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The European Union is confronted with the biggest enlargement in its history: ten states, among them eight middle European - the so called "buffer zone" in the new European migration landscape - will become members in 2004. Other candidates hope to join in the coming years. For all Eastern and Eastern European countries, including those that are not candidates, the end of the bi-polar world meant a hope of "return to Europe". When shifting its borders to the East, the European Union both includes and excludes. The final objective to achieve Europe as "a space of freedom, security and justice", is conditioned by the capacity and necessity to control the migratory flows. The prospect of free circulation for the citizens of the new Union members entails also fears: the EU countries are afraid of the consequences the enlargement would have on migratory flows from the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe and which transit through that area. The perception of migrants as a threat inspired the conditions that the Union imposed on the candidate countries concerning migration policy issues and which mostly focus on the protection of its Eastern borders. For the future Union members however, protecting of the thousand of kilometers of their Eastern border, implies a number of quite different problems. These countries are afraid of the impact the restrictive measures they are obliged to implement would have both on many economic and family ties which have been maintained since the socialist period and on more recently engaged cooperation with the neighbours which are not candidates. The challenge of enlargement is different therefore for the EU members, for the candidate countries and for those who are for the moment excluded from the process. The fears do not seem to be always grounded. Thus, the impact of enlargement which, it was feared, could have been so destabilizing for the Union because of potentially large migration flows, is more likely to be destabilizing for the new candidate countries, especially concerning their relations with their neighbours excluded from the enlargement process.

The goal of paper is to put into focus and explain essential features of the political development in Lithuania during second post-communist decade by means of its comparison with the analoguos processes in other Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) and in those Central European countries with political systems which resemble most closely Lithuanian case (Poland and Hungary). In all these countries, second post-communist decade witnessed the rise of the new successful populist parties. The author argues that this populist rise is the proper context for the understanding of Rolandas Paksas' impeachment in Lithuania in 2003–2004. His Order and Justice party has to be classified together with the brothers Kaczynski's Law and Justice party and its even more radical allies in Poland, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz and Gábor Vona's Jobbik in Hungary, Juhan Part's Res Publica in Estonia and Einars Repše's New Era in Latvia. They were all right-wing populist parties, proclaiming in their anti-establishment rhetoric the war on corruption of the (ex-communist) elite and the coming of "new politics". While the rise of right-wing populism did not change the political system in the former bureaucratic authoritarian countries Estonia and Latvia, in Hungary and Poland the outcome was the breakup of the implicit ex-communist and anti-communist elite pact which was the foundation of the political stability in these former countries of national communism. The Kaczynski twins founded Rzecz Pospolita IV (4th Republic of Poland), grounded in the thorough and comprehensive lustration of the ex-communist cadres. Fidesz leader Victor Orban used the two thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament to promulgate a new constitution. Lithuania is unique in that the ex-communist and anti-communist elite pact was not abolished, but preserved and consolidated due to the collaboration of all, by this time, "established" and Left-of-centre populist parties during the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment of Paksas can be considered as the stress test of the young Lithuanian liberal democracy, just on the eve of the accession of Lithuania to the EU and NATO. An unhappy peculiarity of the stress tests is that they sometimes break or damage the items tested. As far as the success in impeaching R.Paksas prevented the transformation of liberal post-communism into populist post-communism in Lithuania, the test was a success. However, against the expectation of many observers of impeachment events, it did not enhance the quality of democracy of Lithuania. The legacy of impeachment are disequilibrium of the balance of power between government branches in favour of the Constitutional Court, strengthening of the Left-of-Centre populist political forces and the interference of secret services into Lithuanian politics with the self-assumed mission to safeguard Lithuanian democracy from the perils of populism.

euenergy policy objectives are directed at three highly interdependent areas: energy supply security, competitiveness and decarbonization to prevent climate change. In this paper, we focus on the issue of energy supply security. Security of energy supply for the immediate and medium-term future is a necessary condition in the current context of the global political economy for the survival of the Union and its component member states. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, energy policy no longer comes onto the agenda of the European Commission through the backdoor of the common market, environment and competitiveness. The Treaty created a new legal basis for the internal energy market. However, securing external supplies as well as deciding the energy mix, remain matters of national prerogative, though within the constraints of other parts of eu's legislation in force. Without a common defense policy, the highly import dependent Union and its members face external instability in the energy rich Arab Middle East and North Africa.Concern about energy security has been triggered by declining European energy production as well as the strain on global demand exerted by newly industrializing economies such as China and India and the Middle East, as well as the political instability in this reserve-rich part of the world. This paper explores the following two topics [1] the current situation and past trends in production, supply, demand and trade in energy in the eu, against the background of major changes in the last half decade and [2] threats to the security of the supply of oil and natural gas from import regions.Fossil fuel import dependence in the eu is expected to continue to increase in the coming two decades. As global trends show, and despite new fields in the Caspian region and the Eastern Mediterranean, conventional fossil oil and gas resources remain concentrated in fewer geopolitically unstable regions and countries (i.e. the Middle East and North Africa (mena) and the Caspian Region (cr) including Russia), while global demand for fossil energy is expected to substantially increase also within the energy rich Gulf countries. This combination directly impacts eu energy supply security. It should be noted that the trend towards higher levels of import dependence was not interrupted when the era of low energy prices, between 1980 and 2003, came to an end.Within the eu itself, domestic resistance to the development of unconventional resources is an obstacle to investment in unconventional sources in this part of the high-income world. This should therefore not put at risk investments in either renewables or alternative sources at home or conventional resources mainly in the Arab-Middle East.The situation is exacerbated by the spread of instability in the Arab-Middle Eastern countries. There are three domestic and geopolitical concerns to be taken into consideration:(1) In the Arab-Middle East, threats to eu energy supply security originate in the domestic regime of these countries. Almost all Arab resource-rich countries belong to a type ofpatrimonial, rentier-type of state-society relation. These regimes rely on rents from the exploitation of energy resources and the way in which rents are distributed.Regimes of this type are being challenged. Their economies show uneven economic development, centralized power structures, corruption and poverty at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The discrimination of females is a major obstacle to the development of the service sector. At present, even the monarchies fear the spread of violent conflict.Offshoots of these consequences have proven to cause civil unrest, exemplified by what optimists have called the 'Arab Spring.'(2) The second concern is the domestic and global impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds (swfs) managed by Arab patrimonial rentier states. swfs have proven to be an asset in both developing and developed economies due to their ability to buffer the 'Dutch Disease,' and to encourage industrialization, economic diversification and eventually the development of civil society. In patrimonial states, however, swfs are affected by corruption and the diversion of funds away from long-term socioeconomic development to luxury consumption by political elites. In fact, Arab swfs underpin the persistence of the Arab patrimonial rentier state system.(3) Finally, the post-Cold War, me and cea geopolitical landscape is shifting. The emergence of China and other Asian economies has increased their presence in the Middle East due to a growing need for energy and the expansion of Asian markets. The recent discovery of energy resources in the us has led to speculation that there will be less us presence in the region. There would be a serious risk to eu energy security if emerging Asian economies were to increase their presence in the Middle East as us interests recede.

SUMMARY:
Georgii Kasianov explores the emergence of a new, integrative historical narrative aimed at creating loyal citizens of the new state in Ukraine in the past two decades. In the center of his discussion is the debates surrounding the man-maid famine of 1932–1933 in the context of Ukrainian historical memory. Kasianov notes that memory of the Soviet period in Ukraine is shaped first by the fact that most people experienced the Soviet regime first hand, and, second, due to the presence of virtually unreformed state institutions and elites. Correspondingly, the new elite attempts to build positive memories of the Soviet past in the new narrative of the national past, whereas negative memory of the Soviet period serves to legitimize the post-Communist regime. Memory is effectively turned by the elite into a "buffer zone" that protects the regime from attacks by those who demand a post-Communist "Nurnberg". The emerging consensus between former Communists and current nationalist democrats with respect to Ukrainian statehood allowed for the creation of a standardized narrative of the national past, into which memory of the famine of 1932–1933 is written. Unlike famines of 1921–1923 and 1947, which were reported by Soviet historians, the famine of 1932–1933 were covered up by the Soviets. Due to the attention paid in recent years to the famine of 1932–1933 (called Holodomor after the émigré Ukrainian tradition), it became the major symbol of national past with multiple roles in the public discourse and politics. Kasianov surveys attempts by émigré Ukrainians to bring forward a discussion of the famine during the Soviet period as well as discusses the process of gathering momentum in revealing information about it in the late 1980s. As the society learned more about the horrors of the famine, the return of the memory occurred in the context of the emerging Ukrainian national narrative of the past and the famine became one of the central pillars of the national traumatic past. It also served to prove that the Bolshevik regime was a force external to Ukraine. Despite official participation in events commemorating the famine, the post-Communist regime was also careful to brake before demands for a trial of those responsible could gain ground. The famine became the instrument of different fractions of the political elite in their struggles for the appropriation of the national narrative of the past.

Kasianov explores various interpretations of the famine by historians, discussing the range of terms used to describe the hunger ("famine", "famine-genocide", "ethnocide", "Holodomor", "Ukrainian Holocaust", etc). Despite the ambivalence of the term, Kasianov argues in favor of describing the famine of 1932-1933 as genocide on the basis of the UNO Convention of 1948. Kasianov also discusses the numbers of victims and notes that for the most part public discourse on that aspect of the tragedy is mired in politics.

Overall, Kasianov concludes, the discovery of the genocidal famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine became a founding element of the national narrative of the past and debates about it helped distance Ukraine from the Soviet past and forge and strengthen a sense of belonging to the Ukrainian national community. At the same time, memory of the famine was always present, especially among the rural population, which facilitated the topic becoming a central element of the public discourse. As the situation changed and the by the beginning of the 2000s the issue of the genocidal famine acquired the status of a national tragedy and part of the national mythology, the discourses on the famine by historians and by the public increasingly parted, as the first became more rational and the second remained trapped in the mythological stage. The famine remains an instrument of political struggles, while at the same time there is more discussion of non-Ukrainians as victims of the genocide. Nevertheless, there is little discussion of the local executioners of the Moscow-directed policy. Finally, Kasianov believes that there is no single structure in the debates on the famine and that Ukraine did not acquire "a Holocaust industry" of its own.

SummaryChanges that occurred in the social organization of the mountainous Greek village of Stavroupolis are restudied twenty years later in the light of changes that have taken place in rural mountainous Appalachia of the United States. The re‐study has shown that overall patterns of change in social organization of the Greek village are similar to those of mountainous Appalachia. The differences were due primarily to sociocultural differences between the two societies.Findings suggest that a crucial indirect function of the availability of jobs in cities was further weakening of the boundary maintenance mechanisms of the rural social system through increased interaction with the outside and, furthermore, the increased use of the outside as a reference group that led to further out‐migration.For at least some communities, those with limited economic potential in particular, this mutual dependence between out‐migration and sociopsychological linkage with the larger society, continued until out‐migration became a mass exodus, and in some cases the village social organization almost collapsed. These processes are taking place in a number of less developed societies today.The integration of the rural into the larger society takes place primarily in terms of acquisition of higher income and standard of living; the themes of the larger culture. As a consequence, the central axis of integration into the larger society and, in turn, the function, at least today, is the support of economic institutions. followed by government and education, whose indirect but major function, at least today, is the support of economic institutions. The role of the family is dual: to directly help integration into the larger society and to act as a buffer for discords and rapid changes in other institutions mainly produced by the economy. The latter is also the role rural religion is expected to play in the future.RésuméA la lumière des changements qui ont eu lieu dans les régions mon‐tagneuses rurales des Appalaches des Etats Unis, cet article réétudie après vingt ans les changements qui ont pris place dans ľ organisation sociale du village grec de montagne de Stavroupolis. La nouvelle étude a montré que le changement social dans le village grec est identique dans ses grandes lignes à celui qui à eu lieu dans les Appalaches. Les différences sont dues en premier lieu aux ifferences socio‐culturelles entre les deux sociétés.Les résultats montrent qu'une fonction indirecte de première importance de ľoffre ?emplois dans les villes a été?affaiblir encore les mécanismes qui maintenaient le système social dans ses frontiéres spatiales, en raison de ľinteraction croissante avec le monde extérieur et de la tendance toujours plus marquée à prendre le monde extéerieur pour groupe de référence, tendance qui entraina une nouvelle augmentation de ľémmigration.Au moins pour quelques unes des communes, surtout celles à potentiel économique restraint, cette dépendence mutuelle entre émigration et liens socio‐psychologiques avec la société urbaine dura jusqu'à ce que ľémigration se transforme en exode. Dans quelques cas, ľorganisation sociale des villages s'écroula presque. Ces processus ont lieu encore a ľheure actuelle dans quelques sociéteslashs peu développdées.ľintégration du système social rural dans un système social plus large a lieu surtout par ľintermédiaire de ľacquisition ?un revenu et ?un niveau de vie plus élevés ‐ les valeurs de la société dominante. En conséquence, ľéconomie fournit ľaxe central ?intégration dans la société dominante, et est en même temps ľinstitution qui est la plus soumise à la nécessité de réussir. Elle est suivit par le gouvernement et ľéducation, dont le rôle indirect mais central est ‐ tout au moins de nos jours ‐ ?assister ľinstitution économique. Le rôle de la famille est double: aider directement ľ Intéigration dans la société dominante, et former un tampon contre les discordances et les changements rapides dans ?autres institutions que produit surtout ľéconomie. Ce dernier rôle est aussi celui que Ton s'attend à voir joué dans le futur par la religion rurale.ZusammenfassungIn dieser Arbeit werden die Veränderungen in der sozialen Organisation des griechischen Bergdorfes Stavroupolis zwanzig Jahre später auf dem Hintergrund von sozialen Entwicklungen in länd‐lichen Berggebieten der Appalachen in den USA nochmals untersucht. Die Untersuchung zeigt, daß die groben Muster des sozialen Wandels in dem griechischen Dorf ähnlich sind denen in den Appalachen. Die Unterschiede sind in erster Linie auf soziokulturelle Verschiedenheiten der beiden Gesellschaften zurückzuführen.Die Ergebnisse zeigen, daß eine zentrale indirekte Funktion der Verfügbarkeit von Arbeitsplätzen in den Städten in einer weiteren Schwächung der Mechanismen bestehen, die das ländliche Sozial‐system in seinen räumlichen Grenzen zusammenhalten. Dies ist bedingt durch die damit verbundene anwachsende Interaktion mit der Außenwelt und der zunehmenden Tendenz, die Außenwelt als Bezugsgruppe anzunehmen, was zu einer weiteren Abwanderungs‐bewegung führt.Zumindest für einige Gemeinden, vor allem denjenigen mit be‐schränktem ökonomischem Potential hiclt diese gcgenseitdgc Abhängigkeit zwischen Abwanderung und sozial‐psychologischer Verbin‐dung mit dcr städtischen Gcsellschaft so langc an, bis die Abwanderung zum massenhaften Wegzug führte, und in einigen Fällen brach die soziale Organisation der Dörfer beinahe zusammen. Diese Pro‐zesse finden in einigen weniger entwickelten Gesellschaften heute noch statt.Die Integration des ländlichen in ein umfassenderes soziales System geschieht hauptsächlich über das Erreichen eines höheren Einkommens und Lebensstandards, den Werten der Gesamtgesellschaft. Als Konsequenz davon ist die Wirtschaft die zentrale Achse für die Integration in die Gesamtgesellschaft und zugleich die Institution, die am meisten unter Erfolgszwang steht, gefolgt von dem Regierungs‐ und Erziehungssystem, deren indirekte aber hauptsächliche Funktion heut‐zutage darin besteht, die Wirtschaft zu fördern. Die Familie hat eine doppelte Rolle: erstens die Integration in die umfassendere Gesell‐schaft direkt zu unterstützen, und zweitens als ein Puffer für Unstim‐migkeiten und rapiden Wandel, den die Wirtschaft hauptsächlich in anderen Institutionen erzeugt, zu wirken. Die letztere Rolle wird in Zukunft auch von der ländlichen Religion ausgefüllt werden.

SummaryPROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN REGIONS OF CONCENTHATION GERHARD ISBARYModern planning is an expression of society in evolution. It finds itself in the polarity between planning undertaken by the state, and community, town and regional planning carried out by local government. Its coordinating activities are an important democratic means of opposing the arbitrary actions which still create – without having the slightest notions about planning – very momentous data in a given area. Planning therefore is most active in those zones where economy and population have reached such a degree of density that the still existing open areas have to be treated with greatest care. It is the more strange that there are only few contacts between planning and agriculture in these urbanized areas. The sociological problems which arise from the continuous infringement on hitherto agriculturally used land, are often overlooked by planning in these urbanized areas as well as they appeal only very little to agrarian policies.The reason for this lack of contacts between both subjects seems to be not so much the different training of those working in these fields, but the fact that the economic integration of numerous farmers and agricultural employees started sooner than that of agricultural holdings into the national economy. Consequently, symptoms of structural dissolution predominated over the development of new agricultural forms. The great enticement to sell land at favourable prices, as well as the perseverance in traditional forms of farm management and a petrified class‐consciousness impeded the vast market chances in these urbanized areas which resulted from urbanization and its socioeconomic dynamics. Only in the fringe areas where no continuous contact with the 'urban way of life' existed, belts of intensive farming developed. It must, however, be mentioned that in the urbanized areas various groups found ways to assimilate themselves to the changed conditions of agricultural land use. Here horticultural and other holdings with intensive methods of cultivation, sparetime farmers, and often newly‐created lease‐holdings must be mentioned.If one accepts as a fact that in spite of all endeavours to decentralize, the process of increasing densities of population and industries in favourable locations goes hand in hand with the evolution of industrial society, it is obvious that the encroachment on agricultural land in the urbanized areas will continue. It must therefore be asked whether in future it will be possible for farms with an extensive use of land to have a location in these core zones. Planning has always emphasized that it is most important to loosen up these urbanized areas in order to create decent conditions of living for their inhabitants and to facilitate its functioning with as few frictions as possible. Priority must be given to the solution of the problem of preventing the merger of different centres which are connected by their functions within the conurbations, in order to preserve the character and entity of the various local units. Past experience does not show conclusively that the maintenance of these open spaces in the hand of agricultural holdings the productivity of which is related to an increased area of farmland, can be guaranteed even by the preparation of local development plans. Furthermore, planning by statute can give no guarantee for the viability of those agricultural holdings which do not try to reach an economic integration. Consequently, this kind of holdings has few chances in the core zones of the urbanized areas.In the field of international planning the idea has been promoted that public authorities ought to buy land in the open spaces of the 'buffer zones' between the different centres and to develop it for recreational purposes. The working of these open areas could then be undertaken either by special institutions, by public administration or by leasing. Taken as a whole, the land use of the open spaces within the urbanized areas will have to be organized under the principle that – moving from the outer borders of the fringe areas towards the centres – more or less independent holdings (full‐time farmers, part‐time farmers and specialized holdings of all kinds) will be followed by service undertakings (public and corporate property, the areas of permanent allotments, of private property such as parks, inns with gardens, and recreational institutions). In order to realize a plan of this kind a long‐term programme and considerable funds are needed, the use of which will be significant whith regard to the necessary redevelopment of urbanized areas.Parallel to regional economic policy, in international planning policy the tendency to plan integrated socio‐economic regions finds acceptance to an increasing degree. The development of contingent areas and the solution of problems arising therefrom are taken as an entity. The logical consequence will be the evolution of a regional sociology. Its main task will be the investigation of sociological problems in a changing regional community. It will then be in a position to recommend solutions which are urgently needed in planning and administration.RésuméPROBLÈVES DE LA PLANIFI CATION DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DANS LES RÉCIONS DE CONCENTRATION: GERHARD ISBARYLa planification moderne est pour la société en évolution une façon de s'exprimer. Elle se polarise entre une planification établie par l'Etat national et une planification émanant de l'autonomie des localités, des villes, des régions. Son action coordinatrice, orientée vers le bien commun, en fait un puissant moyen démocratique de s'opposer à l'arbitraire suivant lequel, maintenant encore, sans vue d'ensemble et pour ainsi dire inconsciemment, se fait la mise en place de choses importantes dans l'espace. C'est pourquoi la planification s'effectue le plus activement dans les zones où l'éducation et de promotion, une participation à la culture en général correspondent au caractère de notre société démocratique. Le planificateur doit essayer de contribuer à leur réalisation, en créant une structure écologique optimale.économie et la population ont atteint une telle densité qu'il importe de traiter avec le plus grand soin les espaces demeurés libres. Il est d'autant plus ttrange de noter que dans ces terri‐toires à densité croissante il existe peu de contacts entre la planification et l'agriculture. Les problèmes sociologiques qui, en de telles régions, résultent des emprises continuelles qui s'opèrent sur des espaces jusqu'ici utilisés par l'agriculture échappent souvent aussi bien aux conceptions d'améagement qu'éducation et de promotion, une participation à la culture en général correspondent au caractère de notre société démocratique. Le planificateur doit essayer de contribuer à leur réalisation, en créant une structure écologique optimale.à la politique agricole elle‐même. L'absence de relations entre ces deux domaines s'explique moins, pense‐t‐on, par la formation différente des hommes que par le fait que dans les zones à densité croissante l'articulation économique de nombreux exploitants et travailleurs agricoles s'est rélisée plus tôt que l'intégration économique des entreprises dans l'ensemble de l'économie. C'est ainsi que des phéomènes de dissolution structurelle l'ont emporté sur la création de nouvelles structures agraires. La tentation séduisante de vendre les terrains à des prix avantageux, mais aussi l'obstination à maintenir les formes d'exploitation traditionnelles, dans un sentiment de dasse figé, ont empêché dans les zones dont il s'agit la perception des grandes possibilités que la densité démographique croissante et le dynamisrne socio‐économique qui s'ensuit offraient au développement du marché. C'est seulement à l'extrĉme périphérie, là où ne se manifestait aucun contact permanent avec la vie citadine, que s'est développée une ceinture d'agriculture intensive. Sans doute, au sein même des espaces en voie d'agglomération, des groupes isolés ont su adapter l'emploi du sol aux conditions nouvelles. On pourrait mentionncr ici en particulier les exploitations de création de jardins et d'embellissement, les entreprises en rapport avec l'emploi des loisirs et souvent aussi de vraies fermes nouvellement constituées.En constatant que, malgré tous les efforts de décentralisation, la population et l'économie continuent à se concentrer dans les endroits appropriés, à mesure que progresse la civilisation industrielle, on se rend compte aussi que, dans les zones à densité croissante, les emprises de terrains jusqu'à présent agricoles ne sont pas arrivées à leur terme. La question se pose ainsi de savoir si à l'avenir, dans de pareilles zones, il restera une place quelconque pour des exploitations agricoles. Un des principaux postulats de la planification est de dégager les zones de concentration afin d'y créer des conditions de vie satisfaisantes pour la population et aussi pour que les fonctions s'y accomplissent sans s'incommoder l'une l'autre. Cela impose qu'on s'efforce d'empêcher l'imbrication mutelle sur le terrain des centres agglomérés qui constituent des ensembles fonctionnels, de manière à maintenir les possibilités d'existence et de dégagement de la résidence particulière. Or, l'expérience du passé montre que les plans d'origine locale n'ont euxmêmes pas assez pourvu au maintiem de tels espaces libres à la disposition des exploitants agricoles. Au surplus, la planification juridique ne saurait aucunement assurer l'existence d'entreprises qui, de leur côté, ne s'efforcent pas de participer à l'intégration économique. De telles exploitations n'ont par conséquent que peu de chances de subsister à I'intérieur des zones de concentration.Ainsi est apparue, dans l'aménagement international, une conception suivant laquelle, dans les zones intercalaires, les espaces libres seraient acquis par l'autorité publique et réservés aux besoins de détente immédiate de la population. La mise en exploitation de ces terrains peut se réaliser au moyen d'institutions particulières soit par voie administrative soit par voie d'affermage. En somme, l'utilisation des espaces libres à l'intérieur des zones à densité croissante se conformerait à un principe d'articulation suivant lequel, depuis la bordure périphérique en direction des centres, le territoire passerait graduellement des exploitations plus ou moins autonomes (agriculteurs à temps plein, agriculteurs d'appoint et exploitations d'agrément de tout genre) à des entreprises de service (propriétés publiques et corporatives, ceinture de petits jardins, domaines privés tels que parcs, établissements d'hôtellerie ou de détente). Pour réaliser un tel plan il est nécessaire d'établir un programme à long terme et de disposer d'importants capitaux, ce qui se justifiera nénmoins par la nécessité d'assurer les conditions d'assainissement indispensables aux zones d'agglomération croissante.Dans la politique internationale d'améagement du territoire se manifeste toujours davantage, parallèllement à la politique économique régionale, une tendance à planifier et à répartir l'espace en régions socio‐économiques constituant un réseau serré. Le développement d'espaces cohérents et les problémes nouvellement apparus se trouvent également impliqués dans ces conceptions. C'est pourquoi il est inévitable que se développe une sociologie régionale correspondante. Sa mission consistera à examiner par priorité les problèmes sociologiques qui se posent dans la communauté régionale en voie d'évolution. Elle se trouvera ainsi en mesure de recommander des solutions dont la planification et la pratique administrative devront tenir compte.