Suchergebnisse

Abstract
We develop a model in the presence of categories that creates a link between the agent's exogenous endowment and an endogenous reference point. The reference point is the best feasible alternative in the endowment's category. This reference generates a constraint set from which the final choice is made according to utility maximisation. The model predicts category bias, which generalises the status quo bias by attracting the agent to her endowment's category but not necessarily to the endowment itself. We show that it accommodates recent experimental findings regarding the presence and absence of status quo bias in the realm of uncertainty. In a stylised financial setup, we show that it may lead to a risk premium even with risk-neutral agents.

A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is: what determines the reference point? One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based, reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low. (JEL D12, D84, J22)