Suchergebnisse

Ovaj članak se bavi prikazom procesa decentralizacije u Srbiji od 2000. do 2011. godine imajući u vidu da bi ovaj proces ujedno morao biti i proces podizanja kapaciteta lokalnih vlasti. U radu se prati transformacija svakog od bitnih činilaca autonomije lokalne vlasti i njenih menadžerijalnih potencijala: ustavni i zakonski status, izbori i model organizacije vlasti, nadležnosti, finansiranje, pružanje usluga, participacija građana, te odnos države i lokalne samouprave. Ovaj kompleksan proces zahteva vreme, podizanje znanja i veština svih nivoa vlasti (posebno lokalne), posvećenost političke elite demokratskim vrednostima i tesno je vezan sa podizanjem stepena demokratske političke kulture. ; This paper provides a review of the process of decentralisation in Serbia from 2000 to 2011, bearing in mind that this process should at the same time be a process of enhancing the local government capacity. The paper traces the transformation of each of the essential factors of the autonomy of local government and its managerial potentials: its constitutional and legal status, elections and the model of the organisation of government, competences, funding, provision of services, citizen participation, and the relationship between the state and local self-government. This complex process is time-consuming, requires upgrading knowledge and skills at all levels of government (local government in particular), a commitment of the political elite to democratic values, and is closely tied to increasing the level of democratic political culture.

Društvena okolina koja obuhvaća građane u širem smislu vrlo je heterogeno i dinamično područje okoline upravne organizacije. Njezino je značenje za funkcioniranje upravnih organizacija u stalnom porastu jer je suvremena javna uprava izložena sve snažnijim zahtjevima za uvažavanje mišljenja građana. Ovaj se rad bavi analiziranjem društvene okoline upravnih organizacija u Hrvatskoj na temelju analize obilježja sudionika e-savjetovanja kao neposredno zainteresiranih građana za sudjelovanje u izradi propisa i politika. Obilježja sudionika koja se analiziraju obuhvaćaju njihov broj, strukturu (vrsta sudionika) i vrstu komentara koje upućuju, a pokazatelji su intenziteta, stupnja organiziranosti i stupnja kompetentnosti relevantne društvene okoline upravnih organizacija. Empirijski su podaci prikupljeni metodom kvantitativne analize sadržaja izvješća o provedenim e-savjetovanjima od 2016. do 2018. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju kako obilježja društvene okoline ovise o organizacijskim faktorima – razini političko-upravnog sustava na kojoj djeluje organizacija te njezinoj vrsti i funkciji. Osim toga, pokazuje se povezanost između samih obilježja društvene okoline – organiziranosti i kompetentnosti. ; Social context, which refers to the public / citizens, is a very heterogeneous and dynamic area of administrative organizations' environment. Its relevance for the functioning of administrative organizations is constantly increasing in contemporary public administration due to expanding requirements for responsiveness towards citizens' preferences. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the social context of Croatian administrative organizations by analysing the characteristics of participants in e-consultations, i.e., the public involved in the process of policy formulation. Analysed characteristics include the number of participants, their structure (type of stakeholder,) and the type of comments they submit. These characteristics represent indicators of the intensity, organization degree, and the level of competence of the relevant social environment of administrative organizations. Empirical research encompassed quantitative content analysis of e-consultation reports in the period 2016-2018. The research findings suggest that the characteristics of social context are largely determined by organizational factors - the level of politico-administrative system, the type, and the function of an organization. In addition, it appears that the characteristics of social context (the level of organization and competence) are interrelated, too.

Ova doktorska disertacija bavi se glasovanjem, najočitijim oblikom političke participacije građana u modernom demokratskom poretku. Većina istraživanja biračkog ponašanja usmjerena je na proučavanje uzroka glasovanja te na procese oblikovanja stranačkih preferencija (Šiber, 1998b). Međutim, glasovanju možemo pristupiti kao političkoj odluci, a u tom slučaju se javlja pitanje kako tu odluku evaluirati. Potencijalni kriterij za evaluaciju možemo naći u konceptu točnog glasovanja (Lau i Redlawsk, 1997). Ukoliko građanin glasuje za onu stranku kojoj bi dao glas i kada bi bio suočen sa svim relevantnim političkim informacijama, možemo reći da je on točno glasovao. Koristeći kriterij točnog glasovanja možemo evaluirati građansko odlučivanje, ali i kvalitetu demokracije. Ovaj rad ima dva cilja. Kao prvo, zbog niza konceptualnih i operacionalnih nedostataka, on nudi rekonstrukciju koncepta točnog glasovanja. Kroz detaljno povezivanje spoznaja o biračkom ponašanju i pretpostavki modela predstavničke demokracije, uvodi se nova definicija točnog glasovanja, kao onog koji je dan stranci koja je u najvećoj mjeri bliska glasačevim preferencijama. Uz to, problematizira se korisnost ovog koncepta te njegov utjecaj na empirijska istraživanja građanskih kompetencija i na evaluaciju demokratskog poretka. Drugi cilj ovog rada je empirijski – provjeriti koje individualne i situacijske karakteristike doprinose točnom glasovanju. Očekivalo se kako će točnije glasovati sudionici s boljom političkom ekspertizom (visoka politička sofisticiranost i informiranost, visoka motivacija za politiku, više obrazovanje i niža dob), ali i oni koji donose odluke u jednostavnijem okruženju (niže kognitivno opterećenje i lakša politička pitanja). U tu svrhu provedeno je eksperimentalno istraživanje na 210 sudionika koji su sudjelovali u izmišljenoj političkoj kampanji. Tijekom kampanje su prikupljali podatke o strankama i na kraju su glasovali za jednu od njih. Rezultati su pokazali kako točnije glasuju sudionici s višom razinom političke informiranosti, zatim sudionici koji su koristili kompleksnije strategije odlučivanja i sudionici koji su suočeni s nižom razinom kognitivnog opterećenja. Neočekivano, dobiven je i efekt spola – žene točnije glasuju od muškaraca. U radu su ponuđena objašnjenja za nepotvrđene hipoteze i neočekivane rezultate, kao i potencijalna primjena dobivenih rezultata u javnom životu. ; Elections are the main characteristic of modern democracies; as of September 2016., 82 national elections took place this year and almost 650 million people voted. Adult citizens experience elections and participate in voting roughly once every four years. Ever since the empirical research in political science focused on voting behaviour the main focus of inquiry was the understanding of antecedents of vote choice as well as the long-term shaping of political preferences (Šiber, 1998). The vote itself can be conceptualized in many ways, such as a statement of group membership (e.g. Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954), identification with the party (Campbell et al., 1964), as a choice between parties etc. If we approach the vote from a decision-making perspective, a question comes to mind – can we say what is the quality of that choice? In other words, can we evaluate the process and the outcome of the voting decision? This are rather hard questions which is not adequately addressed by researchers, both theoretically and empirically. In order to answer them, Lau and Redlawsk (1997) put forward the concept of correct voting – a vote that is the same as the one that would be given if a voter had all the relevant information. This doctoral thesis is concerned with that concept. It had two broad goals. First, a critique of the concept was put forward, as well as a conceptual reconstruction of correct voting. The new approach to the concept is more clear and better connected to both citizens' competences and democratic theory. The second goal was to study empirically the antecedents of correct voting. For this goal a laboratory experiment was conducted in which participants (N=210) participated in a mock electoral campaign at the end of which they had to vote. Participants differed in various socio-demographic and political characteristics and within the experiment cognitive load and type of political questions in the campaign were manipulated. Results showed that those participants that had better political knowledge, were exposed to lower cognitive load and used complex strategies of decision. Also, an unexpected result was found – women voted more correctly than men. In order to think about the criteria for evaluating the process of voting, one must first understand the relationship between voters and election within democracy. This requires that one chooses a model of democracy. There is an array of these models, and each one focuses on different aspects of the political regime. For the concept of correct voting the most adequate model is that of representative democracy. In this model, democracy is though about as a political system in which the citizens are sovereign, and a smaller group of representatives execute citizens' will. Representatives are chosen via regular competitive elections, and citizens should choose hose representatives that represent their interest in the best way. Other than choosing a model of democracy, we must choose a theoretical approach for political behaviour. We can identify five approaches (those based on personality, sociological model, socio-psychological model, economic-rational model and cognitive model), and within this research a cognitive approach is taken for studying political behaviour and decision-making. This model focuses on cognitive processes, such as evaluation of political candidates, mental strategies, biases, memory etc. The main idea of the cognitive approach is that all thinking is constrained by both biological aspects of the brain as well as the situational pressures (such as the amount of information). As a consequence, citizens will be prone to using mental shortcuts to simplify the political environment. Lau and Redlawsk's (1997) concept of correct voting could be used as a norm of political decision-making. It focuses on cognitive processes and offers an ideal outcome of political thinking which at the same time has implications for the functioning of representative democracy. If citizens choose their representatives correctly than democracy should function better than if that is not the case. However, there are several issues with this concept - there are two distinct conceptualizations and operationalisations of correct voting; authors focus more on the level of information than on the cognitive processes; their norm has within itself several descriptive aspects etc. This thesis puts forward a definition of correct voting – a correct vote is the one which is given to a representative whose political preferences are in the highest concordance with the voter's. Keeping the cognitive approach in mind, several individual and situational characteristics are identified as having a probable impact on the probability for voting correctly. It is expected that citizens who are more politically sophisticated, informed and motivated, as well as those who are better educated and younger should vote more correctly. Considering situational characteristics, higher cognitive load should lower the probability of voting correctly. Also the content, or type of political information, should have an impact on that probability. Political issues can be divided into easy/symbolic/moral and hard/instrumental/public policy. As the percentage of easy issues within a campaign increases so should the probability of casting a correct vote. In order to test these hypotheses an experiment was conducted in which participants participated in a mock election. They collected information about four parties and in the end voted for one of these. Last part of the thesis offers a discussion about the results, their political implications as well as guidelines for future research.

Jacques Bidet's theory of modernity is a fascinating research project which confronts us in a challenging way with a series of key theoretical & practical problems. The text focuses on the concepts of metastructure, domination, class & democracy. The most important concept is "metastructure," which is to be perceived as all coordination & legitimation resources (on the economic, legal-political & cultural levels -- the overcoming of any transcendental order) at the disposal of the citizens of modernity. These resources can be combined in several different ways, in varied structures of modernity. How are we to understand the ontological status of this metastructure? A full answer confronts us with another question: is it possible to offer a scientific explanation of the genesis of this modern (meta)structure? Thus, if metastructure is some sort of general grammar of modernity, the social structures are an actualization of the possibilities of metastructure according to the spectrum ranging from the extreme of planned collectivism to the extreme of liberistic capitalism. Consequently, the duality of modernity is manifest in the fact that it is characterized, on the one hand, by universalistic legitimacy and, on the other, by the persistence of forms of (class) domination. According to Bidet, in capitalism a dominant class will be established with two poles -- property & competence -- which correspond to the interlinkage of market & organization in such a form of society. For this reason, an attempt to achieve emancipation from the domination of the proprietor, in the case of planned collectivism, developing to the full the organizational dimension in order to satisfy the social needs in a more egalitarian way, necessarily results in the organizer's domination. But the thesis that the dominant class in capitalism has two poles (property & competence) is met with the objection that simultaneously too much & not enough is said about the second pole of this class (of managers). Namely, it remains unclear how we must think the unity of capitalist domination in the plurality of spheres of social power; & if, on the contrary, we must abandon this unity, why should we limit ourselves to only two poles? The author concludes with a discussion of two questions which he deems to be decisive: to what extent can the inequalities related to property or competence be designated as class relations or forms of domination? And what is the relation between various modalities of class relations or relations of domination, & the institutions of modern poliarchic democracy which is centered on the multi-party system? Adapted from the source document.

Nakon povijesnog pregleda razvoja grčke lokalne samouprave u razdoblju nakon stjecanja neovisnosti o Otomanskom Carstvu analiziraju se novije reforme krajem 20. i početkom 21. stoljeća. Velika teritorijalna reforma dovršena je 1999. Postoje dvije razine samoupravnih jedinica te regije kao razvojne jedinice s određenim dodatnim ovlastima. Na prvom su stupnju općine i komune, a na drugoj prefekture. Reforma grčke lokalne samouprave pokazuje da ukidanje malih lokalnih jedinica ne mora značiti njihovo potpuno nestajanje, nego ih se može pretvoriti u oblik sudjelovanja građana u lokalnom upravljanju koji zadržava svoj prijašnji teritorijalni identitet. Također, pokazuje se da teritorijalna reforma bez promjena u financijskim izvorima lokalnih jedinica ne dovodi ni do kakvih promjena u mogućnostima financiranja i obavljanja šireg kruga javnih poslova. U tom smislu teritorijalna reforma sama po sebi nije decentralizacijska mjera. Ni neposredni izbor načelnika ne mora sam po sebi donijeti napredak u smjeru demokratizacije – iz grčkog se primjera vidi da bez podrške velikih nacionalnih političkih stranaka praktično nije moguće osvojiti mjesto načelnika ili prefekta. ; Following a historic overview of the development of Greek local self-government after gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire, the author analyses recent reforms at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries. A comprehensive territorial reform was completed in 1999. There are two tiers of local self-government units, and regions as statistical units with certain additional competences. The first tier consists of municipalities and communes, and the second of prefectures. The reform of Greek local self-government has shown that abolition of small local units does not have to mean their complete disappearance, but that they can be turned into a form of citizens' participation in local governance and thus keep their former territorial identity. Moreover, it has become obvious that a territorial reform without a reform of local units' financial resources does not lead to any changes in their financial capacity and does not widen the scope of public affairs they perform. Thus, a territorial reform is not a decentralisation measure in itself. Furthermore, it is clear from the Greek example that even the institution of directly elected mayors does not necessarily mean a progress in democratisation – it is practically impossible to win the elections for a mayor or a prefect in Greece without the support of large national political parties.

Djelovanje Hrvatskog sabora u komunističkom razdoblju (1945.-1990.) nije cjelovito obrađena tema. Ovim člankom daje se prilog poznavanju njegove organizacije u razdoblju od 1963. do 1974. godine. Detaljno je opisana razgranata struktura i aktivnost njegovih pet vijeća (Republičko, Privredno, Prosvjetno-kulturno, Socijalnozdravstveno i Organizaciono-političko) i radnih tijela, koju ilustrira i broj održanih sjednica. Između ostalog, to je trebalo pokazivati položaj Sabora kao formalno najvišeg tijela vlasti, odnosno centra u kojem se donose najvažnije političke odluke o svim područjima života u Hrvatskoj. U vezi s tim, naznačena je potreba za detaljnom analizom odnosa između formalnog (de iure) i stvarnog (de facto) položaja Sabora u tadašnjem političkom sustavu vlasti, kako bi se odgovorilo na pitanje je li, na koji način i u kojoj mjeri taj položaj bio oslabljen u odnosu na druga državna politička tijela (ponajprije Izvršno vijeće Sabora), odnosno instrumentaliziran od strane središnjih tijela Saveza komunista Jugoslavije/Hrvatske. Rezultati istraživanja prezentirani su kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a na kraju članka sistematizirani su u obliku tabličnog prikaza. ; The organisation and the activities of the Croatian Parliament in the communist period (1945-1990) is not a fully researched topic. The paper gives a contribution to the knowledge of its organisation in the period from 1963 to 1974. Its branched structure and the activities of its councils and working bodies are described in detail, which is also illustrated by the number of held sessions. By the Yugoslavian constitution adopted in April 1963, also called "the charter of selfmanagement", the name of the state was changed from People's to Socialist, its socialist attributes were emphasized, and selfmanagement was introduced in all segments of the society. By the new republican constitutions, such changes were also carried out in all then-existing Yugoslavian republics, including Croatia. In the forefront were placed »the sovereign rights of the working people and the Yugoslavian nations which they exercise«, inter alia, as representatives of the working people in councils of federal and republican assemblies. It had affected the organisation of the highest formal political institutions of the government, including federal and republican assemblies, which were declared as »the highest state and self-government authorities, under the law and obligations« of federation, i.e. the republic. The declarative constitutional concept on the assemblies as the highest state and self-government authorities implied the shift in their organisation and activities from the traditional legislative bodies and »law factories« towards »the responsible policy holders«. In other words, »becoming the working selfgovernment bodies«, assemblies were meant to become the centres in which »the whole social practice and harmonised politics is gathered«. Thus, for example, by the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia from April 1963, it was declared that the Parliament (Sabor) can discuss and adopt declarations and resolutions »on all issues of common interest for the Republic [.] laying down values on politics in certain area and the means of its achievement«. The Croatian Parliament's Rules of Procedure from 1965 provided the possibility of convening a General Croatian Conference (Opći sabor Hrvatske), i.e. joint sessions »on all issues of the common interest for the Republic« of all of Parliament's councils with the Central Committee of the Socialist League of Working People of Croatia and the Republican Committee for Croatia of the Association of Trade Unions in Yugoslavia. The main characteristic of the organisation of the Croatian Parliament in the period from 1963 to 1974 was its complex structure. In order to express its working character and central role in the political decision-making process in all spheres of life in Croatia, it was organised as a five-cameral institution. It was the highest number of its chambers in the whole socialist period: until 1953 it was unicameral, in the period 1953-1963 bicameral, and in the period 1974-1990 a three-cameral institution. Those five chambers were: the Republican Council, the Economic Council, the Educational and Cultural Council, the Social and Health Council and the Organisational and Political Council. The Republican Council had 120 representatives, directly elected by the municipal assemblies and citizens. The other four councils had 80 representatives each, elected by the municipal assemblies among the workers across the working areas within the competence of each council. Except the Presidency of Parliament and its five councils, during the whole period 110 different permanent or temporary working bodies were established. Of that total, there were 27 joint working bodies of Parliament as a whole; the Republican Council had 20, the Economic Council 14, the Educational and Cultural Council 15, the Social and Health Council 18, and the Organisational and Political Council 16 permanent or temporary working bodies. The Parliament's councils and working bodies held in total 3 960 sessions, i.e. 360 per year. By comparison, in the period 1947-1953 during which it was organised as a unicameral body, the Parliament and its working bodies held in total 220 sessions (around 30 per year). In the period 1953- 1963 during which it was organised as a bicameral body, the Parliament and its working bodies held in total 1224 sessions, i.e. around 120 per year. More detailed data on the number of sessions held in the analysed period are listed in the table at the end of this paper. The table also includes a systematic overview of all working bodies which were described earlier in this paper, llustrating at the same time the dynamics of changes in their establishment and elimination. Some authors describe the Parliamentary institutions in the communist states with the metaphor rubber stamp legislatures, meaning the institutions with small practical power in the political decisionmaking process, which automatically put a stamp on the legislative proposals of their governments, i.e. communist parties as the real owners of the political power. Some of the researches singled out as exceptions the Polish Sejm and the Yugoslavian Federal Assembly (in the frame of the political system established by the Yugoslavian constitution from 1974). That opens a new research topic about whether the Croatian Parliament in the period 1963-1974 was also "a paradoxical institution" or an exception. In other words, the relation between the formal (de iure) and the real (de facto) position of Croatian Parliament in the political system of that time should be more closely researched, as well as to find whether its position was weakened, in what way and to what extent by the comparison with other state political institutions (notably the Executive Council of Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia), i.e. instrumentalized by the central bodies of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia/Croatia.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.