Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- From 'good governance' to governance that works -- The country contexts -- Maternal health : why is Rwanda doing better than Malawi, Niger and Uganda? -- The politics of policy incoherence and provider indiscipline -- The space for local problem-solving and practical hybridity -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- index.

In seeking to understand how nonprofits participate in policymaking at the state level, scholars of the third sector tend to overlook or assume a barrier to this activity: collective action problems. I show that such problems suppress charter school participation in their trade associations. An analysis of original survey data and informant interviews combined with Internal Revenue Service data for the complete set of charter membership associations in the United States demonstrates that schools' participation in these collectives follows a classic pattern of collective action problems: In states where the number of potential members is high, participation rates are lower. Across states, the size of the population of schools eligible for membership better explains variation in participation than other factors typically deemed important by scholars, such as organizational resources and policy environments. The finding supports the argument that large numbers inhibit participation in associations that pursue collective goods for their industry.

Reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs) allow parents to decide whether their future children will have or lack certain genetic predispositions. A popular model that has been proposed for regulating access to RGTs is the 'genetic supermarket'. In the genetic supermarket, parents are free to make decisions about which genes to select for their children with little state interference. One possible consequence of the genetic supermarket is that collective action problems will arise: if rational individuals use the genetic supermarket in isolation from one another, this may have a negative effect on society as a whole, including future generations. In this article we argue that RGTs targeting height, innate immunity, and certain cognitive traits could lead to collective action problems. We then discuss whether this risk could in principle justify state intervention in the genetic supermarket. We argue that there is a plausible prima facie case for the view that such state intervention would be justified and respond to a number of arguments that might be adduced against that view. ; Chris Gyngell would like to thank the Australian NationalUniversity and the Australian Government for their funding. ThomasDouglas would like to thank the Uehiro Foundation on Ethics andEducation and the Wellcome Trust (grant numbers WT087211 and100705/Z/12/Z) for their funding.

Reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs) allow parents to decide whether their future children will have or lack certain genetic predispositions. A popular model that has been proposed for regulating access to RGTs is the 'genetic supermarket'. In the genetic supermarket, parents are free to make decisions about which genes to select for their children with little state interference. One possible consequence of the genetic supermarket is that collective action problems will arise: if rational individuals use the genetic supermarket in isolation from one another, this may have a negative effect on society as a whole, including future generations. In this article we argue that RGTs targeting height, innate immunity, and certain cognitive traits could lead to collective action problems. We then discuss whether this risk could in principle justify state intervention in the genetic supermarket. We argue that there is a plausible prima facie case for the view that such state intervention would be justified and respond to a number of arguments that might be adduced against that view. ; Chris Gyngell would like to thank the Australian NationalUniversity and the Australian Government for their funding. ThomasDouglas would like to thank the Uehiro Foundation on Ethics andEducation and the Wellcome Trust (grant numbers WT087211 and100705/Z/12/Z) for their funding.

The 1989 Eastern European revolutions produced systematic failures in which various social, economic, and political players to coordinate on mutually beneficial solutions. The old institutional grid--political, economic, and social--was destroyed and the new institutions were still in the making. The collective action problems born in this institutional vacuum contributed to political instability, economic under-performance, and social inefficiencies. This paper examines the cooperation and lack of cooperation among Polish political parties in the 1990s as examples of the failure to reach agreement among political actors.

How and to what effect do firms coordinate their actions to deal with the negative external effects of productive activity? Under which conditions do associations engage in self-regulation and how do they tackle the specific regulatory challenges at stake? When developing hypotheses, we first vary attributes of the information environment in which private actors interact; and, secondly, actors' preferences as a function of the problem type at hand. With respect to the environmental conditions, our findings show that a regulatory threat matters when developing associative action, whilst the evidence is less clear as regards NGO campaigns. In terms of the problem type, we find that redistributive issues and prisoner's dilemma situations are much more conflict prone than coordination/win-win type of problems. Industry actors recur to various governance devices such as flexible contract design and compensation mechanisms to solve redistributive problems. Prisoner's dilemma (PD) problems may only partially be addressed by governance devices to the extent that free-riding is controlled and sanctioned within an association. We conclude that private actors engaging in self-regulation will not successfully manage all types of conflicts. They lack powerful sanctioning tools to deal with PD situations, but prove to be able to flexibly handle redistributive problems.

Research for this paper has been supported by the European Union under the 6th Framework programme (Contract No CIT1-CT-2004-506392). For more information about the Integrated Project "New Modes of Governance", co-ordinated by the European University Institute in Florence, please visit the project website at www.eu-newgov.org. ; How and to what effect do firms coordinate their actions in order to deal with the negative external effects of productive activity? Under which conditions do firm associations engage in environmental self-regulation and what kind of governance devices do they develop in order to tackle the specific regulatory challenges at stake? Is the 'shadow of hierarchy', the credible threat of legislation, executive intervention or court rulings, a necessary condition for associative action to emerge? Or is it only necessary if a redistributive problem is at stake? These are the questions discussed in this article. We will first develop the theoretical argument based on economic institutionalism, derive hypotheses and then submit the propositions to a first empirical assessment of associative self-regulation on waste recycling in the plastic and paper industry.