing well-being in terms of an individual's health status. Principally, I argue that this perspective makes it easier to establish that rich countries at least have an obligation to transfer 1 percent of their GDP to poor countries. If properly targeted at the fundamental determinants of health in developing countries, this transfer would very plausibly yield a disproportionate `bang for the buck' in terms of individual well-being. This helps to explain how the obligation can be both light enough in its burden on the rich to avoid being `too demanding' and yet also bountiful enough in its effects to be worthy of the status of a `minimum obligation'. The advantages I enunciate are particularly relevant to establishing an obligation in the context of a non-ideal theory of international justice, which aims to set interim targets for practical action before an ideal theory has been settled.

This paper discusses obligations of international distributive justice-specifically, obligations rich countries have to transfer resources to poor countries. It argues that the major seven OECD countries each have an obligation to transfer at least one percent of their GDP to developing countries.The strategy of the paper is to defend this position without having to resolve the many debates that attend questions of international distributive justice. In this respect, it belongs to the neglected category of nonideal theory. The key to the strategy is to show that a significant amount of good would be accomplished by a one percent transfer, despite the fact that one percent is quite a small amount.To make this showing, the paper takes health as a fundamental measure of individual well-being and examines the improvement in life expectancy that would likely result from devoting the one percent transfer to the major determinants of health. It adduces data indicating that substantial progress towards raising life expectancy in developing countries to the global average of 64.5 years can be expected from expenditures of $125 per capita, divided between health care, education, and basic nutrition and income support. A one percent transfer from the major seven is enough to cover expenditures on that scale for the poorest fifth of the world's population.

Proposes a strategy of global distributive justice which requires that the "major seven" countries of the OECD transfer one percent of their GDP to worse-off states; examines how this money could help improve health, using life expectancy as the measure. Includes the role of ideal theory and nonideal theory.