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The paper aims to present a comparative analysis of caricatures published in comic papers (Üstökös, Borsszem Jankó, Bolond Istók, and Kakas Márton) in the turn of the 20th century. The author intends to demonstrate the visual methods of depicting the obstruction in the Hungarian parliament (1895–1913). The comic papers represented the viewpoints of the Hungarian parties: Borsszem Jankó an-nounced the opinion of the government, the others the different wings of opposition. The results of the examination reveal that the visual techniques of depicting the obstruction were very similar in spite of the party motivated diverse judgement of the obstruction. ; The paper aims to present a comparative analysis of caricatures published in comic papers (Üstökös, Borsszem Jankó, Bolond Istók, and Kakas Márton) in the turn of the 20th century. The author intends to demonstrate the visual methods of depicting the obstruction in the Hungarian parliament (1895–1913). The comic papers represented the viewpoints of the Hungarian parties: Borsszem Jankó an-nounced the opinion of the government, the others the different wings of opposition. The results of the examination reveal that the visual techniques of depicting the obstruction were very similar in spite of the party motivated diverse judgement of the obstruction.

This contribution offers a reminder of the state of political forces in France and the course of the health crisis, which initially took place in a context of strong political tensions, particularly as a result of the controversial pension reform decided by Macron. The COVID crisis allowed populist parties to develop 'naming' and 'blaming' strategies, initially mobilized in different proportions, to attack the President of the Republic Macron. The analysis shows that the decision to introduce a lockdown led the two leaders of the parties described as populist to harden their criticism to similar proportions but also to 'claim' rapid responses to the crisis. These speeches are also part of the medical polemics that will have been omnipresent throughout the pandemic. Finally, we observe that these strategies have not been beneficial to the populist parties, since during the municipal elections the two parties did not manage to take advantage on this health and political sequence.

In 2004 the European Union accomplished an expansion of unprecedented scale in the scope of which ten new member states joined the 15 existing members of the community in one huge step. During the period leading up to and immediately following the expansion, a great number of analyses and reports saw the light of day that attempted to evaluate the further development potentials of the ten new member countries. These analyses and reports, however, considered the European Union as if it were a uniform and homogenous population or set and used it as a basis for comparison in their projections. They did so even though this assumption already fails to hold true for the EU15 and that the subsequent accessions and the global economic crisis exacerbated, and in fact, accentuated the differences in the member states' levels of development. Therefore, leaving these false assumptions behind, to gain a more reliable and workable evaluation of the convergence processes of the four Visegrad countries and to make an adequate comparison of the results, I find it highly advisable to consider the problem of catching-up from various aspects and to lay down different performance levels. My analysis only encompasses real convergence, which means that I only analyse the catching-up process and opportunities of the four Visegrad countries with a view to their GDP per capita figures, their main labour market indicators and productivity. In my paper, I present the results of the convergence calculations I did as well as the conclusions that may be drawn from them with the help of multi-level analyses that at the same time allow for describing both the functionality and the efficiency of the European Union. ; In 2004 the European Union accomplished an expansion of unprecedented scale in the scope of which ten new member states joined the 15 existing members of the community in one huge step. During the period leading up to and immediately following the expansion, a great number of analyses and reports saw the light of day that attempted to evaluate the further development potentials of the ten new member countries. These analyses and reports, however, considered the European Union as if it were a uniform and homogenous population or set and used it as a basis for comparison in their projections. They did so even though this assumption already fails to hold true for the EU15 and that the subsequent accessions and the global economic crisis exacerbated, and in fact, accentuated the differences in the member states' levels of development. Therefore, leaving these false assumptions behind, to gain a more reliable and workable evaluation of the convergence processes of the four Visegrad countries and to make an adequate comparison of the results, I find it highly advisable to consider the problem of catching-up from various aspects and to lay down different performance levels. My analysis only encompasses real convergence, which means that I only analyse the catching-up process and opportunities of the four Visegrad countries with a view to their GDP per capita figures, their main labour market indicators and productivity. In my paper, I present the results of the convergence calculations I did as well as the conclusions that may be drawn from them with the help of multi-level analyses that at the same time allow for describing both the functionality and the efficiency of the European Union.

A tanulmány célja a 2015-ben indult Modern városok program (MVP) iparfejlesztési elképzeléseinek kritikai elemzése a hazánkban kialakult függő piacgazdasági modell és a tartós gyengeségekkel küzdő fejlesztéspolitikai intézményrendszer tükrében. A gazdasági válság utáni Magyarországon a főáramú fejlesztéspolitikák kudarca, az ország gyenge felzárkózási teljesítménye növekvő érdeklődést eredményezett az alternatív gazdaságfejlesztési receptek iránt. Az új teret nyert developmentalista felfogás visszanyúl az erős állami beavatkozás ideájához, ezt azonban paradox módon olyan környezetben teszi, amelyben a gazdaság jelentős hányada külföldi beruházók kezében van, a hazai fejlesztéspolitika eszköz- és intézményrendszere pedig tartós és öröklődő gyengeségekkel küzd. A kormány és a fejlesztésre kijelölt megyei jogú városok külön megállapodásain nyugvó, uniós forrásokat újraelosztó Modern városok program projektszemléletű, vonásaiban a francia és a lengyel tervszerződésekhez hasonló (de azoknál gyengébb és esetlegesebb) fejlesztési eszközként, az új fejlesztési filozófia megtestesítőjeként jelent meg az állami cselekvésben. A program, bár elsősorban városfejlesztési eszköz, jelentős számban tartalmaz újraiparosításra irányuló vagy azt támogató fejlesztési célokat (77 projekt). A program elképzeléseit jelentős regionális különbségek fémjelzik. Az ország nyugati felében inkább a hagyományos fejlesztési eszközök alkalmazása és néhány tudásintenzív tevékenység letelepítésére irányuló törekvés figyelhető meg; a Dél-Alföldön és környezetében az endogén növekedési modell számára is kedvező komplex iparfejlesztési célok kerültek előtérbe; az ország ipari perifériáin azonban egyáltalán nem került sor igazi áttörést sejtető, előremutató fejlesztési célok megfogalmazására. Feltehető, hogy az MVP nyertesei elsősorban a már iparosodott vagy újraiparosodó térségek lesznek; a területi különbségek mérséklődése helyett a különbségek további növekedésére számíthatunk. A critical analysis of the Modern Cities Programme, a development programmelaunched by the Hungarian government in 2015, considers the reindustrialisation components as part of the debate on the varieties of capitalism (in particular the issue of Central and Eastern European dependent market economies) and the persisting institutional deficiencies in the Hungarian planning system. After the 2008 crisis, the low efficiency or failure of mainstream development policies and Hungary's poor convergence record have contributed to a growing interest in alternative development policies. The emerging development-policy vision is returning to the idea of strong state intervention, although paradoxically it continues to operate in an environment characterised by exceptionally high foreign participation in the economy, particularly in its most competitive segments. In addition, domestic development policy struggles with permanent and self-reinforcing institutional weaknesses that significantly reduce its effectiveness. The resulting re-centralisation has not only led to an increase in regional differences, but also to a further weakening of development institutions operating in cities and regions. Effective development systems (development coalitions and early-stage urban regimes) that are capable of setting and achieving coherent, systematic development goals exist only in a few select locations across the country. The Modern Cities Programme, essentially a redistribution of EU funds based on special agreements between the central government and the major Hungarian cities, is a project-based development agenda that somewhat resembles French and Polish planning contracts, albeit in a diluted and less coherent form. As an instrument of development policy, it fits into the new etatist development philosophy. Although the programme is predominantly an instrument of urban development, it also includes 77 projects directly or indirectly related to reindustrialisation. These initiatives focus mainly on improving transport links, developing specific sectors, vocational training, education and a limited R&D+I component. The programme characteristics vary greatly from region to region. In the western half of the country, traditional development instruments predominate with limited evidence of attempts at building up knowledge-intensive activities. In the Southern Great Plain, also complex industrial development goals are found that are conducive to endogenous growth, partly reflecting the lack of FDI in the region and a more SME-based development trajectory. The programme has not been able to realise favourable reindustrialisation initiatives in the peripheral industrial areas of Hungary. The fact that the programme tended to benefit 'winners' is likely to increase existing development gaps rather than reduce existing regional disparities.