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This piece examines the curious nature of the conceptual foundations of current democracy promotion practice. I point out that while it is broadly accepted today that a liberal democratic politico-economic model should stand at the heart of democracy promotion, the scholarly literature on democracy-capitalism relationship stands in sharp contrast to this consensus in highlighting the contested nature of this relationship. Through a survey of some of the key theoretical texts on capitalism and democracy, and a brief empirical survey of politico-economic contours of current democracy promotion, this article highlights the poorly thought-through links between capitalism and democracy in current democracy promotion. It is argued here that un-reflexive conjoining of democracy and liberal capitalism and sidestepping of the plurality of nuanced positions on this relationship in scholarly literature is problematic and that revisiting the lines of contestation over the relationship between capitalism and democracy is deeply consequential for re-evaluating and revising democracy and market promotion policies in the current context of 'dual crisis' facing democracy promoters today. Adapted from the source document.

Der Beitrag setzt sich kritisch mit den demokratietheoretischen Konzepten von Huntington, Diamond, Przeworski und Di Palma auseinander. Besonderer Wert wird dabei auf die Unterscheidung zwischen einem Demokratiebegriff, der als zentrales Kriterium auf wirtschaftliche Liberalisierung setzt, und einem anderen, der sich in erster Linie an politischen Rechten und Freiheiten orientiert. Eine zu starke Betonung des Aspektes der wirtschaftlichen Liberalisierung, wie sie von Wissenschaftlern aus dem Westen oft vertreten wird, verweist auf imperialistische Interessen und trägt neokoloniale Züge. (DÜI-Spl)

The End of Liberalism by Theodore Lowi was and is an important book, large in conception, bold in execution, and substantial in influence. It is a provocative and influential statement of some of the problems of pluralism, or "interest-group liberalism." One of those problems is the inadequately constrained delegation of legislative problems to administrative agencies, leading to "the atrophy of institutions of popular control" (p. 86). The atrophy occurs because administrators exercise their discretion in ways set by agency-group relationships rather than by popular choice (p. 90). To solve this problem, Lowi calls for a return to "juridical democracy," which means, in part, limiting federal action "to those practices for which it is possible to develop a clear and authoritative rule of law, enacted democratically and implemented absolutely" (p. 271). One way of achieving that limit is by asking the Supreme Court to declare "invalid and unconstitutional any delegation of power to an administrative agency that is not accompanied by clear standards of implementation" (p. 298).Earlier this had been the view of Albert V. Dicey, the great British legal scholar. Dicey argued against the emerging administrative law on grounds that, by removing the defense of individual rights from the common courts, it would permit the growth of the welfare state. Lowi does not mention Dicey, and there is no indication that he is opposed to the substance of the welfare state.