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The discipline of crisis negotiation has been hailed as one of the most effective and successful tools used by law enforcement today. Despite its documented success, some law enforcement agencies remain ill prepared to adequately respond to a hostage/crisis situation. In most cases, this lack of preparedness can best be attributed to an agency's failure to implement a crisis negotiation component to respond in conjunction with a tactical intervention during a hostage/crisis situation. Complex factors such as the rising number of individuals effected by mental illness and the ease with which law enforcement agencies may obtain tactical equipment through government surplus programs have intensified the need for the development of crisis negotiation teams in agencies of all sizes. Although some agencies may be unable to budget for independent negotiation teams, or may not be staffed adequately enough to create a negotiations team, it is imperative that all agencies pre-plan in order to respond to such an incident. Low cost training and equipment grant options are available for agencies struggling with budgetary constraints, and task force or direct assistance options are available for agencies struggling with staffing shortages. Regardless of the issue, law enforcement agencies capable of employing any type of tactical response in a crisis situation should implement a crisis negotiation component in order to decrease liability and ensure the safest possible outcome for all parties involved.

This text focuses on operational theory and practice for negotiators by following a crisis intervention model for crisis negotiations. Its intent is to provide some depth and breadth of understanding for instructors, students, and line negotiators seeking excellence in the professional role of hostage crisis negotiator. The book is written principally to enhance negotiator confidence and competence, well-grounded in deliberate and effective use of self as an intervener and negotiator in critical incidents. The text seeks to provide a structure and framework for conducting negotiations. Major t

While there are many books on crisis negotiation, most of the current literature focuses on the history and mechanics of this dynamic process, leaving out critical elements that are required for a successful encounter with a hostage-taker or other malfeasant. Psychological Aspects of Crisis Negotiation, Second Edition explores the methods and strategies for confronting the nine types of subjects typically encountered in hostage/suicide sieges by correctional staff and law enforcement crisis negotiators. Drawn from articles published by Thomas Strentz while serving at the FBI Academy* along with written versions of lectures developed and delivered since his retirement, the book highlights psychological dynamics of negotiations as they apply to the negotiator, the hostage, and the subject. It discusses the predictors of surrender versus the need for a tactical intervention and examines the phases of a hostage crisis and the changing focus as the crisis develops. Referencing historical events such as The Bay of Pigs invasion and the Challenger and Columbia incidents, the book demonstrates how faulty group decision making can spell tragedy. Enhanced with case studies to put the material into context, this second edition also includes new chapters on the first responder, hostage survival, and the Islamic belief system and culture. Steeped in sage advice from a national expert, this volume arms those tasked with confronting dangerous offenders with the knowledge and tools they need to subvert disaster and ensure the preservation of human life. *Articles were reviewed by the Academy Editorial/Review Board and approved by the Bureau for publication.

States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases.

This paper reports on a series of experiments designed to assess the impact of grouping decision makers by level of cognitive complexity on the outcomes they attain in crisis negotiations. The participants—University of Maryland undergraduates who took roles in a simulated international hostage crisis—used a computer decision support system and a controlled network environment for communications. The goal of the experiments was to better understand the dynamics that lead certain types of groupings to have greater success in negotiations, and that lead certain groups of adversaries to achieve more mutually beneficial outcomes such as compromise and agreement. The findings point to a positive relationship between the level of homogeneity in cognitive complexity among decision makers and the achievement of positive outcomes in crisis negotiations.

AbstractOver the past several decades, crisis negotiation has become the primary method of dealing with hostage incidents in many countries of the world. This article uses the analytical framework of interest-based negotiation to provide a comparative analysis of the negotiation dynamics involved in barricade versus kidnapping incidents. The primary difference between the two scenarios is that the location of the victim(s) as well as that of the perpetrator(s) is unknown in kidnappings. As a result, many of the components of crisis negotiation that have been so successful in resolving barricade situations are inapplicable to kidnappings. This article should help the reader understand the critical differences between the two scenarios, and the implications of those differences for the likelihood of success of different crisis negotiation strategies. Central focus is devoted to premeditated incidents perpetrated by organized groups with a political, criminal, or religious motivation.