Suchergebnisse

"In this new edition of Foundations for Moral Relativism a distinguished moral philosopher tames a bugbear of current debate about cultural difference. J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes". The six self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual worlds, lying in Russian and truth-telling in Quechua, the pleasure of solitude and the fear of absurdity. Accessibly written, this book presupposes no prior training in philosophy. "--Publisher's website

The article presents three essays part of the undergraduate course on "NBFuture PersonsNB' (NYU, 2007). In part I the author starts off with Parfits perception of treating future persons, given that any attempt to treat them better may result in them never being born. The author argues that even if this empirical assumption were false, the problem would remain, and neither group would find harm or benefit by what is done. Part II and III are a development of a solution, articulating first a conception of how personal obligations are incurred on someone by bringing him into existence, the supposed gift of life therefore no longer a compensation for the wrong done in disregarding the possibilities for human flourishing or suffering in the future. In part III, Parfits non-identity problem is addressed through the results of part II. References. Adapted from the source document.