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This article proposes a political economy of extraction framework that explains political order and state collapse as alternative outcomes in the face of lootable wealth. Different types of institutions of extraction can be built on lootable resources—with divergent effects on political stability. If rulers are able to forge institutions of extraction that give them control of revenues generated by lootable resources, then these resources can contribute to political order by providing the income with which to govern. Conversely, the breakdown or absence of such institutions increases the risk of civil war by making it easier for rebels to organize. The framework is used to explain two puzzling cases that experienced sharply contrasting political trajectories in the face of lootable resources: Sierra Leone and Burma. A focus on institutions of extraction provides a stronger understanding of the wide range of political outcomes—from chaos, to dictatorship, to democracy—in resource-rich countries.

A well-developed thesis in political economy claims that crises create opportunities for change. Yet despite creating similar preferences for change, the Asian financial crisis led to reform of policies and institutions in some issue areas and in some countries of Southeast Asia, but not in others. In this essay I find that policies and institutions associated with technological upgrading of the economy, and particularly the manufacturing sector, are often immune to reform efforts, for two reasons. First, reform demands that policymakers know what to do; and second, they must know how to do it. Whether countries can discover and adopt new "templates" for reforming technology policies and institutions depends on the capacity of preexisting institutions to foster participative rather than simply consultative public-private collaboration. Such collaboration is most likely when decentralized yet coordinated bureaucracies facilitate meaningful participation from private actors, including business, labor, and academia, in forming, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing development policies.

Corporate governance describes the structures, processes, and institutions within and around organizations that allocate power and resource control among participants. Law and economics scholars have developed a view of the public corporation as a nexus-of-contracts whose structure is driven by the requirements of financial markets, and thus features of the corporation and its surrounding institutions are theorized in terms of their function in directing corporations toward share price as a criterion of value. Working from this base, more recent research has studied historical and cross-national variation in governance institutions, producing highly varied interpretations of their sources and function. Sociological work, particularly within organization theory, has critiqued this functionalist view and provided alternative interpretations based on networks, power, and culture. The most promising contemporary work seeks to analyze governance in terms of the dynamics of institutions—where they originate, how they operate, how they change, and how they spread beyond their original purposes.

The language choice at institutions of the European Union has been investigated in numerous studies examining such aspects as the European language constellation, institutional multilingualism and its possible reforms, linguistic capital and symbolic domination, and European identity related to the EU enlargement. In addition to these, studies researching the (language) practices at a specific EU institution, like the European Parliament, or analyzing EU organizational discursive practices have also been carried out. These studies, however, offer no insight into the way actors in EU institutions deal with multilingualism in their work place while producing texts for these institutions. It is for this reason that I decided to conduct a case study at the European Parliament to examine how advisers belonging to various political groups, despite their different national culture and distinct mother tongues, together succeed in producing what they call "panacea texts". Finally, a possible new language constellation for the EU is discussed.

The language choice at institutions of the European Union has been investigated in numerous studies examining such aspects as the European language constellation, institutional multilingualism & its possible reforms, linguistic capital & symbolic domination, & European identity related to the EU enlargement. In addition to these, studies researching the (language) practices at a specific EU institution, like the European Parliament, or analyzing EU organizational discursive practices have also been carried out. These studies, however, offer no insight into the way actors in EU institutions deal with multilingualism in their work place while producing texts for these institutions. It is for this reason that I decided to conduct a case study at the European Parliament to examine how advisers belonging to various political groups, despite their different national culture & distinct mother tongues, together succeed in producing what they call "panacea texts." Finally, a possible new language constellation for the EU is discussed. 51 References. Adapted from the source document.

Objective. This article examines the factors that determine whether an intercollegiate athletic program is in compliance with Title IX, the statute requiring gender equity in educational programs. Methods. I conduct a series of econometric regressions that examine the compliance status of Division I institutions as well as the progress they have made toward compliance. Results. Large institutions & institutions with a lower percentage of female undergraduates are more likely to be in compliance. Institutions with football programs are less likely to be in compliance as are schools in the south. The effect of football revenues, operating budgets, & NCAA sanctions varies across division as well as compliance area. Conclusions. The results of the analysis indicate that current enforcement mechanisms have been relatively ineffective at increasing compliance & that some change either in enforcement or compliance standards is warranted. Additionally, a one-size-fits-all enforcement approach is unlikely to be effective. 7 Tables, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.

The hypothesis: The main aim of this paper is to analyse three central issues of the governance of the EU. It seeks to locate the EU institutions in a comparative politics context, which allows us to go beyond the detailed configurative studies of the EU institutions that already exist and place them in a context, which allows differentiation between formal political institutions, informal conventions and the norms and beliefs embedded within those institutions. The shortcomings of employing the new institutional approach to the study of the EU are more related to the general weaknesses of this particular perspective. The problem is that little but common scepticism toward atomistic accounts of social processes and a common conviction that institutional arrangements and social processes matter unites various branches of the new institutionalism. New institutionalism seeks to impose a unity of perspective on a set of figures that actually have little in common.

ABSTRACT. The paper discusses the role of uncertainty in economic sociology, aiming to clarify some controversial issues in the related literature. Initially, some conceptual remarks are made about the relation between economic sociology, neoclassical economics, and rational choice theory. Next, in light of the existing literature on uncertainty and economic sociology, we distinguish between complexity and different types of uncertainty. We also identify different versions of the maximization hypothesis and examine their relations to the different types of uncertainty. Then we defend a concept of fundamental uncertainty that emphasizes the role of institutions. A theory that combines fundamental uncertainty and institutions should emphasize not only the existence of behavior in accordance with institutions, but also the possibility of creative, bold, unconventional behavior, discussed next, as people may use the knowledge provided by institutions to go against the tide. Finally, we suggest that the primary distinction should be that between approaches to economic issues, not between disciplines.

The theory of boundary organizations was developed to address an important group of institutions in American society neglected by scholarship in science studies and political science. The long-term stability of scientific and political institutions in the United States has enabled a new class of institutions to grow and thrive as mediators between the two. As originally developed, this structural feature of these new institutions—that is, their location on the boundary between science and politics—dominated theoretical frame-works for explaining their behavior. Applying the theory of boundary organizations to international society requires a refocusing of some of the theory's central features, however. In this article, I introduce a new framework—hybrid management—to explain the activities of boundary organizations in the more complex, contingent, and contested settings of global politics. I develop the framework of hybrid management using the specific example of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change's Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice.

Problems of representation lie at the centre of recent experiments in deliberative democracy. The problems are not primarily social scientific questions concerning the statistical representiveness of small-scale deliberative institutions but normative questions about their political and ethical legitimacy. Experiments in deliberative democracy often rely for their representative legitimacy on appeals to the presence of members of different groups. However, they often do so without clear sources of authorisation and accountability from those represented. The representation of nonhumans and future generations in deliberative institutions is still more problematic. In the necessary absence of their authorisation, accountability, and presence, claims to speak on their behalf relies on epistemic claims, coupled with care. To highlight these problems is not to claim that small deliberative institutions are illegitimate but rather to point out the need for a clearer account of their role in democratic institutions and the proper sources of contestability of their outcomes.

In the 1990s, the concept of civil society has inspired a variety of publications by Western scholars studying the Middle East and has become the rallying cry for representatives of Western governments interested in promoting democracy in the region. The great majority of such publications and government promotions assume that the Middle East does not have, or has only in very weakly developed forms, the institutions that constitute a civil society. By "civil institutions" they mean such things as labor unions, political parties, independent newspapers and universities, and, most important, voluntary associations—for example, human-rights organizations, professional associations, charitable organizations, and non-governmental organizations.1 Discounted in this discussion is the possibility that the Middle East has its own resilient civil institutions undergoing their own transformations in the global society at the end of the century. In Jordan, this gigantic oversight reflects a misunderstanding of what "tribal" institutions are and do.

Theories of international cooperation rely on claims about joint gains to argue that governments create international institutions to mitigate information and enforcement problems and realize efficient solutions. We present a model in which politicians propose international institutions to resolve domestic political dilemmas and suggest that the international institutions they propose are sometimes intentionally redistributive. We apply both approaches to the Basle Accord and conclude that domestic politics rather than international market failure motivated American policymakers to propose international regulation, that through international regulation the United States sought to redistribute income from Japanese to American commercial banks, and that, therefore, the Basle Accord did not offer joint gains. Agreement was reached only after the United States used financial market power to eliminate the regulatory status quo. The Basle Accord is an instance of redistributive cooperation. The case suggests that domestic politics should supplant aggregate benefits in explanations of why governments propose and create international institutions.

Since 1989, Germany's domestic and international environments have experienced significant changes. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the country's long-standing foreign and domestic policies will adapt to novel challenges and pressures. This article examines eastern trade policy, an area in which one might expect to observe a greater degree of government intervention postunification. In fact, no such adaptation has taken place. This empirical puzzle lends itself to analysis based on the interaction of interests, institutions, and ideas. Unification altered the prevailing constellation of material economic interests in Germany, as well as parliamentary-electoral institutions. However, the events of 1989 to 1990 left untouched dominant ideas that shaped the West German political economy, as well as crucial sets of domestic and international institutions linked to those ideas. The authors conclude that the absence of an interventionist trade response stems from continuity at the nexus of ideas and institutions in unified Germany.

Notes that logistics costs in the grocery sector, in Italy, are about 25,000 billion lire and that in order to reduce these costs logistics integration has to be improved between institutions of the distribution channel. Focuses on two of the main institutions of the grocery distribution channel: branded product industry and large‐scale trade. Referring to these institutions and to the logistics functions they carry out, analyses integration areas in order to identify some organizational and managerial solutions for improving interfunctional and interorganizational co‐ordination. In particular, divides these solutions into three main groups according to the level of integration they refer to: internal integration (inside each business), vertical integration (between businesses located at different stages of the channel) and horizontal integration (between different businesses located on the same level of the channel). Internal and horizontal integration are the prerequisites for achieving vertical integration and consequently for achieving synergies between the institutions involved.