Suchergebnisse

Chapter 1: Political parties, state resources and electoral clientelism -- Chapter 2: Clientelism and distributive politics in Australia: comparing partisan pork barrel with contingency-based vote-buying -- Chapter 3: Administrative clientelism and policy reform failure: the Western Canada Integrated Land Management experience 1990–2015 -- Chapter 4: Authoritarian clientelism: the case of the president's 'creatures' in Cameroon -- Chapter 5: Coordinating the machine: subnational political context and the effectiveness of machine politics -- Chapter 6: Political parties and clientelism in transition countries: evidence from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine -- Chapter 7: Does clientelism hinder progressive social policy in Latin America? -- Chapter 8: Conclusion.

Introduction : the art of raccomandazione -- The ethnographic setting -- Patronage/clientelism : some theoretical considerations -- Towards a poetics of patronage -- Raccomandazione, tangente and mafia : an "amoral" family of genres -- Raccomandazione, class relations and the southern question -- Employing the 'little shove' : raccomandazione and work -- "We're not Uganda, but almost" : raccomandazione and southern identity -- Conclusion : raccomandazione and the bourgeois-liberal world order -- Epilogue : what happened when they read what I wrote : Mediterranean clientelism and corruption revisited

This book improves understandings of how and why clientelism endures in Latin America and why state policy is often ineffective. Political scientists and sociologists, the contributors employ ethnography, targeted interviews, case studies, within-case and regional comparison, thick descriptions, and process tracing.

"After the ousting of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, there was much debate about the reasons for the former regime's longevity and its collapse. Here, Safinaz El Tarouty provides an original contribution to the study of authoritarianism in Egypt by focusing on the role of businessmen in authoritarian survival. As the regime intensified neo-liberal economic reforms that led to social deprivation and frustration amongst increasing numbers of Egyptian citizens, they co-opted businessmen in order to defuse challenges and buttress the regime, constructing a new political economy of authoritarianism. Extending the existing literature on clientelism, El Tarouty creates a typology of regime-businessmen relations to describe the multiple mechanisms of co-option in the context of economic liberalization. Ultimately, though, these businessmen proved too narrow a constituency to provide legitimacy to the regime and in fact formed one of the reasons for its collapse"--

Since the third wave of democratization research on clientelism has experienced a revival. The puzzling persistence of clientelism in new and old democracies inspired researchers to investigate the micro-foundations and causes of this phenomenon. Though the decline of clientelistic practices - such as vote buying and patronage - in democratic contexts has often been predicted, they have proven to be highly adaptive strategies of electoral mobilization and party building. This volume seeks to contribute to this new line of research and develops a theoretical framework to study the consequences of clientelism for democratic governance. Under governance we understand "all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market, or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization, or territory, and whether through laws, norms, power or language

In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates. Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning including vote buying and electoral coercion persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that we must disaggregate clientelistic strategies based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. We document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions. We also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians' personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy. Most voters judge candidates who use clientelism harshly. So how does clientelism, including its most odious coercive forms, persist in democratic systems? This book suggests that politicians can get away with clientelism by using forms of it that are in line with the policy preferences of constituencies whose votes they need. Clientelistic and programmatic strategies are not as distinct as previous have argued.

"In many young democracies, local politics remain a bastion of nondemocratic practices, from corruption to clientelism to abuse of power. In a context where these practices are widespread, will local politicians ever voluntarily abandon them? Focusing on the practice of clientelism in social policy in Argentina, this book argues that only the combination of a growing middle class and intense political competition leads local politicians to opt out of clientelism. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, an original public opinion survey, and cross-municipal data in Argentina, this book illustrates how clientelism works and documents the electoral gains and costs of the practice. In doing so, it points to a possible subnational path towards greater accountability within democracy"--

"What happens when vote-buying becomes a means of social policy? Although one could cynically ask this question just as easily about the United States's mature democracy, Diego Abente Brun and Larry Diamond ask this question about democracies in the developing world through an assessment of political clientelism, or what is commonly known as patronage. Studies of political clientelism, whether deployed through traditional vote-buying techniques or through the politicized use of social spending, were a priority in the 1970s, when democratization efforts around the world flourished. With the rise of the Washington Consensus and neoliberal economic policies during the late-1980s, clientelism studies were moved to the back of the scholarly agenda. Abente Brun and Diamond invited some of the best social scientists in the field to systematically explore how political clientelism works and evolves in the context of modern developing democracies, with particular reference to social policies aimed at reducing poverty. Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy is balanced between a section devoted to understanding clientelism's infamous effects and history in Latin America and a section that draws out implications for other regions, specifically Africa, Southeast Asia, and Eastern and Central Europe. These rich and instructive case studies glean larger comparative lessons that can help scholars understand how countries regulate the natural sociological reflex toward clientelistic ties in their quest to build that most elusive of all political structures--a fair, efficient, and accountable state based on impersonal criteria and the rule of law.In an era when democracy is increasingly snagged on the age-old practice of patronage, students and scholars of political science, comparative politics, democratization, and international development and economics will be interested in this assessment, which calls for the study of better, more efficient, and just governance"--