Suchergebnisse

We consider a setting where agents are subject to two types of collective action problems, any group user's individual extraction inducing an externality on others in the same group (intra-group problem), while aggregate extraction in one group induces an externality on each agent in other groups (intergroup problem). One illustrative example of such a setting corresponds to a case where a common-pool resource is jointly extracted in local areas, which are managed by separate groups of individuals extracting the resource in their respective location. The interplay between both types of externality is shown to affect the results obtained in classical models of common-pool resources. We show how the fundamentals affect the individual strategies and welfare compared to the benchmark commons problems. Finally, different initiatives (local cooperation, inter-area agreements) are analyzed to assess whether they may alleviate the problems, and to understand the conditions under which they do so.

We consider a setting where agents are subject to two types of collective action problems, any group user's individual extraction inducing an externality on others in the same group (intra-group problem), while aggregate extraction in one group induces an externality on each agent in other groups (intergroup problem). One illustrative example of such a setting corresponds to a case where a common-pool resource is jointly extracted in local areas, which are managed by separate groups of individuals extracting the resource in their respective location. The interplay between both types of externality is shown to affect the results obtained in classical models of common-pool resources. We show how the fundamentals affect the individual strategies and welfare compared to the benchmark commons problems. Finally, different initiatives (local cooperation, inter-area agreements) are analyzed to assess whether they may alleviate the problems, and to understand the conditions under which they do so.

This article examines how states attempt to overcome collective action problems for promoting regional integration, by highlighting such attempts by members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It considers two kinds of collective action problems: collaboration games where actors are lured to defect from an agreement in order to obtain short-term gains, and coordination games where actors face difficulty in reaching an agreement. The article argues that although ASEAN countries have not intended to establish a supranational body to resolve collective action problems, they have gradually developed feasible enforcement mechanisms by intensifying the centralized nature of regional organization. It also contends that some member states have begun to play a "focal point" role in resolving coordination problems resulting from accelerated regional integration and market liberalization, and the resolution of coordination problems has been pursued in a framework where extra-regional countries and environments play a significant role.

This article examines how states attempt to overcome collective action problems for promoting regional integration, by highlighting such attempts by members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It considers two kinds of collective action problems: collaboration games where actors are lured to defect from an agreement in order to obtain short-term gains, and coordination games where actors face difficulty in reaching an agreement. The article argues that although ASEAN countries have not intended to establish a supranational body to resolve collective action problems, they have gradually developed feasible enforcement mechanisms by intensifying the centralized nature of regional organization. It also contends that some member states have begun to play a focal point role in resolving coordination problems resulting from accelerated regional integration and market liberalization, and the resolution of coordination problems has been pursued in a framework where extra-regional countries and environments play a significant role. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

Incomplete information exacerbates the problems inherent in collective action. Participants cannot efficiently coordinate their actions if they do not know each other's preferences. I investigate when ordinary communication, or cheap talk, may resolve mutual uncertainty in collective action problems. I find that the efficacy of communication depends critically on the relationship between contributions and the value of the joint project. The incentive barriers to honesty are highest when every contribution increases the project's value. Participants then have a strict incentive to say whatever would induce others to contribute the most, so cheap talk lacks credibility. By contrast, when contributions may be marginally worthless, such as when the project has no value unless contributions hit a certain threshold, communication may help participants avoid wasted effort. Using these findings, I identify which collective action problems in politics might benefit from communication and which require more expensive solutions to overcome uncertainty.

We present a model of collective action in a heterogenous population of egoists and conditional cooperators. Each player is uncertain about the cooperative inclinations of the other player. A government or principal who has information about the distribution of types may introduce sanctions for defection. We study the impact of such sanctions through the e¤ect on the beliefs of the players about the distribution of types they are facing. It is shown that in equilibrium sanctions can crowd out trust between agents by sending a signal that there are many egoists around. This can lead the government to set low sanctions to induce trust and 'crowd in' cooperation. In cases where conditional cooperation is an important factor in collective action, as is the case in tax compliance, the model provides a rationale for the low observed sanctions in the real world.

AbstractThe adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals has rejuvenated an old debate: Can foreign aid be used to finance global public goods (GPGs)? There are those who see aid exclusively as a source of development funding for poor countries. And there are others who are open to answering the question in the affirmative. I put forward five arguments why the latter position is reasonable. Firstly, the formal definition of official development assistance (ODA) cannot be said to exclude its use in financing GPGs as these goods by definition benefit developing countries. Secondly, the amount of ODA provided has never been the gold standard of rich country effort envisaged by some. In particular, the level is boosted by the self‐interests of donors. Thirdly, there is ample precedent for following the benefit principle when it comes to multilateral organisations, which are often seen as GPGs. Fourthly, distinguishing between national public goods and GPGs is not always straightforward as the former are in many cases inputs into the production of the latter, and in such cases, the dividing line between 'traditional aid' and 'funding for GPGs' is blurred. Finally, it is not obvious in practice that aid as country finance always generates greater welfare gains for developing countries than the provision of GPGs. In sum, being overly normative with respect to what ODA is distracts us from the real problem, namely, that collective action problems result in too little spending on all international public goods, including poverty alleviation in poor countries.

Introduction -- From 'good governance' to governance that works -- The country contexts -- Maternal health : why is Rwanda doing better than Malawi, Niger and Uganda? -- The politics of policy incoherence and provider indiscipline -- The space for local problem-solving and practical hybridity -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- index.

In seeking to understand how nonprofits participate in policymaking at the state level, scholars of the third sector tend to overlook or assume a barrier to this activity: collective action problems. I show that such problems suppress charter school participation in their trade associations. An analysis of original survey data and informant interviews combined with Internal Revenue Service data for the complete set of charter membership associations in the United States demonstrates that schools' participation in these collectives follows a classic pattern of collective action problems: In states where the number of potential members is high, participation rates are lower. Across states, the size of the population of schools eligible for membership better explains variation in participation than other factors typically deemed important by scholars, such as organizational resources and policy environments. The finding supports the argument that large numbers inhibit participation in associations that pursue collective goods for their industry.

The 1989 Eastern European revolutions produced systematic failures in which various social, economic, and political players to coordinate on mutually beneficial solutions. The old institutional grid--political, economic, and social--was destroyed and the new institutions were still in the making. The collective action problems born in this institutional vacuum contributed to political instability, economic under-performance, and social inefficiencies. This paper examines the cooperation and lack of cooperation among Polish political parties in the 1990s as examples of the failure to reach agreement among political actors.