Suchergebnisse

What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to successfully illuminate the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political? How can such struggles be understood as involving collective struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination that seek to improve practices of knowledge production and make lives more liveable? In this paper, I argue that currently dominant, Fricker-inspired approaches to theorizing epistemic wrongs and remedies make it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the epistemic dimensions of historic and ongoing political struggles. Recent work in the theory of recognition—particularly the work of critical, feminist, and decolonial theorists—can help to identify and correct the shortcomings of these approaches. I offer a critical appraisal of recent conversation concerning epistemic injustice, focusing on three characteristics of Frickerian frameworks that obscure the epistemic dimensions of political struggles. I propose that a theory of epistemic injustice can better illuminate the epistemic dimensions of such struggles by acknowledging and centering the agency of victims in abusive epistemic relations, by conceptualizing the harms and wrongs of epistemic injustice relationally, and by explaining epistemic injustice as rooted in the oppressive and dysfunctional epistemic norms undergirding actual communities and institutions.

"Injustice and Inequalities in Health" published on by Oxford University Press.

Environmental justice (EJ) activists have long worked with abolitionists in their communities, critiquing the ways policing, prisons, and pollution are entangled and racially constituted. Yet, much EJ scholarship reflects a liberal Western focus on a more equal distribution of harms, rather than challenging the underlying systems of exploitation these harms rest upon. This article argues that policing facilitates environmentally unjust developments that are inherently harmful to nature and society. Policing helps enforce a social order rooted in the 'securing' of property, hierarchy, and human-nature exploitation. Examining the colonial continuities of policing, we argue that EJ must challenge the assumed necessity of policing, overcome the mythology of the state as 'arbiter of justice', and work to create social conditions in which policing is unnecessary. This will help open space to question other related harmful hegemonic principles. Policing drives environmental injustice, so EJ must embrace abolition.

According to his death certificate, Anthony Don Mitchell died as a result of hypothermia as well as "sepsis resulting from infections injuries obtained during incarceration and medical neglect." Mitchell was held for 14 days in the Walker County, Alabama, jail after he fired a gun towards officers who had come to his home for a…

Abstract
This paper focuses on the nature of the landlord/tenant relationship in uncontrolled rental housing markets. I argue that relational egalitarianism—the view that our social and political relations to one another ought not involve arbitrary power asymmetries—gives us moral reasons to criticize this relationship. In particular, I try to show that landlord/tenant relationships involve objectionable forms of economic subordination—more specifically, relations that involve exploitation and marginalization—as well as political inequality. I conclude the paper with some reflections on policy solutions to the problems I identify. Contrary to the consensus among most economists and government officials, not to mention landlords, I maintain that rent control should be seen as a legitimate and effective tool—among others—for curbing the power of landlords and protecting tenants.

Que revendique-t-on, dans le monde du travail, quand on demande une « plus grande reconnaissance » ? Derrière une multitude d'attentes, trois valeurs servent à se justifier : l'égalité, le mérite et l'autonomie. Or, ces trois principes entrent souvent en contradiction dans les situations pratiques. Comment arbitrer ? C'est à une théorie de la justice (et non de la reconnaissance) qu'il revient de faire le partage entre des revendications à la fois légitimes et contradictoires.