Oil and international cooperation
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 85-97
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
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In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 85-97
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 85-97
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 209-222
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
In: International Studies Quarterly, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 209-222
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 108, Heft 3, S. 389-434
ISSN: 2161-7953
Customary international law (CIL) is widely recognized as a fundamental source of international law. While its continued significance in the age of treaties was once contested, it is now generally accepted that CIL remains a vital element of the international legal order. Yet CIL is also plagued with conceptual and practical difficulties, which have led critics to challenge its coherence and legitimacy. In particular, critics of CIL have argued that it does not meaningfully affect state behavior. Traditional CIL scholarship is ill equipped to answer such criticism because its objectives are doctrinal or normative—namely, to identify, interpret, and apply CIL rules, or to argue for desirable changes in CIL. For the most part, that scholarship does not propose an explanatory theory in the social scientific sense, which would articulate how CIL works, why states comply, and why and how rules change.
In: American journal of international law, Band 108, Heft 3, S. 389-434
ISSN: 0002-9300
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 68, Heft 1, S. 77-110
ISSN: 1531-5088
Do international court judgments influence the behavior of actors other than the parties to a dispute? Are international courts agents of policy change or do their judgments merely reflect evolving social and political trends? We develop a theory that specifies the conditions under which international courts can use their interpretive discretion to have system-wide effects. We examine the theory in the context of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rulings on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) issues by creating a new data set that matches these rulings with laws in all Council of Europe (CoE) member states. We also collect data on LGBT policies unaffected by ECtHR judgments to control for the confounding effect of evolving trends in national policies. We find that ECtHR judgments against one country substantially increase the probability of national-level policy change across Europe. The marginal effects of the judgments are especially high where public acceptance of sexual minorities is low, but where national courts can rely on ECtHR precedents to invalidate domestic laws or where the government in power is not ideologically opposed to LGBT equality. We conclude by exploring the implications of our findings for other international courts. Adapted from the source document.
In: 68:1 International Organization 77-110 (2014)
SSRN
In: American Journal of International Law, Band 108, S. 389-434
SSRN
In: International organization, Band 68, Heft 1, S. 77-110
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractDo international court judgments influence the behavior of actors other than the parties to a dispute? Are international courts agents of policy change or do their judgments merely reflect evolving social and political trends? We develop a theory that specifies the conditions under which international courts can use their interpretive discretion to have system-wide effects. We examine the theory in the context of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rulings on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) issues by creating a new data set that matches these rulings with laws in all Council of Europe (CoE) member states. We also collect data on LGBT policies unaffected by ECtHR judgments to control for the confounding effect of evolving trends in national policies. We find that ECtHR judgments against one country substantially increase the probability of national-level policy change across Europe. The marginal effects of the judgments are especially high where public acceptance of sexual minorities is low, but where national courts can rely on ECtHR precedents to invalidate domestic laws or where the government in power is not ideologically opposed to LGBT equality. We conclude by exploring the implications of our findings for other international courts.
In: International Studies Quarterly, Band 59, S. 209-222
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
In: International organization, Band 68, Heft 1, S. 77-110
ISSN: 0020-8183
In: Journal of peace research, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 79-97
ISSN: 0022-3433
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of peace research, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 79-97
ISSN: 1460-3578
Are violators of international human rights norms punished with lower levels of foreign aid? Despite their abstract preferences, governments often lack the incentive to punish norm violators bilaterally. Multilateral lending institutions, such as the World Bank, could fill the void if they wanted to consider human rights abuses and could bypass restrictions on evaluating the political character of recipients. This article argues that `shaming' in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, through resolutions that explicitly criticized governments for their human rights records, provided substantive information about rights abuses and gave political cover for the World Bank and other liberal multilateral aid institutions seeking to sanction human rights violators. Statistical analyses support these theoretical claims. The adoption of a UNCHR resolution condemning a country's human rights record produced a sizeable reduction in multilateral, and especially World Bank, aid but had no effect on the country's aggregate bilateral aid receipts. The analyses also support predictions that `objective' measures of human rights have no independent effect on multilateral aid allocations. The findings, which are robust to different model techniques and specifications, suggest that punishment for violating international human rights norms is selective, that international organizations play an important role in the selection process and, thus, that seemingly symbolic resolutions of a politically motivated IO can carry tangible consequences.