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Beginning with the assumption that philosophy - the Greek love of wisdom - is alive and well in American culture, this work traverses American life to find places in the wider culture where professional philosophy in the distinctively American tradition can strike up a conversation

Preliminary Materials /B. Mou -- Constructive-Engagement Movement In View Of Searle'S Philosophy And Chinese Philosophy: A Theme Introduction /Bo Mou -- Chapter One. The Globalization Of Philosophy /John R. Searle -- Chapter Two. Analysis Of Searle's Philosophy Of Mind And Critique From A Neo-Confucian Point Of View /Chung-Ying Cheng -- Reply To Chung-Ying Cheng /John R. Searle -- Chapter Three. Wú-Wéi, The Background, And Intentionality /Chris Fraser -- Reply To Chris Fraser /John R. Searle -- Chapter Four. A Daoist Critique Of Searle On Mind And Action /Joel W. Krueger -- Reply To Joel W. Krueger /John R. Searle -- Chapter Five. The Philosopher And The Sage: Searle And The Sixth Patriarch On The Brain And Consciousness /Robert E. Allinson -- Reply To Robert Allinson /John R. Searle -- Chapter Six. Searle And Buddhism On The Mind And The Non-Self /Soraj Hongladarom -- Reply To Soraj Hongladarom /John R. Searle -- Chapter Seven. Reference, Truth, And Fiction /A.P. Martinich -- Reply To A.P. Martinich /John R. Searle -- Chapter Eight. How To Do Zen (Chan) With Words? An Approach Of Speech Act Theory /Yiu-Ming Fung -- Reply To Yiu-Ming Fung /John R. Searle -- Chapter Nine. Searle, De Re Belief, And The Chinese Language /Marshall D. Willman -- Reply To Marshall D. Willman /John R. Searle -- Chapter Ten. Confucianism And The Is-Ought Question /A.T. Nuyen -- Reply To A.T. Nuyen /John R. Searle -- Chapter Eleven. Xun Zi On Capacity, Ability And Constitutive Rules /Kim-Chong Chong -- Reply To Kim-Chong Chong /John R. Searle -- Chapter Twelve. Weakness Of Will, The Background, And Chinese Thought /Chris Fraser and Kai-Yee Wong -- Reply To Chris Fraser And Kai-Yee Wong /John R. Searle -- Chapter Thirteen. Searle On Knowledge, Certainty And Skepticism: In View Of Cases In Western And Chinese Traditions /Avrum Stroll -- Reply To Avrum Stroll /John R. Searle -- Chapter Fourteen. Searle's Theory Of Intentionality As A Philosophical Method For Research In The Human Sciences /B. Jeannie Lum -- Reply To B. Jeannie Lum /John R. Searle -- Chapter Fifteen. Unconscious Intentionality And The Status Of Normativity In Searle's Philosophy: With Comparative Reference To Traditional Chinese Thought /Yujian Zheng -- Reply To Yujian Zheng /John R. Searle -- Chapter Sixteen. Searle, Zhuang Zi, And Transcendental Perspectivism /Bo Mou -- Reply To Bo Mou /John R. Searle -- Index Of Names And Subjects /B. Mou.

1. Contrastive explanation / Christopher Hitchcock -- 2. Causal contextualisms / Jonathan Schaffer -- 3. Contrastive Bayesianism / Branden Fitelson -- 4. Contrastive belief / Martijn Blaauw -- 5. Contrastive knowledge / Adam Morton -- 6. Contrastive semantics for deontic modals / Justin Snedegar -- 7. Free contrastivism / Walter Sinnott-Armstrong -- 8. Luck and fortune in moral evaluation / Julia Driver.

What is moral philosophy? That is the question with which this important volume grapples. Its starting point is the famous critique made in 1958 by Elizabeth Anscombe, who argued that moral philosophy begins from a mistake: that it is fundamentally wrong about the sort of concept that the word 'moral' represents. Anscombe rejected moral philosophy as it was then (and mostly now still is) practised. She offered instead a blueprint for the task moral philosophers must embrace if they are to speak intelligibly to society about good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation. The chapters in this book are inspired by Anscombe's classic text. One of the most powerful voices here, among many authoritative voices, is that of Philippa Foot - Anscombe's lifelong friend - who asserts that 'any account of practical reason evacuated of an understanding of what human beings need to flourish is inadequate and must be rejected.'