Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Erfolgsbedingungen politischer Parteien im frankophonen Afrika -- Inhalt -- Abkürzungsverzeichnis -- Vorwort -- 1. Einleitung -- 2. Theoretische und konzeptionelle Grundlagen -- 2.1 Parteienforschung zu Afrika: Konjunktur und Stand eines vernachlässigten Forschungsfeldes -- 2.1.1 Frühe Parteienforschung in Afrika -- 2.1.2 Renaissance der Parteienforschung zu Afrika -- 2.1.3 Forschungsbedarf und Fragestellung -- 2.2 Anwendung der Vergleichenden Methode und Forschungsdesign -- 2.2.1 Der Vergleich als Methode -- 2.2.2 Vergleichsstrategien -- 2.2.3 Von der Fragestellung zur Variablenordnung -- 2.2.4 Fallauswahl -- 2.3 Theoretische Ansätze und Generierung eines Analyserasters -- 2.3.1 Sozialstrukturelle Ansätze -- 2.3.2 Institutionelle Ansätze -- 2.3.3 Systemtheoretisch-funktionalistische Ansätze -- 2.3.4 Organisationstheoretische Ansätze -- 2.3.5 Ökonomische Ansätze -- 2.3.6 Typologiebildende Ansätze -- 2.3.7 Analyseraster -- 2.3.8 Forschungsinstrumente -- 3. Nationale Faktoren als intervenierende Variablen -- 3.1 Stand der Demokratisierung -- 3.1.1 Demokratiekonzept und -messung -- 3.1.2 Benin -- 3.1.3 Burkina Faso -- 3.1.4 Varianz der ersten intervenierenden Variable -- 3.2 Institutionelles Arrangement -- 3.2.1 Institutionenbegriff und Auswahl zentraler Institutionen -- 3.2.2 Benin -- 3.2.3 Burkina Faso -- 3.2.4 Varianz der zweiten intervenierenden Variable -- 3.3 Historische und sozialstrukturelle Besonderheiten -- 3.3.1 Was sind nationale Besonderheiten? -- 3.3.2 Benin -- 3.3.3 Burkina Faso -- 4. Angebotsbezogene Merkmale politischer Parteien in Benin und Burkina Faso -- 4.1 Analysedimension 1: Organisationsmerkmale -- 4.1.1 Parteistruktur -- 4.1.2 Materielle Ausstattung -- 4.1.3 Vernetzung -- 4.1.4 Mitgliederbasis -- 4.2 Analysedimension 2: Repräsentationsmerkmale -- 4.2.1 Parteigenese -- 4.2.2 Programmatik -- 4.2.3 Spitzenpersonal

The creation of constitutional courts is a political affair because the judicial review of laws and competences potentially curb the power of the elected branches. This paper seeks to refine the explanations for both the spread of constitutional courts and the extent of their formal independence. Our comparison of nine former French colonies in West Africa that have all introduced constitutional courts since 1990 is built on (a) the combination of the two competing theories of international diffusion and domestic strategic action and (b) a new, theoretically and arithmetically refined index of formal independence. The empirical analysis in this area of similar political context supports the argument that global trends and "natural" foreign reference models (namely, France) set a minimum standard and that interests in political insurance determine the deviations from (in this case Gallic) institutional diffusion. As Francophone West Africa is one of the most dynamic arenas of third wave democratic experiments, these findings offer not only insight into a largely neglected geographic area but also a better general understanding of the political role of constitutional courts in new democracies with a colonial past.

In the early 1990s most African countries carried out extensive reforms of their electoral regimes. Adopting a historical institutionalist approach, this paper critically examines the role of institutional path dependence in accounting for the setup of six African electoral regimes. For this purpose, we distinguish between different types of path dependence. The paper further analyzes the extent to which the development of electoral institutions contributed to the regime-type outcome (democratic/hybrid/autocratic). The main emphasis herein is on so-called "hybrid regimes"; in other words, regimes existing in the grey zone between democracy and autocracy. The paper finds that, while institutional path dependence has a limited but important impact on the setup of the electoral regimes, it is ultimately the process of decision-making during critical junctures that accounts for the regime type outcome. Hybrid regimes lack long-term institutional ownership. -- hybrid regimes ; democratization ; historical institutionalism ; electoral institutions ; Africa

Scholars of institutional design attribute large importance to the choice of new institutions. The comparative analysis of how Rwanda and Zambia crafted their new electoral systems and the systems of government regards procedural, structural and rational choice variables which may influence the option for particular solutions. External influences and the type of transition are determinants that can decide which actors make their interests prevail. The degree of innovation or conservatism of new institutions is mainly a result of the speed of the process and the kind of actors involved. However, rational reflections on how to produce legitimacy and minimize personal risks which take into consideration the state of conflict in the country decide on the speed and on innovative outcomes. The structured analysis of only two cases uncovers already that it is rather difficult to realise the transfer of design recommendations into reality. -- institutions ; institutional design ; transition ; electoral system ; Rwanda ; Zambia