Japanese Economic Model
In: Mirovaja ėkonomika i meždunarodnye otnošenija: MĖMO, Heft 1, S. 98-106
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In: Mirovaja ėkonomika i meždunarodnye otnošenija: MĖMO, Heft 1, S. 98-106
In: International journal of political economy: a journal of translations, Band 33, Heft 3, S. 28-49
ISSN: 0891-1916
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 21, Heft 1, S. 17-28
ISSN: 1549-9219
We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups currently in power are weak but can't be removed from power legitimately, the dissident groups are likely to initiate rebellion activity, such as civil wars & coups, to take over the rule of the governing elite themselves. In particular, the model exhibits multiple equilibria. For example, one equilibrium can be sustained where groups with limited access to opportunity may find it rational to engage in terrorist activities while policy-maker elites may find it rational not to engage in opening access to these groups. The result is, then, a pattern of reduced economic activity & increased terrorism. An alternative equilibrium can be sustained where access is more abundant & terrorism is reduced. 3 Figures, 19 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 21, Heft 1, S. 17-28
ISSN: 1549-9219
We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups currently in power are weak but can't be removed from power legitimately, the dissident groups are likely to initiate rebellion activity, such as civil wars and coups, to take over the rule of the governing elite themselves. In particular, the model exhibits multiple equilibria. For example, one equilibrium can be sustained where groups with limited access to opportunity may find it rational to engage in terrorist activities while policy-maker elites may find it rational not to engage in opening access to these groups. The result is, then, a pattern of reduced economic activity and increased terrorism. An alternative equilibrium can be sustained where access is more abundant and terrorism is reduced.
In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 23, Heft 5, S. 553-568
ISSN: 0161-8938
In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 23, Heft 5, S. 553-568
ISSN: 0161-8938
In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 17-28
ISSN: 0738-8942
In: Demokratizatsiya: the journal of post-Soviet democratization = Demokratizacija, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 17-25
ISSN: 1074-6846
In: Developments in politics: an annual review, Band 12, S. 113-114
ISSN: 0961-5431
In: Alternative voices in contemporary economics
In: Demokratizatsiya: the journal of post-Soviet democratization = Demokratizacija, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 17-25
ISSN: 1074-6846
World Affairs Online
In: The Diversity of Modern Capitalism, S. 171-224
In: Theory and society: renewal and critique in social theory, Band 32, Heft 5-6, S. 551-565
ISSN: 0304-2421
In: Topics in theoretical economics, Band 3, Heft 1
ISSN: 1534-598X
This paper considers the robustness of optimal decisions in a model of monopoly and a model of competitive equilibrium in a securities market. Robustness, defined as payoffs being continuous with respect to perturbations in the underlying model, fails to hold for either model. Decision rules are made robust by appropriately "smoothing" the problem, and by decreasing the weight given to small details of belief that can cause large changes in optimal payoffs.
In: Theory and society: renewal and critique in social theory, Band 32, Heft 5/6, S. 551-565
ISSN: 1573-7853