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Since the outbreak of the US subprime crisis in 2007, financial stability has become a pressing item in the agenda of governments and policy-makers worldwide. However, to date, there are no books that provide a comprehensive analysis of financial stability in all of its dimensions. 'Understanding Financial Stability' undertakes an in-depth analysis of all the concepts and issues related to financial stability. It establishes a general framework for a holistic assessment of financial stability, provides a comprehensive analysis pertaining to the genesis of financial crises, and offers key terms and elements embodied in financial stability. Posing the question of whether financial stability should rely only on resilience or predictability issues when it comes to handling crises, the book provides: Extensive coverage of all key issues involved in the field of financial stability; a consideration of the political economy; a complete and in-depth assessment of crises in the world based on full historical coverage; including a definition of crises, various theories of crises, costs related to crises, types of crises and policy responses to crises. This book will prove valuable to central bankers, economists, and policy-makers who are involved in the field of financial stability, as well as researchers studying the field.

In the current interdependent global economic system, measures adopted nationally by governments to safeguard financial stability sometimes produce cross-border spillovers. A question arises as to how international economic law shall treat states' regulatory powers to tackle internal and external economic and financial threats. The goal of the research is to analyze (i) how international law distributes between different international subjects the social costs of global instability in the event of emergencies, and (ii) how regulatory powers are attributed in a situation of economic and financial interdependence. To do so, this essay sets out a law and economics theory that conceptualizes financial stability in international law as the result of a trade-off between three competing regulatory objectives: domestic stability, global stability, and financial integration. The way in which the interplay between these objectives is represented in law crucially influences the balance of rights and obligations in the formulation of national economic and financial policies, and the level of protection against economic threats. This essay argues that current international law is largely inefficient because it structures the protection of financial stability as a matter of the individual rights of each state, rather than a social problem of the international community.

This book approaches macroprudential oversight from the viewpoint of three tasks. The focus concerns a tight integration of means for risk communication into analytical tools for risk identification and risk assessment. Generally, this book explores approaches for representing complex data concerning financial entities on low-dimensional displays. Data and dimension reduction methods, and their combinations, hold promise for representing multivariate data structures in easily understandable formats. Accordingly, this book creates a Self-Organizing Financial Stability Map (SOFSM), and lays out a general framework for mapping the state of financial stability. Beyond external risk communication, the aim of the visual means is to support disciplined and structured judgmental analysis based upon policymakers' experience and domain intelligence.

Uganda has registered one of the most impressive economic turnarounds of recent decades. The amelioration of conflict and wide ranging economic reforms kick-started rapid economic growth that has now been sustained for some 20 years. But there is a strong sense in policy making circles that despite macroeconomic stability and reasonably well functioning markets, economic growth has not translated into significant structural transformation. This paper considers (i) Uganda's record of economic transformation relative to the high growth Asian countries and (ii) the contending explanations as to w

This article accounts for how authoritarian regimes use elections to achieve stability (and, thus, longevity). At the domestic level, elections are deployed to either feign conformity to established rules and/or shared beliefs about how political power should be maintained or mobilise citizens in a unanimous show of manufactured support for the ruling party. At the international level, elections are employed to simulate compliance to international democratic norms about the appropriate method of selecting political authority. It validates this theory using the case of Myanmar, where three different ruling cliques have sanctioned elections in the pursuit of this dividend. The institutionalisation of this function over time has in turn contributed to the stabilisation of autocratic rule, which has occurred through a combination of endogenous self-reinforcement, exogenous reinforcement and reciprocal reinforcement. This positive relationship offers further opportunities for within-case and cross-case comparisons to be made in the future.

International audience ; The goal of this paper is to make an assessment of the correlation between monetary stabilitynamely price stability-and macro financial euphoria in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC).Our methodological approach which combines econometrics, graphical and historical analyses, shows that the relationship between the selected indicators of macro financial exuberance and inflation is not obvious in all of CEMAC apart from the Central African Republic (CAF).Nonetheless, since we consider CAF is the only country in CEMAC to be constantly in a situation of political instability, we may assume that the positive correlation between euphoria and inflation in that country has little or nothing to do with monetary policy performances. This enables us to give an empirical justificationit is the originality of this researchthe persistent situation in liquidity excess and the credit rationing in CEMAC Zone. It even raises the question of whether lower inflation in CEMAC may be more associated to "Good Luck" than "Good Policy" hypothesis.

In the last Supreme Court term, the Court ruled in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that Article II of the U.S. Constitution and separation of powers prohibit Congress from shielding the Bureau's director from termination except for cause. Seila Law has natural implications for the CFPB's independence (although the magnitude of that effect is unclear). More troubling, Seila Law could open up the financial system to destabilization by paving the path for a full-scale assault on the traditional independence of federal financial regulators and presidential manipulation of the economy. Seila Law erodes independent agency protections in the worst possible way, by enshrining its ruling as constitutional command. The constitutional basis of that ruling ossifies the law on independent agency safeguards and means Congress and the president cannot overturn it. The decision further exposes the CFPB, and possibly other federal financial regulators, to political strong-arming to chase short-term gains at potential expense to long-term financial stability. In the process, Seila Law damages the important ballast of economic health that agency independence provides.