Causal scientific explanations from machine learning
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 202, Heft 6
ISSN: 1573-0964
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 202, Heft 6
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: AI and ethics
ISSN: 2730-5961
AbstractTo monitor and prevent bias in AI systems, we can use a wide range of (statistical) fairness measures. However, it is mathematically impossible to optimize all of these measures at the same time. In addition, optimizing a fairness measure often greatly reduces the accuracy of the system (Kozodoi et al., Eur J Oper Res 297:1083–1094, 2022). As a result, we need a substantive theory that informs us how to make these decisions and for what reasons. I show that by using Rawls' notion of justice as fairness, we can create a basis for navigating fairness measures and the accuracy trade-off. In particular, this leads to a principled choice focusing on both the most vulnerable groups and the type of fairness measure that has the biggest impact on that group. This also helps to close part of the gap between philosophical accounts of distributive justice and the fairness literature that has been observed by (Kuppler et al. Distributive justice and fairness metrics in automated decision-making: How much overlap is there? arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.01441, 2021), and to operationalise the value of fairness.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 197, Heft 9, S. 3779-3796
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 197, Heft 3, S. 1241-1261
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 507-509
ISSN: 1467-9981
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 194, Heft 6, S. 2233-2250
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: AI and ethics
ISSN: 2730-5961
AbstractRelevancy is a prevalent term in value alignment. We either need to keep track of the relevant moral reasons, we need to embed the relevant values, or we need to learn from the relevant behaviour. What relevancy entails in particular cases, however, is often ill-defined. The reasons for this are obvious, it is hard to define relevancy in a way that is both general and concrete enough to give direction towards a specific implementation. In this paper, we describe the inherent difficulty that comes along with defining what is relevant to a particular situation. Simply due to design and the way an AI system functions, we need to state or learn particular goals and circumstances under which that goal is completed. However, because of both the changing nature of the world and the varied wielders and users of such implements, misalignment occurs, especially after a longer amount of time. We propose a way to counteract this by putting contestability front and centre throughout the lifecycle of an AI system, as it can provide insight into what is actually relevant at a particular instance. This allows designers to update the applications in such a manner that they can account for oversight during design.
In: AI and ethics, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 1-3
ISSN: 2730-5961