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Democratic backsliding (meaning the state-led debilitation or elimination of the political institutions sustaining an existing democracy) has changed dramatically since the Cold War. Open-ended coups d'état, executive coups, and blatant election-day vote fraud are declining while promissory coups, executive aggrandizement and strategic electoral manipulation and harassment are increasing. Contemporary forms of backsliding are especially vexing because they are legitimated by the very institutions democracy promoters prioritize but, overall, backsliding today reflects democracy's advance and not its retreat. The current mix of backsliding is more easily reversible than the past mix and successor dictatorships are shorter-lived and less authoritarian.

ABSTRACTDespite the general narrative that the world is in a period of democratic decline, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies that assess whether this is systematically true. Most existing studies of global backsliding are based largely if not entirely on subjective indicators that rely on expert coder judgment. Our study surveys objective indicators of democracy (e.g., incumbent performance in elections) and finds little evidence of global democratic decline during the past decade. To explain the discrepancy in trends between expert-coded and objective indicators, we consider the role of coder bias and leaders strategically using more subtle undemocratic action. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the world is becoming less democratic exclusively in ways that require subjective judgment to detect, this claim is not justified by existing evidence.

Recent developments in Hungary and Poland have made democratic backsliding a major issue of concern within the European Union (EU). This article focuses on the secondary agents that facilitate democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland: the European People's Party (EPP), which has continually protected the Hungarian Fidesz government from EU sanctions, and the Hungarian ruling party Fidesz, which repeatedly promised to block any EU-level sanctions against Poland in the Council. The article analyses these agents' behaviour as an instance of transnational complicity and passes a tentative judgment as to which of the two cases is normatively more problematic. The analysis has implications for possible countervailing responses to democratic backsliding within EU member states.

Recent developments in Hungary and Poland have made democratic backsliding a major issue of concern within the European Union (EU). This article focuses on the secondary agents that facilitate democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland: the European People's Party (EPP), which has continually protected the Hungarian Fidesz government from EU sanctions, and the Hungarian ruling party Fidesz, which repeatedly promised to block any EU-level sanctions against Poland in the Council. The article analyses these agents' behaviour as an instance of transnational complicity and passes a tentative judgment as to which of the two cases is normatively more problematic. The analysis has implications for possible countervailing responses to democratic backsliding within EU member states.

Thomas M. Keck (Syracuse University - Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs) has posted Free Speech in an Age of Democratic Backsliding (International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2023) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: This review essay draws on...

The Trump presidency generated concern about democratic backsliding and renewed interest in measuring the national democratic performance of the United States. However, the US has a decentralized form of federalism that administers democratic institutions at the state level. Using 51 indicators of electoral democracy from 2000 to 2018, I develop a measure of subnational democratic performance, the State Democracy Index. I then test theories of democratic expansion and backsliding based in party competition, polarization, demographic change, and the group interests of national party coalitions. Difference-in-differences results suggest a minimal role for all factors except Republican control of state government, which dramatically reduces states' democratic performance during this period. This result calls into question theories focused on changes within states. The racial, geographic, and economic incentives of groups innationalparty coalitions may instead determine the health of democracy in the states.

We review recent contributions to the modeling of democratic backsliding. We organize these theories according to (a) the source of constraints on the executive (vertical or horizontal restrainers) and (b) the target of backsliding (electoral manipulation or executive aggrandizement), and then use these concepts to build a scaffold for a meta-model of democratic backsliding. This meta-model allows us to describe and compare the premises and insights of this scholarship. We further apply our two-dimensional classification to more than 30 empirical papers and show how these theories can guide research design. We conclude by highlighting open issues for future research.

Singapore is a well-known illiberal democracy, ruled by one party, the People's Action Party (PAP), uninterruptedly since 1959. The rise of disinformation, the leadership succession crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have posed challenges to the ruling party's technocratic, 'soft-authoritarian' governance style. Is it business as usual in Singapore? Or has its democracy backslid like its regional neighbours? Drawing on an established index of accountability and V-Dem's democratic indicators, our study investigates whether democratic institutions in hybrid regimes such as Singapore have changed. We find that mechanisms of diagonal accountability related to media and civil society have declined. Vertical and horizontal accountability remains weak as expected in a hybrid regime such as Singapore. The PAP government has returned to relying on the law as a 'fist in velvet glove' to muzzle dissent and constrain information that may last post pandemic.

Article by Meghna Pamula Although democracy has greatly expanded globally over the past few decades, democratic backsliding has been a topic of concern over recent years. Democratic backsliding is the state-led debilitation or elimination of the institutions sustaining democracy. Democracy is made up of factors such as voting rights, freedom of the governed, and minority […]
The post Income Inequality and Democratic Backsliding appeared first on The Lowe Down.

AbstractWe propose a theory of democratic backsliding where citizens' retrospective assessment of an incumbent politician depends on expectations that are endogenous to the incumbent's behaviour. We show that democratic backsliding can occur even when most citizens and most politicians intrinsically value democracy. By challenging norms of democracy, an incumbent can lower citizens' expectations; by not doubling down on this challenge, he can then beat this lowered standard. As a result, gradual backsliding can actually enhance an incumbent's popular support not despite but because of citizens' opposition to backsliding. This mechanism can only arise when citizens are uncertain enough about incumbents' preferences (e.g. owing to programmatically weak parties). Mass polarization, instead, can reduce the occurrence of backsliding while simultaneously increasing its severity.

AbstractThe twenty‐first century has been one of democratic backsliding. This has stimulated wide‐ranging scholarship on the causes of democratic erosion. Yet an overarching framework that identifies actors, behaviors, and decision processes has not been developed. I offer such a structure that includes elites (e.g., elected officials, the judiciary), societal actors (e.g., social movements, interest groups, media), and citizens. I discuss erosive threats stemming from each actor and the concomitant role of psychological mechanisms. The framework highlights the challenge of arriving at a holistic explanation of erosion within a given country during a finite period. It also accentuates why scholars should regularly consider the implications of their specific findings for democratic stability. I conclude by discussing various lessons and suggestions for how to study democratic backsliding.