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Cooperating to strengthen Japan's cyber defences and develop new offensive cyberweapons must be the first priority of any AUKUS collaboration involving Japan. Not only is this now key to Japan's security, but it is a ...

Long-standing unresolved colonial history and territorial issues between China and Japan, as well as the two countries' opposing world views, have increasingly manifested in the escalation of tensions. With high-level political/diplomatic communication at a standstill, the relationship has become adrift.

Ahead of the recent official visit with Japan, the US, UK, and Australia announced that they're considering bringing Japan into the folds of AUKUS. More security cooperation between the United States and Japan is exactly what's needed. Now is not the right time.
The post Japan in AUKUS? Why That's Premature appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.

Japan has gone through a gradual process of dismantling its self-imposed ban on exporting lethal weapons, a process that reached a new plateau with last month's decision to permit the export to third countries of the next-generation fighter aircraft to be developed jointly with the United Kingdom and Italy.When this policy change is read in conjunction with the U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders' Statement issued on April 10, 2024, it is likely that Japan has agreed to jointly develop and produce missiles with the United States and export them to third countries. (It also marks the latest development in its departure from its pacifist defense policy that dates back to the immediate post-World War II era.) This article tries to explain the background and implications of Japan's policy changes.Eroding the arms export banAfter the end of World War II, the Japanese government refrained from exporting arms. In 1967, then-Prime Minister Eisaku Sato made it clear that Japan would not allow the export of weapons either to communist countries, countries whose arms exports are prohibited by U.N. resolutions, or countries involved in international conflicts. In 1976, the cabinet of his successor, Takeo Miki, issued a unified government opinion that banned all arms export. Despite some subsequent exceptions, such as the supply to the United States of technologies related to missile defense, Japan continued to make it a national policy to refrain from exporting arms.The ban on arms exports began to wear away in 2011. In that year, the cabinet of then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, the leader of the Democratic Party of Japan, eased regulations in order to permit joint development of weapons with countries that cooperate with Japan on security matters, and export the products to partners in the joint development program. Pursuant to this exception, Japan tried to sell jointly produced submarines to Australia in 2015-16.In 2014, the cabinet of then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe enabled the export of military equipment for such uses as rescue, transport, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Under this reform, Mitsubishi Electric began delivering the Air Surveillance Radar Systems to the Philippine Air Force just last year.In December 2023, the cabinet of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida approved exporting domestically produced weapons under license to the provider of the license. Thus, PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors, which are manufactured in Japan under a U.S. license, will be exported to the U.S., effectively replacing what Washington has provided to Ukraine in its war against Russia. This measure is reportedly based on a request from the U.S. government.Getting close to lifting the whole banMost recently, Kishida made a cabinet decision on March 26 to permit the export to third countries of the next-generation fighter aircraft that will be developed jointly with the United Kingdom and Italy. At the same time, the National Security Council amended the Implementation Guidelines on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Although the government set three conditions on the export of fighter jets to third countries in the document, the new policy change has broad implications.First, the government asserts that exports to third countries will be allowed only for the next-generation fighter aircraft, which is the only item now listed in the Implementation Guidelines. However, joint development of Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) and unmanned aerial vehicles is already under consideration. The very recent U.S.-Japan joint statement also put missiles on the agenda. Once these are materialized, the only thing the government will have to do is add them to the guidelines.Second, Japan and the recipient country must "conclude an international agreement obligating the use of defense equipment transferred from Japan in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." Currently, 15 countries are signatories to such agreements, including some authoritarian regimes like Vietnam and the United Arab Emirates. Negotiations are underway with Bangladesh to conclude a similar agreement. The number of signatory countries that will presumably be eligible to buy the jointly-developed weapons will continue to grow. Third, the ban on exporting the fighter to "a country where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of an armed conflict" will remain in effect. For example, if a next-generation fighter plane were completed tomorrow, Japan could not export it to Ukraine. Once sold to an eligible buyer, however, it would of course be possible that it could be transferred to a country that is engaged in conflict.Rationales for deregulationThe most recent decision, of course, begs the questions of why Japan is so determined to pursue joint development and export, and why it chose the United Kingdom and Italy as its partners.First and foremost, declining to engage in joint production and exports to third countries would be tantamount to abandoning the efficient introduction of advanced weapons systems in Japan's future. When the United States started the joint development with its allies and partners of the F-35, Japan was unable to participate in the program because its arms export ban was intact at the time. As a result, Tokyo had to pay much more to buy the warplane and also wait much longer for delivery. As weapon systems become more sophisticated and development costs soar, forgoing participation in the joint development of advanced weapon systems would very negatively affect Tokyo's arms procurement policy. Moreover, other participants in a joint development program would effectively disqualify participation by a country that did not agree to the export to third countries. When it comes to arms procurement, Tokyo has been disappointed with Washington's performance. In 1987, Japan and the United States began co-production of the current support fighter, the F-2. During the process, however, the U.S. assumed complete control of the development and refused to disclose key technologies to Japan. In the late 2000s, Japan showed interest in purchasing the F-22, but was rebuffed by the U.S. In more recent years, aspects of U.S. weapons development goals have failed to meet the needs of the Self-Defense Forces. As a result, Tokyo has grown skeptical of Washington's willingness to be flexible. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, appears to have satisfied Japanese requirements for partnership in the joint development of the next-generation fighters.Domestically, more than 100 companies have withdrawn from the defense industry over the past 20 years, and there is a growing sense of crisis in maintaining the country's defense industrial base and employment. Because the Japanese companies have limited experience and the domestic market is still too small, the only way to preserve and promote the industry is through joint production and export.There is a strong desire within the Japanese government to strengthen the alliance and enhance deterrence against China through cooperation with the United States. The Russia-Ukraine war has also reinforced the government's belief that relying on the U.S. alone will be insufficient in the event of a future conflict with China, and that Japan will need broader support from the West. In this view, joint development is useful for deepening security relationships with the West. In addition, Japan hopes to create a more favorable security environment by exporting arms to Southeast Asia and elsewhere.Finally, nostalgia for the pre-World War II period also has its appeal for some Japanese. As former Prime Minister Abe advocated "dismantling the postwar regime," many Diet members from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party want to once again realize the "combination of military and nationalism" that existed before the war. Fostering the defense industry through arms exports has been their long-cherished wish.After approving the export of jointly developed weapons to third countries, political leaders vow that Japan would uphold its basic principles as a peace-loving nation. Coupled with a sharp increase in defense spending and the stipulation of "counterstrike capabilities" that enables attacks on other national territories in its National Security Strategy, however, few would take these words at face value. At the very least, the meaning of "peace-loving nation" has changed completely. While the main pillar of the traditional notion of peace-loving nation was for Japan to maintain its military asceticism and not become a threat, Japan today emphasizes the reinforcement of deterrence in order to achieve peace.Unfortunately, the military buildup that Japan has recently embarked on and the increase in arms exports alone is unlikely to bring about the improvement in the security environment that Japan desires. Despite the Biden administration's apparent increased density of dialogue with China following the November 2023 U.S.-China summit, Tokyo has recently shown virtually no interest in direct communication with China. If Tokyo pursues deterrence by further building its military infrastructure, promoting arms exports, and strengthening alliances without offering reassurance to Beijing, it will inevitably result in the security dilemma for both countries. The real concern is that Japan is underestimating the risk.

History has shown that Washington's international economic policies often belie its lofty rhetoric about the importance of the bilateral relationship with Japan, as domestic politics continue to triumph over sound policy.

On 14 November, Aso Taro, the vice president of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, called for Japan to be included in the AUKUS trilateral security partnership with Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. ...

Strategically, Japan and Australia have more in common than just about any two nations—to the extent that we are allies in all but treaty status. Australia wants—and in fact needs—that relationship to get even closer. ...

Update, Dec. 7 at 8:48 a.m.: The Pentagon announced that it will ground its entire Osprey fleet after announcing that all eight airmen onboard the V-22 that crashed off the coast of Japan had died. Since last year, 19 service members have died in V-22 training crashes.A V-22 Osprey crashed over the sea near Japan on Wednesday, killing at least one of the aircraft's eight crew members and marking the fourth deadly accident involving the controversial aircraft since 2022.The exact reasons for the crash, as well as the condition of the other soldiers onboard, remain unknown at this time. Some witnesses said one of the aircraft's engines "appeared to be on fire as it approached an airport for an emergency landing, despite clear weather and light wind," according to a Reuters report drawing on local Japanese news outlets.The Osprey, known for its distinctive "tiltrotor" design that allows it to take off like a helicopter and fly like a plane, has earned a reputation in its two decades of service as one of the least reliable aircraft in the Pentagon's stockpile, leading some to dub it the "widow maker." Osprey crashes have now left at least 12 soldiers dead in less than two years. These incidents have led some analysts to call for the V-22 to be retired.While other aircraft have higher overall crash rates, the Osprey stands out for the circumstances in which accidents have occurred, according to Julia Gledhill of the Project on Government Oversight."[W]hat's striking about the Osprey is that since the aircraft became operational in 2007, most of the fatalities involving the aircraft have happened during training exercises, not active operations," Gledhill wrote in RS earlier this year.Persistent issues with the Osprey's engine and gearbox have led the Air Force, Marines, and Navy to each ground at least part of their fleet over the past year. It is not clear which service was operating the Osprey that crashed near Japan on Wednesday.The V-22 is not the only military plane that has seen an increase in crashes in recent years, a fact that experts attribute to poor oversight and a steady drop in flight hours for pilots, many of whom spend much of their training time in simulations rather than in the air.The Pentagon created a new Joint Safety Council last year in response to the uptick in crashes, but the panel has yet to publish any public reports or share the status of its work.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

The Biden White House is reportedly trying to rein in the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Rahm Emanuel, whose social media trolling of the Chinese government in recent weeks has become increasingly combative. According to NBC News, Biden aides have asked Emanuel to stop mocking Xi Jinping online over China's economic woes and the removal of several high-profile officials. As one anonymous White House official drily put it, the tweets were "not in keeping with the message coming out of this building." Emanuel's sarcastic criticism of the Chinese government and Xi has predictably irritated Beijing, and that has been undermining the administration's efforts to stabilize the deteriorating U.S.-Chinese relationship. As one administration official said, "It just fights what we are doing there in the region." A former administration official quoted in the report was blunter: "They're trying to calm things down and to have the ambassador to Japan attack the Chinese? It's stupid."Emanuel was always a curious choice for a prominent diplomatic post, given his record as a crude, knife-fighting political operative, but in recent weeks he outdid himself with his trolling comments about China. When the then-defense minister, Li Shangfu, had not been seen in public for several weeks, Emanuel tweeted a mocking reference to Agatha Christie's "And Then There Were None" as he called attention to the growing list of top Chinese officials removed from their positions over the last few months. This briefly earned the ambassador some favorable coverage back home, including a report in The Wall Street Journal last week that billed him as a "warrior diplomat," but like the so-called wolf warrior tactics that Emanuel has been imitating it ended up backfiring on him.The ambassador's social media antics have done nothing to advance U.S. interests, and it is hard to see how it benefits Japan or the U.S.-Japanese relationship to have our ambassador in Tokyo flinging insults at a neighboring country. As the NBC News report said, a "second administration official said for Emanuel to make these comments makes no sense and does not advance U.S. strategic goals with China or with the Asia-Pacific region." The U.S. doesn't send its ambassadors abroad so that they can play at being the ugly American for online clout, but lately that seems to be what Emanuel thinks his job is. It was a mistake to appoint Emanuel as an ambassador, and it was even worse to send him to a region where tensions are already high enough without having a top U.S. official throwing rhetorical bombs every week. Diplomats don't have to be quiet or boring, but they do need to be professional and responsible in what they say because they aren't just speaking for themselves. The White House is right to get Emanuel back in line. It remains to be seen if he will stay there. Emanuel's public attacks on China illustrate the limited utility of aggressive, hawkish posturing. Mocking Xi and the Chinese government over their current difficulties is juvenile at best, and to the extent that it contributes to further mistrust and hostility it can have real consequences for the bilateral relationship that can undercut U.S. policies and cause damage to U.S. and allied interests. While Emanuel may not take his responsibility seriously, representing the U.S. overseas is not a game. Especially when it concerns powerful rival states, diplomats need to take extra care in what they say, how they say it, and where they say it. They certainly shouldn't be freelancing with pointed public attacks on the rival's leadership because it amuses them.Making playground taunts of foreign leaders may seem harmless enough, but such slights help to erode goodwill between governments and provide fodder to hardliners in the other country that thrive on contempt and anger. Emanuel may imagine that he is boldly "calling out" the Chinese government for its failures, but it doesn't hurt their government to have an obnoxious foreign diplomat attacking them in public. If anything, it is useful to their propagandists to have someone like Emanuel as a foil. All that it does it make the work of real U.S. diplomats that much harder, and ultimately that means that the U.S. ends up absorbing higher costs down the road.When U.S. diplomacy is successful, it secures U.S. interests in other parts of the world at the lowest possible cost. It can be challenging and sometimes dangerous work, and it is almost never glamorous, but when it is done right it can achieve far more through negotiation and compromise than can be achieved by force, threats, and denunciations. Emanuel is the product of a political culture that prizes the latter and hates the former, and so it isn't surprising that he is not suited at all to the task of being a diplomat. One of the weaknesses of U.S. diplomacy is the selection of unqualified political appointees for ambassadorial roles. No other major government hands out ambassadorial posts on the basis of political cronyism and donations. As a result, they typically avoid the embarrassments and scandals that come from being represented by people that have no training or aptitude for diplomatic work. There may sometimes be some value in having political allies of the president in a foreign capital, but most of the time it does little to help advance U.S. interests. In some cases, it can work against them. It is good that the Biden administration is trying to get one of its loose cannons under control, but it would be much better if we had a system in which only career diplomats served as our ambassadors in every country.There is a legitimate role for criticism of other governments in the practice of U.S. diplomacy, but it has to be part of a coordinated policy aimed at securing real benefits for the American people. Trolling the Chinese leadership over their internal problems just antagonizes their government and achieves nothing of value. Before sounding off in public, an ambassador or any other U.S. official needs to ask what purpose is being served by the criticism and whether that is the smartest way to respond. Does a public attack bring the U.S. closer to advancing its interests, or does it create an additional obstacle that makes that more difficult? Obviously, Emanuel didn't bother to ask those questions.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso is an outspoken advocate of Japan's joining AUKUS – as reflected in his recent speech in Canberra to the AIIA. He also has a record of hawkish comments on Taiwan, but how much influence does he wield within the Japanese government and in his own party?

A piece missing from Australian conversations on the China–US tangle over Taiwan is the island's growing strategic importance to other countries in the region. What happens between Beijing and Taipei matters for Japan and South ...

Japan and South Korea have the lowest fertility rates in the world. Labour rights can improve this phenomenon, but an attachment to tradition has hampered their responses despite broader moves for equality.

Driven by their common perception that North Korea and China posed growing threats to their nations' security, U.S. President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida agreed at last August's summit at Camp David to elevate trilateral military ties to an unprecedented level. They have been demonstrating this commitment everyday since, some say to the detriment of stabilizing relations with Pyongyang and Beijing.In recent years, North Korea has steadily expanded its nuclear arsenal and become more aggressive in its rhetoric and posturing. In light of Taiwan's deepening resistance to the idea of eventual unification with mainland China, an impatient Beijing appears to be relying increasingly on displays of its increasing military might, too, as a way to demonstrate its own determination to bring the territory under its control, raising concerns that it may yet resort to force to achieve unification in the coming years. Since the Camp David summit, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo have worked to enhance their collective combat readiness, such as conducting regular joint naval and aerial maneuvers in regional maritime and air spaces, to strengthen deterrence and demonstrate their own opposition to North Korea and China. Policymakers in the three capitals may believe that continuous reinforcement of trilateral military cooperation and posturing will act as a deterrent to aggressive behavior by Pyongyang and Beijing. However, such optimism may prove unfounded. The evolving Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral partnership might pose considerable risks because their approach to deterrence overlooks security dilemmas faced by North Korea and China. In a new Quincy Institute report, Mike Mochizuki and I examine this issue and offer recommendations to address it. Insecurity about regime survival plays a decisive role in North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and its strategic calculations as to whether and when to use them. An effective strategy to deal with North Korea would therefore seek to deter North Korea but, at the same time, to avoid fueling its anxiety about foreign efforts to engineer regime change or collapse. Unfortunately, the current trilateral approach appears likely to exacerbate Pyongyang's worst fears and insecurities in this regard. In seeking to deter North Korea, Washington, Seoul, and increasingly Tokyo are relying on offensive military capabilities and doctrines to retaliate against possible North Korean aggression. Emphasizing offensive military functions can indeed bolster deterrence in many circumstances, but they may also overshadow their defensive intentions and thereby contribute to North Korea's conviction that only stronger nuclear capabilities and more offensive nuclear posture and strategy can guarantee regime protection and survival. As Pyongyang continues to make progress in its nuclear and missile development, U.S., South Korean, and Japanese policymakers may become tempted to respond with a more offensive collective military posture and bigger and more threatening joint exercises. Such a response, however, may exceed the basic requirements for deterrence and can thus fuel escalation dynamics, increasing the risks of actual conflict. In our report, we offer alternative suggestions to deter North Korea without undermining stability. Regarding the Taiwan issue, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul have now adopted an implicit yet firm trilateral stance against possible Chinese use of force to achieve unification, stating in their joint communique their strong opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the region. While the unambiguous trilateral opposition to unification by force can benefit deterrence, it needs to be coupled with efforts to credibly reassure China that the trilateral partnership will not try to promote Taiwan's permanent separation. In terms of reassuring China on the Taiwan issue, all three capitals are falling short so far, as they appear to have become increasingly indifferent to, or even ambivalent about, the importance of reaffirming their respective One China policies in recent years.The ostensible U.S., Japanese, and South Korean reluctance to reaffirm their One China policies as clearly as they did in previous years risks feeding into Beijing's suspicion that Washington is orchestrating a containment coalition to pursue a "One China, One Taiwan" policy. Such an interpretation of the trilateral partnership's intent will likely be bolstered if Washington begins to accept the notion that Taiwan should be permanently kept separate from the mainland for the sake of U.S. regional military advantage. U.S. policymakers may be tempted to involve Japan and South Korea in joint combat operational planning for a Taiwan contingency, but moving in that direction can make escalation and conflict more likely by compounding Bejing's fears and fueling its resolve to reshape the status quo in its favor. To decrease the risk of conflict over Taiwan, we suggest that Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul devote more attention to stabilizing relations with China through credible reassurances on the Taiwan issue. They should also pursue a defensive-denial approach to Taiwan contingency planning, which we explain more in our report. The three countries should also be alert to the possibility that their transition into an overtly anti-China coalition may prompt Beijing to create a countervailing anti-U.S. military partnership with Russia and North Korea. China has so far maintained a relative distance from the tightening of military ties between Russia and North Korea that has taken place since the former's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russia reportedly proposed China trilateral naval drills with North Korea last year. The fact that such drills have not yet taken place indicates that Beijing remains cautious about the idea of trilateral military cooperation with Moscow and Pyongyang. Indeed, China has an interest in constructive engagement with the United States, Japan, and South Korea and likely prefers not to further jeopardize it by pursuing an outright military bloc formation with Russia and North Korea. However, its calculation may change if it comes to believe that the Japan-U.S.-South Korea partnership poses too serious a threat to its core interests, such as Taiwan and economic development. The recent call between President Biden and Xi Jinping suggested that Beijing views U.S.-led economic and technological restrictions as second only to the Taiwan issue as an area of concern with the potential for conflict. With that in mind, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul should tread carefully with their coordination of "de-risking" with China. U.S.-led "de-risking" risks going beyond simply seeking to reduce Chinese access to advanced technologies with clear military applications to the point of threatening China's economy. Even while working together to tackle genuine economic challenges posed by China, such as coordinating responses to China's economic coercion, the three countries should seek to promote inclusive economic and diplomatic engagement with Beijing to reassure it that they do not intend to create a broad exclusionary anti-China economic or technological bloc. We offer several ways to do this in our report. U.S. policymakers should also keep in mind that President Yoon's conservative policy preferences and philosophy have played a key role in enhancing trilateral military ties and cooperation. But what would happen if South Korean voters, in 2027, elect a liberal president who would be more sensitive to historical disputes with Japan and prefer a more congenial approach to North Korea and China? In such a case, trilateral cooperation centered on confronting North Korea and China may cease to be viable.For the trilateral partnership to be more sustainable and synergetic, it should be oriented around reducing tensions and mitigating risks of conflict with China and North Korea. Such an approach would better serve U.S. interests by enhancing regional stability and allowing safer and more productive competition with China. It is also more likely to garner broader public support in both South Korea and Japan beyond the current political alignment between the two countries.

The most important security issue for the United States, the contest/competition/rivalry with China, may soon fade away.The plausibility of this proposition is enhanced if we take as a parallel not the rivalry with the USSR during the Cold War, but the one that smoked through the 1980s and early 1990s when Japan appeared to be becoming "Number One." The rather benign ending of that rivalry may have something to say about what will happen as China slides into what many suggest will be a lengthy period of slow growth or even stagnation.In both cases, the perceived threats have been primarily economic.JapanAs with China today, concerns about Japanese economic growth and business practices were once intense and widespread.In a 1987 best-seller, Yale's Paul Kennedy confidently listed a set of reasons why Japan was likely to expand faster than other major powers, stressing the country's "immensely strong" industrial bedrock and its docile and diligent work force. He also predicted that Japan was likely to become "much more powerful" economically. Meanwhile, Harvard's Samuel Huntington assured us, in phrases that sound much like what we are hearing about the China challenge today, that a need had suddenly arisen to fear not "missile vulnerability" but "semiconductor vulnerability," that "economics is the continuation of war by other means," and that there was danger in the fact that Japan had become the largest provider of foreign aid and had endowed professorships at Harvard and MIT. One book of the time was even entitled, "The Coming War with Japan," and some analysts argued that Japan by natural impulse would soon come to yearn for nuclear weapons.Fareed Zakaria, managing editor of Foreign Affairs at the time, recalled a few years ago his experience "sorting through manuscript after manuscript arguing that Japan was going to take over the world."The public responded to this threatening perspective — especially after the diabolical Japanese bought Rockefeller Center (which they later sold at a loss) and a major Hollywood film studio. By 1989, the Japanese "threat" was seen by the public to be nearly comparable to the one posed by the still heavily armed Soviet Union, and America was convinced that Japan would be the number one economic power in the next century.Politicians predictably followed suit, finding that Japan-bashing sold well. In 1987, several members of Congress publicly sledgehammered Toshiba products on the front steps of the Capitol. Meanwhile, Donald Trump complained at the time, "They come over here, they sell their cars, their VCRs. They knock the hell out of our companies," and, "First they take all our money with their consumer goods, then they put it back in buying all of Manhattan."These concerns evaporated in the early 1990s when Japan's "threatening" economy stagnated and the American one surged. Huntington quickly decided that, as it turned out, the real problem was actually a "clash of civilizations" like the one going on at the time in Bosnia, and Kennedy moved on to warn of the dangers from job‑stealing robots and — as the rise in world population began to stagnate or even reverse — population explosions.ChinaWhen he began his quest for the presidency in 2016, Trump tried Japan-bashing again, designating it along with China and Mexico as a country where "we are getting absolutely crushed on trade."However, by that time Japan's growth had been mostly flat, and trade friction had become much more subdued even though the United States continued (and still continues) to run large trade deficits with Japan while Japan can still make foreign investment difficult.China-bashing sold much better, as Trump found out in a speech in which his line, "We can't allow China to rape our country, and that's what we're doing," inspired an approving roar from the audience. Trump spent the rest of the 2016 campaign building on that theme and repeating much of it in his 2020 campaign, as did many other candidates.Something similar to the Japanese experience may now be happening with the China threat as its growth slumps and the U.S., far from being "displaced" in its GDP ranking as number one, retains its statistical advantage.Most troubling for China is a growing set of difficulties, most of them deriving from a determination to prioritize control by the antiquated and kleptocratic Chinese Communist Party over economic development. The list of resulting problems is substantial: endemic corruption, environmental degradation, slowing growth, capricious shifts in government policies (including the abruptly canceled "zero COVID" policy), inefficient enterprises, fraudulent statistical reporting, a rapidly aging population, enormous overproduction, huge youth unemployment, increasing debt, a housing bubble, restive minorities, the alienation of Western investors, and a clampdown on civil liberties. There also seems to be something of a decline in confidence in, and in the credibility of, the Communist Party's dictates, a change that could have dire long‐term consequences for the regime.The ComparisonThere are some non-comparable elements between the cases, of course. Despite books like "The Coming War with Japan," concerns about Tokyo were less military than they are for China, which has increased its defense expenditures and is accused of threatening to invade Taiwan and becoming a dominant "hegemon" in its area, while expanding its global reach.Nonetheless, the perceived threat remains mainly economic. For example, a recent report by a devotedly anti-China committee in Congress restricts its concerns to what it calls China's "economic aggression" (while recommending a series of changes including a rise in tariffs that might cost the American economy nearly two trillion dollars over five years).Although books entitled "Destined for War" may continue to sell for a while, China's economic stagnation (but not collapse) is in the air, and some elements of its counterproductive "wolf warrior" diplomacy have been relaxed. As a result, the political appeal of China-bashing may be headed for a degree of remission.When Toyota became the number one car maker in the U.S. in recent years, scarcely anyone noticed and fewer cared. If there's an electric car in the future, it may well be Chinese. But, if the Japan analogy holds, it is likely that the reaction will be much the same.

As the US, Taiwan and Australia struggle to assemble forces to face the challenge of a rapidly arming China, Japan is planning to discard good equipment that could be kept in service. It proposes to ...