Equilibrium impotence: why the states and not the American national government financed economic development in the Antebellum era
In: NBER working paper series 11397
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In: NBER working paper series 11397
In: NBER working paper series 11080
In: NBER working paper series 10753
In: NBER working paper series 10451
In: The Manchester School
ISSN: 1467-9957
AbstractHuman productivity began increasing in the mid‐19th century in a group of societies whose institutional structures simultaneously transformed. This paper develops a general way of thinking about institutional structures and identifies how specific institutional changes that occurred in the mid‐19th century could have caused an increase in productivity across many of the organizations in a society. External rules enforced by one organization but used by other organizations, are central to the argument, as is the emergence of impersonal rules that apply equally to all citizens. The productivity revolution of the late 19th century occurred in an era when a few societies adopted impersonal rules on a broad scale for the first time in human history.
In: The journal of economic history, Band 82, Heft 2, S. 335-367
ISSN: 1471-6372
In the middle of the nineteenth century, a handful of societies began creating and enforcing impersonal rules, rules that treat everyone the same, on a broad scale. The existing institutional literatures, while appreciating the importance of impersonal rules for the rule of law, have not understood how they contribute to economic and political development through rules that are enforced but not followed: default rules. The conceptual importance of impersonal default rules is drawn out and then applied to better understand both economic and political development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In: The journal of economic history, Band 76, Heft 3, S. 937-947
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: Journal of institutional economics, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 589-593
ISSN: 1744-1382
Abstract:This article provides comments on the article titled 'Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History' by Ha-Joon Chang.
In: The journal of economic history, Band 65, Heft 1, S. 211-256
ISSN: 1471-6372
Between 1842 and 1852, eleven states adopted new constitutions, simultaneously creating procedures for issuing government debt and for chartering corporations through general incorporation acts. Why simultaneously? Voters wanted geographically specific infrastructure investments but opposed geographically widespread taxation. States resolved the dilemma by developing several innovative public finance schemes. One, "taxless finance," used borrowed funds and special corporate privileges without raising current taxes. Another scheme, "benefit taxation," coordinated the incidence of taxes with the geographic benefits of investments through the property tax. After the fiscal crisis of the early 1840s, states changed their constitutions to eliminate taxless finance in the future.
In: Explorations in economic history: EEH, Band 40, Heft 3, S. 223-250
ISSN: 0014-4983
In: Explorations in economic history: EEH, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 140-170
ISSN: 0014-4983
In: The journal of economic history, Band 56, Heft 1, S. 258-259
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: Independent Review, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 295-297
In: The journal of economic history, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 243-244
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: Explorations in economic history: EEH, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 45-72
ISSN: 0014-4983