Suchergebnisse

With the rise of supranational legislative bodies, the use of supranational adjudicatory bodies has also increased. These adjudicatory bodies have even been allowed to review the domestic law decisions offederal administrative agencies, and their decisions are insulated from any review by Article III courts. These developments have been met by intense opposition. This Article addresses the question whether, as claimed by several writers, the emerging supranational adjudicatory order impermissibly contravenes the "essential attributes of the judicial power established by Article III." Examining two case studies, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, Professor Monaghan concludes that (generally at least) supranational judicial review does not run afoul of Article III. He draws upon the historical practice of allowing binational panels (BNPs) to adjudicate claims by Americans against foreign sovereigns that stretches back to the earliest days of the Founding, beginning with the Jay Treaty. Indeed, in the period following the Civil War, BNPs even "reviewed" decisions of the United States Supreme Court. With respect to the constitutionality of supranational tribunals expounding treaty obligations, Professor Monaghan argues that these tribunals are fully competent to determine these obligations, and, at least in the trade area, fit well within the "public rights" doctrine, which has played an important role in the rise of the administrative state. Professor Monaghan concludes that based on historical practice and current doctrine, Article III, standing alone, poses no substantial barrier to supranational judicial review.

"Europe's Supranational Courts and LGBT Rights" published on by Oxford University Press.

We study fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget. We explore the link between the allocation and nations' contributions that occurs since bargaining power is endogenous, and generically causes inefficiency. Interestingly, redistribution arises endogenously, despite nations being purely self-interested. However, there exists a trade-off between increasing equality and decreasing efficiency, which becomes more severe as the centralized budget increases. We also analyze partial ex-ante commitment through alternative decision-making institutions: Both majority rule and exogenous tax rules can improve efficiency.

We study fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget. Since decisions are made by unanimity, bargaining power over the allocation becomes a function of contributions, which generically causes inefficiency in the presence of income asymmetry between member nations. This link between the budget allocation and contributions explains patterns of inefficient spending in the EU, e.g. why resources are diverted to low‐productivity projects in high‐income countries: the option of veto creates a trade‐off between efficiency on the contributions margin and efficiency on the allocation margin.

The article confirms the hypothesis that a multiplicity of parties of the European and national levels forms the party system of the European Union (EU). The authors describe the main characteristics of Europarties and political groups comprised of them as key actors in the European Parliament's (EP) political and legislative processes. The authors adopt the institutional approach and make use of the tools of the comparative, structural, and functional analyses. Special attention is paid to the 'two-tier' structure the connection between national and supranational institutions as a key feature of the European Union's party system. The study is based on the European Parliament framework laws, election results, Europarties' political programmes, as well as on the comparison of the composition of the Europarties and the EU bodies. The analysis provides a new perspective on the major processes and contradictions in the functioning of the European Parliament and demonstrates that the transformation of the EU from an intergovernmental association to a (con)federation has not been completed yet.

The article confirms the hypothesis that a multiplicity of parties of the European and national levels forms the party system of the European Union (EU). The authors describe the main characteristics of Europarties and political groups comprised of them as key actors in the European Parliament's (EP) political and legislative processes. The authors adopt the institutional approach and make use of the tools of the comparative, structural, and functional analyses. Special attention is paid to the "two-tier" structure -the connection between national and supranational institutions- as a key feature of the European Union's party system. The study is based on the European Parliament framework laws, election results, Europarties' political programmes, as well as on the comparison of the composition of the Europarties and EU bodies. The analysis provides a new perspective on the major processes and contradictions in the functioning of the European Parliament and demonstrates that the transformation of the EU from an intergovernmental association to a (con)federation has not completed yet.

Seit rund zwei Jahrzehnten entwickelt der Unionsgesetzgeber einen europäischen Justizraum, in dem die nationalen Gerichte und Justizbehörden in besonders enger Weise zusammenarbeiten sollen. Die Untersuchung arbeitet das Sekundärrecht der justiziellen Zusammenarbeit in Zivil- und Strafsachen ordnungsbildend auf, skizziert zehn Bausteine supranationaler Gerichtskooperation und zieht eine rechtspolitische Zwischenbilanz: Welche Schritte auf dem Weg zum europäischen Justizraum sind bereits zurückgelegt und welche Aufgaben müssen künftig in Angriff genommen werden – wo muss weiterhin grundlegende Aufbau- und Konstruktionsarbeit, wo eher der abschließende rechtliche Feinschliff geleistet werden? In vier Kapiteln zu den Kooperationsfeldern Kommunikation, Wissensverwaltung, Entscheidungen und Verfahren markiert die Arbeit Aufgabenfelder und Arbeitsschwerpunkte. Sie schließt mit Überlegungen zur übergreifenden Querschnittsaufgabe künftiger europäischer Justizpolitik: der Stärkung des gegenseitigen Vertrauens als zunehmend brüchigem Fundament des europäischen Justizraums und seiner zehn Bausteine. / »EU Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Criminal Matters. Current State and Future Reform«: For more than two decades, the project to create a single »European judicial area« between member states has been one of the most dynamic EU policy fields. Examining the current status quo of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, this book maps out EU policy makers' next steps: Which elements of the European judicial area have proven successful so far – and which parts must be revisited by the EU legislator? A particular emphasis is placed on the fostering of mutual trust as a general precondition for the European judicial area's future success.

Das »Al Qaida-Sanktionsregime«, das sich mittlerweile auch gegen den sog. »Islamischen Staat« richtet, fungiert im Friedenssicherungssystem der Vereinten Nationen als »standard setter«, weshalb ihm auch über seinen unmittelbaren Regelungsbereich hinaus große Bedeutung zukommt. Die Arbeit stellt den supranationalen Charakter des Regimes heraus, befasst sich mit seiner Legalität und Legitimität, um darauf aufbauend mit einem rechtspolitischen Reformvorschlag abzuschließen.