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The trend of recent elections does not support the widespread prediction of Donald Trump's victory in November. The bias in election forecasts may result from the over-polling of Trump's voters in electoral surveys.Let us look, first, at recent elections. The electoral cycle of special, state, and local elections from early 2023 has been seen as a success for the Democrats. Candidates from the Democratic party won in three of the four special elections for the federal House of Representatives. They also increased their representation in two state legislatures, made a net gain of four mayors, and improved positions in state supreme courts and other offices. If this is the current trend, the Democrats should be optimistic about the upcoming presidential and congressional elections.At the same time, the support for Donald Trump may be weaker than it may have appeared in the ongoing Republican party primaries. Let us focus on the fifteen states that held them on Super Tuesday. The total number of voters turning out was one-third of the votes for the Republican party in the general election four years before (9.1 million out of 27.2 million or 33.5%). Typically, the primary voters are more extreme in their preferences than their party's voters and even more than the whole electorate including independents. The Republican primary voters are older and much more conservative than the rest of the party voters. In eleven states with closed party primaries, nearly one-half of the participants were Evangelicals.Let us now turn to the inaccuracy or simply the failure of survey polls. The average of six well-reputed pollsters for Super Tuesday was that Trump would receive 79% of votes while Nikki Haley would get only 15%, so 64 points of advantage for the former president. The actual results were quite different: Trump got 71% and Haley 26%, "only" 45 points of advantage.The contrast between survey poll predictions and actual results cast serious doubts about the forecasts for the elections in November.One of the main suspects is the technique of running survey polls by cell phone. In the past, surveys were based on in-person interviews, in which the interviewers knocked on thousands of doors across the country. Starting in the 1980s, most interviews were developed over the phone. Currently, most surveys are run through cell phones.Historically, US telephones were "landline" devices and phone numbers were accessible from printed telephone directories, from which pollsters selected a sample assuming that it represented a large proportion of the population. Today, there are far fewer landline telephones, millions of cell phones, and scarce published directories.Many people with cell phones do not answer calls from unknown numbers, a precaution against telemarketing and scams. David Hill, president of a major research consultant, acknowledges that "whereas once I could extract one complete interview from five voters, it can now take calls to as many as 100 voters to complete a single interview." And "people who tend to pick up any and all phone calls tend to be older, conservative, less wealthy, and less educated", a profile that fits a typical Trump voter.As people with extreme political opinions tend to be more eager to participate in party primaries than most voters, they also tend to respond to more surveys on their cell phones. Some researchers hold that "there is currently no way to select survey samples in a way that covers the entire population." Many surveys are not based on random samples, but on "polls of the willing." A few hundred people who were willing to answer a random phone call make a survey that is misinterpreted as an expression of the national electorate.In 2016 it was said that there were "secret" or "hidden" Trump voters who did not respond to the polls, so the surprise of the election result. Now some analysts hypothesize, analogously, that there are "hidden" anti-Trump voters who elude to respond to the polls. But it may be more reasonable to suspect that today there are too many Trump voters who are over-polled on landline and cell phone surveys.The bias of survey polls in favor of Trump may be both good news and bad news. Good news because it may mean that Joe Biden is ahead in the voters' actual preferences. Bad news because if the survey polls bias continued and Biden won, Trump might launch an even stronger denial than in 2020. This time, however, the administration and the police would still be in the hands of the Democratic incumbent. COMMENTSI hope you are right.Rein TaageperaUniversity of California, Irvine, and University of Tartu, EstoniaI think you're onto something.  I have a piece coming out in Sabato's Crystal Ball on Tuesday raising doubts about these polling numbers, especially among Black voters. Alan Abramowitz        Emory University Excellent piece. Thank you.Gianfranco PasquinoUniversita di Bologna & Johns Hopkins UniversityEstoy muy de acuerdo -- llevo tiempo defendiendo esta idea en mis conversaciones y correos con amigos.  Es muy difícil saber cual es exactamente la magnitud de este fenómeno pero parece quer sí que es muy real.  Confio en que Biden va a ganar en noviembre.  Probablemente por un margen mayor que en 2020.Una abraçada,Robert FishmanUniversity of Notre Dame

 The Washington Post recently had a story called "Black Americans More Upbeat but Fear Worsening Racism, poll finds."  As the title shows, the results could be read in different ways.  Near the end, it said that most black employees had pretty favorable views of their own workplaces, but "beyond work, however, 17 percent of Black Americans say they often feel treated with less respect or feel as if they received bad service at a restaurant or store because of their race." That was followed by a graph entitled "Fewer Black Americans say they are often treated poorly … than in 2006."  The numbers of black people who say that various things happen to them "often" or "somewhat often" because of their race.                                                     2006       2023Less respect than others                 25%      17%Poorer service.                               27%       17%Act as if you're not smart.             32%.      21%Act afraid of you.                           26%.      16%Act as if you're dishonest.              22%.      15%"Often" experience one or more.   54%.       36%They could have added another "however":  17% is too many, but it's less than the 25% who said that they experienced that in 2006.   There's been a substantial decline on all of them since 2006.  The 2006 survey was done by telephone, and the 2023 survey was done over the internet.  In 2006, black respondents were more likely to report discrimination if they had a black interviewer, suggesting that there was some "social desirability bias" when they had a white interviewer:  black respondents were reluctant to offend or sound like they were complaining.    That's not a factor with a web survey, so the decline may have been even larger than the above comparison suggests.   Returning to the paradox in the title of the Post story, people are usually more negative about both the levels and trends of things that are more remote from their lives:  schools in general compared to the schools in their neighborhood, or economic conditions generally versus their own financial situation.   So although I think some of fear of worsening racism reflects actual political developments, I think that the bigger story is the substantial decline in perceived discrimination in their own lives.[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

 A series of questions from a new survey sponsored by the Wall Street Journal is getting a lot of attention.  The figure that's been circulating shows the percent who says that the following values are very important "to you personally" in surveys taken in 1998, 2019, and 2023:So it appears that patriotism, religion, having children, and community involvement are becoming less important to people, while money is becoming more important.  The WSJ story on the survey also mentions that the percent who say that tolerance and hard work is very important to them fell between 2019 and 2023.  So the results seem to show a dramatic turn towards selfishness in the past few years.A few people have raised questions about this interpretation.  Patrick Ruffini notes that the 1998 and 2019 surveys were taken by telephone, while the 2023 survey was online.  He suggests that phone surveys are affected by "social desirability bias"--you want the interviewer to think well of you, so you give answers that will make you look better.  Social desirability bias might have inflated the numbers for values like hard work, patriotism, and community involvement, and held down the numbers for money.Another new feature of the 2023 poll was that half of the sample were asked the response options ("very important," "somewhat important," "not that important," and "not at all important") in reverse order (see p. 7 here).  This may also make a difference--making a distinction "very important" and "somewhat important" may be harder than making a distinction between important and not important.  In this case, whether people say "very" or "somewhat" may depend on which answer is offered first.  In the phone surveys, "very" was always offered before "somewhat"--in half of the internet surveys, "somewhat" came first.  So my hypothesis is that the distribution of answers in 2023 differed depending on the order of the response options.  If so, comparison with the earlier years should be based only on the part of the sample that offers them in the same order as the phone surveys.  Or you could look at the the combined percentages for "very" and "somewhat" important:                                        1998    2019   2023Hard work                         98%    98%   94%Self-fulfillment                  94%   94%   91%Tolerance                           NA     96%   90%Money                                 88%   92%   90%Community involvement   94%   96%    80%Patriotism                           93%   88%    73%Children                              84%    77%   65%Belief in God                      NA     72%    65%Religion                              89%    75%   60%For the first four, there's little change--they are almost universally regarded as important at all three times.  The results for "self-fulfillment," which isn't mentioned in the WSJ article, are particularly interesting--the percent rating it as very important fell from 64% in 2019 to 53% in 2023.  That's hard to square with either the growing selfishness or the social desirability interpretations, but is consistent with my hypothesis.  These figures indicate some changes in the last few years, but not the general collapse of values that is being claimed.Unfortunately, the Wall Street Journal doesn't make the original survey data available.  If they ever do, I will check and see if the response order makes a difference.  

 I have an account on Truth Social, and I check it from time to time to see what Donald Trump is saying.  He recently posted a story from Breitbart about a survey by Rasmussen Reports.  According to the story "more than 1-in-5 voters who submitted ballots by mail say they did so fraudulently."  This isn't just some Twitter "poll"--Rasmussen has decent record of accuracy in predicting elections (a B rating from 538)--so it deserves a closer look.  The survey found the 30% of the sample said they voted by mail in the 2020 election.  Those who said they did were asked "did a friend or family member fill out your ballot, in part or in full, on your behalf" (19% yes); "did you fill out a ballot, in part or in full, on behalf of a friend or family member, such as a spouse or child?" (21% yes); "did you cast a mail-in ballot in a state where you were no longer a permanent resident? (17% yes); "did you sign a ballot or ballot envelope on behalf of a friend or family member, with or without his or her permission?" (17% yes).  Everyone was asked three additional questions whether "a friend, family member, or organization, such as a political party, offer to pay or reward you for voting?" (8% yes); whether "you know a friend, family member, co-worker, or other acquaintance who has admitted to you that he or she cast a mail-in ballot in 2020 in a state other than his or her state of permanent residence?" (10% yes); and whether "you know a friend, family member, co-worker, or other acquaintance who has admitted to you that he or she filled out a ballot on behalf of another person?" (11% yes).  Rasmussen didn't release the original data, but they provided a detailed breakdown of responses.  In looking at that, I noticed something strange--people who said they voted for Trump were likely to say that they had done these things.  For example, among people who voted by mail, 26% of Trump voters and 14% of Biden voters said that a friend or family member had filled in their ballot.  A larger fraction of Biden voters voted by mail (36% vs. 23%), so overall, .23*.26=.060 or 6% of Trump voters and .36*.13=.050 or 5% of Biden voters said that someone else had filled in their ballot.  The total percent of voters who answered yes on each question:                                                                   Trump                BidenSomeone else filled in your ballot                  6.0%                5.0%You filled out someone else's                         6.9%                4.7%Signed someone else's                                    5.3%                4.0%So if you accept the data, Trump voters were more likely to engage in "fraud" than Biden voters. For the questions asked of everyone:Offer of reward                                               6%                    9%Know out-of-state voter                                13%                    8%Know someone who filled out other's           12%                    9%There was also another odd pattern in the data.  For all of the questions, people in the youngest age group (18-39) were more likely to answer yes--a lot more likely.  For example, 33% of people aged 18-39, 9% of people aged 40-64, and 1% of people aged 65% said that they had signed someone else's ballot.  Of course, there is sampling error, but these aren't tiny groups--there are roughly 100 absentee voters in each age group.  Since people in the youngest age group were more likely to have voted for Biden, the tendency for Trump voters to be more likely to report irregularities would be even stronger after controlling for age.   The age differences are also present in the questions asked of everyone--19% of 18-39 year olds, 7% of 40-64 year olds, and 3% of people over 65 said they knew someone who admitted casting a ballot in a state of which they weren't a resident.  How can you explain the age differences? I doubt that there has been a dramatic increase in propensity to violate the rules for mail in ballots (and to tell friends, family members, and acquaintances that you've violated the rules) across the generations.  Rasmussen has a statement on their methodology that might provide an answer.  Their sample is mostly obtained by random-digit dialing of phone numbers, but "to reach those who have abandoned traditional landline telephones, Rasmussen Reports uses an online survey tool to interview randomly selected participants from  a demographically diverse panel." Unlike most survey organizations, Rasmussen doesn't use live interviewers--there's a recorded voice and people answer by "press 1 for yes, 2 for no....."  I suspect that people are more likely to give a false answer with this format than when speaking to a person, and because Trump has been saying that there was fraud in mail voting, Trump voters may have wanted to help give evidence of fraud.**  This tendency is likely to be stronger in the panel--since they are regularly asked to do surveys (and probably are generally more online), they are likely to have a better sense of how the results will be used.  People without landlines tend to be young, so the panel probably makes up a much larger share of the 18-39 group.  So my hypothesis is that many of the "yes" answers are a result of Trump voters (especially in the panel) giving answers that they think will help to make Trump's case that there was a lot of fraud in the election.   Another factor is that people in the online panel are presumably given some compensation for participating in the surveys, so they may rush through without paying much attention.  Most organizations make some effort to identify people like this and remove them from the sample, but they are usually pretty crude and Rasmussen doesn't say anything about whether and how they do it.  So some of the "yes" answers, especially in the youngest cohort, may be people who are essentially answering at random.  *The "no longer a permanent resident" question was left out of the table.  **The question about who you voted for was asked before the questions on voting irregularities--that is, people answered it before they knew what the survey would be about.  

From Richard Nixon to the Israel lobby, the late Republican Congressman Paul Norton "Pete" McCloskey Jr. challenged the most powerful elements of the ruling class on the American people's behalf.On September 29, 1927, McCloskey was born in San Bernardino, California. He was raised in South Pasadena. After graduating high school in 1945, McCloskey joined the Navy and attended Occidental College as well as the California Institute of Technology. In 1950, he graduated from Stanford with a Bachelor's degree.When the Korean War began, McCloskey joined the Marines where he led a rifle platoon in a bayonet charge to take a strategic hill. He won the Navy Cross, the Silver Star, and two Purple Hearts. He remained a Marine Reserve officer for several years thereafter. In 1953, McCloskey earned his law degree from Stanford and became a deputy district attorney in Alameda County until 1954.Subsequently, from 1955-1967, he practiced general and environmental law in Palo Alto, while giving lectures on legal ethics at the Santa Clara and Stanford law schools. He was inspired to enter politics after he saw President Jack Kennedy give a speech in 1963 during a conference regarding civil rights.In a 1967 special election necessitated by the death of Rep. J. Arthur Younger, McCloskey won his seat representing the San Mateo district in Congress. With the Vietnam War already raging, McCloskey ran as an antiwar candidate defeating the beloved film star and his fellow Republican Shirley Temple Black along with the Democrat Roy Archibald.While serving seven terms in Congress, McCloskey became the first GOP representative to both oppose the war – including by calling for a repeal of the despicable Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which ostensibly authorized the unconstitutional war – and demand Nixon's impeachment.In 1972, he fought a quixotic battle attempting to unseat Nixon for the GOP nomination for President, arguing "I'll probably get licked, but I can't keep quiet." He won 19.7 percent of the vote against Nixon at the New Hampshire primary. McCloskey was emphatic, "To talk, as the president does, of winding down the war while he is expanding the use of air power is a deliberate deception."He was prevented from speaking against Nixon and the war at the Republican National Convention that year as a result of a rule written by John Ehrlichman, his old friend and law school debate partner, stating a candidate could not get to the floor with fewer than 25 delegates. McCloskey only had one.In 1975, he traveled to Cambodia to observe the mass destruction left by the massive US bombing campaign. Yale's Ben Kiernan, a leading historian on Cambodia, estimates the US dropped approximately 500,000 tons of bombs on the country between 1969-1973. According to the BBC, "the number of people killed by those bombs is not known, but estimates range from 50,000 to upwards of 150,000."Then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger approved nearly 4,000 bombing raids on Cambodia between 1969-1970. He infamously stated during a declassified 1970 telephone conversation "It's an order, it's to be done. Anything that flies, on anything that moves. You got that?"McCloskey condemned the atrocities committed in Cambodia, declaring that Washington had unleashed "greater evil than we have done to any country in the world, and wholly without reason, except for our benefit to fight against the Vietnamese."In the early 1980s, McCloskey began criticizing the immense power and pervasive influence of the Israel lobby on American foreign policy. He supported then-chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Yasser Arafat. His position was that Palestinian militancy and resistance, including the use of terrorism, was a reaction to the brutality of the illegal Israeli occupation, ongoing since 1967, in the West Bank and Gaza.He vehemently opposed Israel's expansion of Jewish-only colonies in the territory intended by the United Nations as land for a future Palestinian state. He advocated for the implementation of UN resolutions which declared the so-called settlements illegal. McCloskey even put forward a resolution to withhold $150 million in US aid to Israel in order to pressure Tel Aviv to remove the settlements.Facing intense backlash from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), McCloskey ultimately withdrew his amendment. After Israel, under the leadership of Likudnik Prime Minister Menachem Begin, passed its 1981 Golan Heights annexation law, he denounced the move as an "aggressive and imperialistic action." In response to this violation of Syrian sovereignty, McCloskey also implored Congress to rescind the $2.2 billion in US taxpayer money Tel Aviv was due to receive in 1982-1983."Until Congress is willing to stand up to Israel, every time that we step back and deliver them F-16s, or accept the bombing of downtown Beirut, we will accept whatever they want to do," McCloskey thundered. AIPAC poured money into his opponents' campaigns and he was unseated during the 1982 election."In 1982, McCloskey lost to future governor Pete Wilson in a primary election for the U.S. Senate. He told The Times that his controversial positions on Israel might have contributed to his defeat," the Los Angeles Times reports. "He has been supportive of the Palestinian people's plight since the late 1970s," Helen McCloskey, his longtime press secretary whom he married in 1982, told the outlet. "Of course, now that is very relevant," she added.Even after leaving politics, McCloskey continued to oppose the Israel lobby and its depredations against the American people. As Paul Findley, the former Illinois congressman and McCloskey's co-founder of the Council for the National Interest, has written:AIPAC's endeavors did not stop McCloskey from seeking out justice in issues related to the Middle East. In 1993, the district attorney of San Francisco released 700 pages of documents implicating the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, a major Jewish organization that calls itself "a defender of civil rights," in a vast spying operation. The targets of the ADL operation were American citizens who were opposed to Israel's repression of Palestinians and to the South African government's policy of apartheid. The ADL was also accused of passing on information to both governments. After experiencing "great political pressure," the district attorney dropped the charges, prompting victims to file a suit against the ADL for violation of their privacy rights. They chose Pete McCloskey as their attorney.McCloskey and his clients, two of whom were Jews who had been subjected to spying after criticizing Israeli policy in the occupied territories, revealed an extensive operation headed by ADL undercover operative Roy Bullock, whose files contained the names of 10,000 individuals and 600 organizations, including thousands of Arab Americans and national civil rights groups such as the NAACP. Much of Bullock's information was gained illegally from confidential police records. In April 2002, after a nine-year legal battle, McCloskey won a landmark $150,000 court judgment against the ADL.During the second Iraq War, McCloskey also highlighted the heavy influence of the Likud as well as the neoconservatives in spearheading the push for Washington's illegal and disastrous invasion.In a 2005 interview with Scott Horton, host of Antiwar Radio and now editorial director of Antiwar.com, McCloskey rebuked the arguments for the war and excoriated the neocons proliferating throughout the George W. Bush administration,We killed a lot of people [in Vietnam], we killed a million Vietnamese, 55,000 Americans, and wounded four or five times that many in a war we shouldn't have fought in the first place… [And in the case of Iraq,] it's the same problem. I don't know how you earn the love and affection and the minds and hearts of the ordinary Iraqi when you're blowing up his houses and killing his relatives… [Paul] Wolfowitz, and [Douglas] Feith, and this man [Richard] Perle, and John Bolton appointed to the UN [ambassadorship], those men have considered Israel almost as the 51st state. I don't think there's any secret that we've gone to war in Iraq, not to protect against the Iraq threat to the United States, but to stop the Iraq threat to Israel, the same men that have taken us into this policy and this war… [including] Perle [had been] advising the Israeli government in 1996 to take out Iraq [in the "Clean Break" document written for then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu]. Of course, now they're pushing to take out Iran. Well why are we wanting to take out Iran? Because it represents a threat to Israel.During the interview, McCloskey continues to rail against the iron grip of the Israel lobby in American politics and warns of the consequences of the extraordinary deference to Israel regarding Washington's relations with the Middle East,And this whole policy over the last 20 years has ignored [UN Security Council] Resolution 242 which… allowed the creation of the state of Israel but said it should be side by side by a Palestinian state made up of the West Bank and Gaza. And our refusal to comply with the United Nations and now trying to appoint Bolton as our representative to the United Nations sends a signal to the world that whatever Israel does the United States is going to support, including Israel's known possession of atomic weapons… And the only reason we take these policies is because the [lobby] through AIPAC has scared every congressman into fearing they'll lose their seat if they in any way vote against Israel.In a sense, McCloskey's antiwar career came full circle in 2014 when he visited North Korea. While there, he met with a fellow veteran from the opposite side of the battle, a retired three-star general who had also been wounded. "I told him how bravely I thought his people had fought, and we embraced… We ended up agreeing that we don't want our grandchildren or great-grandchildren to fight, that war is hell, and there's no glory in it," McCloskey said.Last week, the former congressman passed away at his home in Winters, California as a result of congestive heart failure, according to family friend Lee Houskeeper. McCloskey was 96 years old.American congressmen seldomly, if ever, conduct themselves with any honor or courage. Too often we see our supposed representatives in the legislature shamelessly carrying water for the war party, lying to their constituents, regurgitating propaganda from foreign lobbies and arms-industry funded think tanks. With well over $30 trillion in debt, most of our lawmakers happily continue robbing the American people to fund the American Empire.McCloskey's example and legacy is one to emulate if we desire to avoid full-scale war with any of the current White House's favored targets: Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, or Tehran. Given that we already stand on the precipice of nuclear conflict with Russia and soon China, concurrently committing mass slaughter in Palestine, and edging towards war with Iran and its allies across the Middle East, we could use a great man like former California Congressman Pete McCloskey.This article was republished with permission from Antiwar.com

The videos and speeches of the Bradley prize winners are up. My video here (Grumpy in a tux!), also the speech which I reproduce below. All the videos and speeches here (Betsy DeVos and Nina Shea) My previous interview with Rick Graeber, head of the Bradley foundation. Bradley also made a nice introduction video with photos from my childhood and early career. (A link here to the introduction video and speech together.) And to avoid us spending all our talks on thanking people, they had us write out a separate thanks. That seems not to be up yet, but I include mine below. I am very thankful, humbled to be included in such august company, and not so boorish that I would not have spent my whole talk without mentioning that, absent the separate opportunity to say so. Bradley prize remarks (i.e. condense three decades of policy writing into 10 minutes): Creeping stagnation ought to be recognized as the central economic issue of our time. Economic growth since 2000 has fallen almost by half compared with the last half of the 20th Century. The average American's income is already a quarter less than under the previous trend. If this trend continues, lost growth in fifty years will total three times today's economy. No economic issue — inflation, recession, trade, climate, income diversity — comes close to such numbers.Growth is not just more stuff, it's vastly better goods and services; it's health, environment, education, and culture; it's defense, social programs, and repaying government debt.Why are we stagnating? In my view, the answer is simple: America has the people, the ideas, and the investment capital to grow. We just can't get the permits. We are a great Gulliver, tied down by miles of Lilliputian red tape.  How much more can the US grow? Looking around the world, we see that even slightly better institutions produce large improvements in living standards. US taxes and regulations are only a bit less onerous than those in Canada and the UK, but US per capita income is 40% greater. Bigger improvements have enormous effects. US per capita income is 350% greater than Mexico's and 950% greater than India's. Unless you think the US is already perfect, there is a lot we can do. How can we improve the US economy? I offer four examples.I don't need to tell you how dysfunctional health care and insurance are. Just look at your latest absurd bill. There is no reason that health care cannot be provided in the same way as lawyering, accounting, architecture, construction, airplane travel, car repair, or any complex personal service. Let a brutally competitive market offer us better service at lower prices. There is no reason that health insurance cannot function at least as well as life, car, property, or other insurance. It's easy to address standard objections, such as preexisting conditions, asymmetric information, and so on.How did we get in this mess? There are two original sins. First, in order to get around wage controls during WWII, the government allowed a tax deduction for employer-based group plans, but not for portable insurance. Thus preexisting conditions were born: if you lose your job, you lose health insurance. Patch after patch then led to the current mess. Second, the government wants to provide health care to poor people, but without visibly taxing and spending a lot. So, the government forces hospitals to treat poor people below cost, and recoup the money by overcharging everyone else. But an overcharge cannot stand competition, so the government protects hospitals and insurers from competition. You'll know health care is competitive when, rather than hide prices, hospitals spam us with offers as airlines and cell phone companies do.  There is no reason why everyone's health care and insurance must be so screwed up to help the poor. A bit of taxing and spending instead — budgeted, appropriated, visible — would not stymie competition and innovation. Example 2: Banking offers plenty of room for improvement. In 1933, the US suffered a great bank run. Our government responded with deposit insurance. Guaranteeing deposits stops runs, but it's like sending your brother-in-law to Las Vegas with your credit card, what we economists call an "incentive for risk taking." The government piled on regulations to try to stop banks from taking risks. The banks got around the regulations, new crises erupted, new guarantees and regulations followed. This spring, the regulatory juggernaut failed to detect simple interest rate risk, and Silicon Valley Bank had a run, followed by others. The Fed and FDIC bailed out depositors and promised more rules. This system is fundamentally broken. The answer: Deposits should flow to accounts backed by reserves at the Fed, or short-term treasuries. Banks should get money for risky loans by issuing stock or long term debt that can't run. We can end private-sector financial crises forever, with next to no regulation. There is a lesson in these stories. If we want to improve regulations, we can't just bemoan them. We must understand how they emerged. As in health and banking, a regulatory mess often emerges from a continual patchwork, in which each step is a roughly sensible repair of the previous regulation's dysfunction. The little old lady swallowed a fly, a spider to catch the fly, and so on. Now horse is on the menu. Only a start-from-scratch reform will work.Much regulation protects politically influential businesses, workers, and other constituencies from the disruptions of growth. Responsive democracies give people what they want, good and hard. And in return, regulation extorts political support from those beneficiaries. We have to fix the regulatory structure, to give growth a seat at the table.  Economists are somewhat at fault too. They are taught to look at every problem, diagnose "market failure," and advocate new rules to be implemented by an omniscient, benevolent planner. But we do not live in a free market. When you see a problem, look first for the regulation that caused it.Example 3: Taxes are a mess, with high marginal rates that discourage work, investment and production; disappointing revenue; and massive, wasteful complexity. How can the government raise revenue while doing the least damage to the economy? A uniform consumption tax is the clear answer. Tax money when people spend it. When earnings are saved, invested, plowed into businesses that produce goods and services and employ people, leave them alone.Example 4: Bad incentives are again the unsung central problem of our social programs.  Roughly speaking, from zero to about sixty thousand dollars of income, if you earn an extra dollar, you lose a dollar of benefits. Fix the incentives, and more people will get ahead in life. We will also better help the truly needy, and the budget.Some more general points unite these stories:Focus on incentives. Politics and punditry are consumed with taking from A to give to B. Incentives are far more important for economic growth, and we can say something objective about them. Find the question. Politics and punditry usually advance answers without stating the question, or shop around for questions to justify the same old answers. Most people who disagree with the consumption tax really have different goals than funding the government with minimum economic damage. Well, what do you want the tax system to do? State the question, let's find the best answer to the question, and we can make a lot of progress.Look at the whole system. Tax disincentives come from the total difference between the value your additional work creates and what you can consume as a result. Between these lie payroll, income, excise, property, estate, sales, and corporate taxes, and more, at the federal, state, and local level. Greg Mankiw figured his all-in marginal tax rate at 90%, and even he left out sales, property, and a few more taxes. Social-program disincentives come from the combined phaseout of food stamps, housing subsidies, medicaid or Obamacare subsidies, disability payments, tax credits, and so on, down to low-income parking passes. And look at taxes and social programs together. A flat tax that finances checks to worthy people is very progressive government, if you want that. Looking at an individual tax or program for its disincentives or progressivity is silly. The list goes on. Horrible public education, labor laws, licensing laws, zoning, building and planning restrictions, immigration restrictions, regulatory barriers, endless lawsuits, prevailing-wage and domestic-content rules, are all sand in the productivity gears. Oh, and I haven't even gotten to money and inflation yet! And that just fixes our current economy. Long-term growth comes from new ideas. Many economists say we have run out of ideas; growth is ending; slice the pie. I look out the window and I see factory-built mini nuclear power plants that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is strangling; I see a historic breakthrough in artificial intelligence, facing an outcry for the government to stop it. I see advances in biology that portend much better health and longevity, but good luck getting FDA approval or increasingly politicized research funding.Many conservatives disparage this "incentive economics" as outdated and boring. That attitude is utterly wrong. Incentives, and the freedom, rights, and rule of law that preserve incentives, remain the key to tremendous and widespread prosperity. And it is hard work to understand and fix the incentives behind today's problems.Yes, supply is less glamorous than stimulus. "Fix regulations" is a tougher slogan than "free money for voters." Efficiency requires detailed reform in every agency and market, the Marie-Kondo approach to our civic life. But it's possible. And we don't need to reform all the dinosaurs. As we have seen with telephones, airlines, and taxis, we just need to allow new competitors, to allow the buds of freedom to grow.Many people ask, "How can we get leaders to listen?" That's the wrong question. Believe in democracy, not bending the emperor's ear. Take action. My fellow prizewinners have grabbed the levers of influence that belong to citizens of our free society, and done hard work of reforming its institutions. And ideas matter. The Hoover Institution motto is "ideas defining a free society." The Bradley Foundation tonight celebrates good ideas, and is devoted to spreading them. When voters, media, the chattering classes, and institutions of civil society understand, advance and apply these ideas, politicians will swiftly follow.   Notes:Growth: Real GDP 1950:I was $2186 billion, and per capita $14500; in 2000:I, $12935 and per capita $45983; in 2022:IV, $20182 and per capita 60376. From these numbers, average log real GDP growth 1950-2000 was 3.56% From 2000-2002, 1.96%. In per capita terms,  2.31% and  1.20%. (2.31-1.20)x22 = 24.4. Cross-country comparison: Calculations based on purchasing-power-adjusted GDP per capita: US $69,287, Canada $52,790, UK $50,890, Mexico $19,587, India $7,242. Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD The PPP adjustment tries to take account that some things are cheaper in other countries. Converting at the exchange rate produces even larger differences. US $70.248, Canada $51,987, UK $46,510, Mexico $10,065, India $2,256. Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CDMankiw: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/business/economy/10view.htmlThanksI have been fortunate to benefit from the effort, time, wisdom and affection of so many people, and many institutions that supported their efforts.Of course it starts with my parents, Eric and Lydia Cochrane. They expected children to think and speak at the family dinner table. They exposed me to different cultures, on the south side of Chicago and in Italy, sometimes beyond my desires. They set an example by how they lived: They steadfastly followed their intellectual pursuits with extreme honesty. They treated people with a radical egalitarianism. And then left me alone to pursue my own passions. I was lucky to learn from some extraordinary and dedicated teachers, at the Ancona Montessori School, the U of C Lab school, Italian public schools, and Kenwood high school. There, in an inner city public school, Arlene Gordon (Math), Judith Stein (English) Walter Sherrill (Chemistry) and especially Joel Hofslund (Physics) gave me absolutely first rate experience. Thanks also to Ed Shands' patient coaching of our swim team. I moved on to MIT to study physics. This was more impersonal, and a difficult time for me, but as it turned out a superb education in the kind of mathematical modeling essential to economics. I went on to study economics at the University of California at Berkeley. Faculty took PhD teaching seriously, not just of their own research, and I soaked it up. I thank especially my advisers, Roger Craine, Tom Rothermberg, and George Akerlof.  Many of their lessons are vivid today, but like my parents they provided only gentle guidance and feedback on my own imperfect quests. I was supremely luck to land a job at the University of Chicago. I learned a tremendous amount in the wide open collegial atmosphere at Chicago, thanks in large part to Lars Hansen and Gene Fama, but also colleagues too numerous to mention in this short space.  Generations of MBA and PhD students also pushed me hard to understand economics and became lifelong friends and colleagues. At just the right moment Hoover came calling, allowing me the time and institutional support to blossom as a public intellectual and commenter as well as an academic. A special thanks to John Raisin for that. No man is an island. The world of ideas is a conversation. Everything I know has been shaped by teachers, friends, colleagues, collaborators, students, journal editors, referees, and others who took the time and effort to help me think about things. Many small interactions have had a crucial effect on my life. A coffee conversation at a conference with John Campbell resulted in our best known academic paper. A lunch conversation with Luigi Zingales produced my first public writing during the financial crisis. As a result, Amity Shlaes invited me to a conference. Howard Dickman, then at the Wall Street Journal, liked my presentation and asked, "Why don't you write opeds for us?" I answered, "Why don't you stop rejecting them?" My oped career was born. And so forth. I thank these and many more, and lady luck who put us together. Of course my greatest thanks go to my wonderful wife, Elizabeth Fama. We met the night I returned to Chicago. It was love at first sight. We were engaged on the second date. She has been my best friend and constant companion ever since, though marriage to a passionate researcher, busy teacher and lover of time consuming sports cannot have been easy. Together we raised four amazing children, Sally, Eric, Jean, and Lake, who fill my heart with love, and now that they are grown a bit of nostalgia. 

Dirk Messner on the dynamics
of global change and the significance of international science and technology
cooperation in the post-Western world



This is the fifth in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich 





In recent years, the analysis of new emerging powers and shifting global order has become central to the study of international relations. While International Relations, aiming to evolve into a truly global discipline, is only just about to start opening up towards Non-Western perspectives, global power shifts have already led to a restructuring of global governance architecture in large fields of political reality and practice. Dirk Messner illustrates how far global power shifts have to lead to new patterns of international cooperation using international science and technology cooperation as a case in point. He argues that investment in joint knowledge creation and knowledge exchange is vital for managing the earth system. Messner also points to the multitude of tasks related to socio-technical systems which the political sphere is currently facing, particularly with regard to the challenge of managing the climate system. 




Print version of this Talk (pdf)




What is the most important challenge facing global politics that should be the central debate in the discipline of International Relations?



The biggest challenge of the next decades which we have to come to terms with is governing the big global commons. When I say global commons I do have in mind the atmosphere, the climate system, and other parts of the earth system, but also international financial markets and global infrastructures, such as the Internet – stability of these and other global commons is a public good much required. We need to stabilize the global commons and then manage them in a cooperative manner.



Three dynamics of global change make it specifically challenging to manage these global commons. The first wave of global change is the globalization wave; the economic globalization, cross-border dynamics, global value chains. It becomes evident that in many areas and especially when it comes to the global commons, regulation exceeds the capacity of individual nation states. The international community is required to institutionalize multilateralism and efficient global governance mechanisms in order to properly address issues arising from global dynamics. The second big global change is the shift from a Western to a post-Western world order. Global power shifts remaking the international system impede governing global commons. The third wave of global change is related to climate change, which adds a new dimension of global dynamics; human beings now have to learn how to steer, to stabilize, and how to govern the earth system as such. We are not only a species living on this planet, depending from resources and ecosystems of the earth systems. With the acceleration of economic globalization during the 1990s and the emergence of new, non-Western economic drivers of change, like China, humankind now significantly impacts the physical structures of the earth system. This trend is new. For the first 4,6 billion years of the existence of the earth system it was driven by the laws of physics, the dynamics of biology and bio-chemical processes. Homo sapiens appeared 220.000 years ago, and the impact of our species on the earth system has been marginal until the industrial revolution started 250 years ago. During the last decades human mankind became a major driver of change at a planetary scale.





How did you arrive in your current thinking about these issues?



I have always been interested in international relations, international policy dimensions, and the global economy. I started at the Free University of Berlin at the beginning of the 80's towards the mid-80's, studying Political Science and Economics. One among those professors who have been particularly important to me is Elmar Altvater. He was the supervisor of my diploma as well as of my Ph.D., and he sent me abroad. This resulted being a pivotal experience to me. I studied the last year of my first degree in Seoul, in South Korea. It was the period, the 80's, when the four Asian Tiger states emerged following Japan's example: South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong, and Singapur. I had the chance to visit these countries, study there and learn a lot about Asia. I was fascinated by the dynamics of emerging economies and what this implied for the international arena. Somewhat later, the Latin American continent became the center of my interest. I did research in Nicaragua, Uruguay, Chile and some other Latin American countries, trying to understand liberalization-movements, how weaker actors come under pressure in Western-dominated global settings, but also how some countries managed it to become dynamic parts of the global economy (like the "Asian tigers" or Chile) and why others failed. I learnt that it is crucial to understand dynamics of global change in order to being able to build solid and inclusive economic structures and legitimate political systems at national levels. There has always been a political impulse that pulled me into certain fields I decided to work in.





What is your advice for students who would like to get into the field of global change research or international cooperation?



My first advice is: visit and work in different countries and different cultural and political settings. It is one thing to learn from scholars or books, but having studied and having lived in different contexts and countries is absolutely a key experience. This is the way to understand global dynamics, to get a feeling for differences and similarities. My second advice stems from my experience and conviction that we need much more interdisciplinary research than we currently have. We talk a lot about interdisciplinarity, however, we do not have career paths that systematically build interdisciplinary teams.



Looking particularly at global environmental changes and the future of the earth system, at the end of the day, social scientists and natural scientists need to learn how to work together and to understand each other. The future of the oceans, for example, is not a question that can be understood by ocean biologists only. They are the people studying how these elements of the earth system are actually working, the dynamics and drivers - focusing on physical, chemical, and biochemical processes. But when we look at the oceans towards 2100 from the perspective of global change, the most important drivers are now us human beings, our economies, our consumption patterns, our greenhouse gas emissions and their impacts on the oceans. And this implies that to understand dynamics of global change, we need to analyze the interactions, interdependences and feedback loops between three systems: the ecological system(s); social systems (our economies and societies) driven by humans; the technical systems and infrastructures. Therefore natural scientists, social scientists, and engineers need to interact very closely.  In the German Advisory Council on Global Change we call this approach: Transformation Research. Currently, we do not possess the appropriate university structures to adequately address this sort of problems. This is an immense institutional challenge. If I were a young scholar I would move into this direction, crossing disciplinary boundaries as much as possible.





What is the role of science and technologies in the dynamics of global change?



There are multiple important dimensions, but I would like to focus on some of them by moving through the aforementioned waves of global change. Technology is driving economic globalization, the first wave of global change. So we need to understand the dynamics of new technologies, especially the impact of ICTs, in order to understand the dynamics of economic globalization. The World Wide Web and social communication media are restructuring industrialization processes and global value chains. ICT infrastructure is also displaying a big potential for less developed regions. In Africa, for example, we saw many African countries jumping from the old telephone technologies to smartphones within less than a decade, because the old, maintenance and capital intensive communications infrastructure was no longer needed. Many African people now have access to smartphones, thus to communication- and information networks, and begin to reshape prize constellations and the global economy. Because of its restructuring effects, the impact of ICTs is relevant in all areas of the global economy. The global trend towards urbanization is similarly related to ICTs. Currently, we approach the global economy via data on national economies. But this might be about to change, as global mega-cities develop into global knowledge and financial hubs, building their own networks. In 2040, 80 percent of the global production, global GDP, global consumption, global exchange might be concentrated in 70 to 80 global cities or city regions.



Technology is also linked to the second wave of global change – the tectonic global power shift – in the way that investment in technology and knowledge in emerging economies are growing rapidly. We are not only facing economic and political power shifts, but also a remaking of the global science and research system itself. From my perspective, international cooperation in the field of science and technology research between "old powers" and "new powers", between Western countries and non-Western countries is extremely important for two reasons: First, we need to pool know-how in order to solve core global challenges and to develop patterns for managing the global commons. Interaction and cooperation in the field of science and technology is especially important for the creation of knowledge that is "better" in any way. For instance, in the field of adaptation policies to the impacts of climate change, most of the knowledge on how societies and local communities actually work or respond under these conditions exists in non-Western societies. The generation of knowledge is context dependent. We need to interact with colleagues from the respective countries for mutual learning and common knowledge improvement. My second argument is that, as an effect of the global power shift, traditional development cooperation is losing legitimacy. Many of these societies, from China to Peru, from Kenya to Vietnam, are no longer interested in our usual business, in our "aid-packages", our money, our experts or our concepts. What they are more interested in is true and reciprocal knowledge exchange and joint knowledge creation. Therefore, investments in respective forms and institutions of knowledge exchange and creation will be a central pillar of/for future oriented development cooperation or international cooperation and beneficial for all partners involved. Joint knowledge creation is a precondition for joint action and legitimate global governance initiatives.



The role of technologies with regard to the implications of climate change is crucial and multifaceted. In the German Advisory Council on Global Change we put forth suggestions concerning the transformation towards a low-carbon global economy. We are relatively optimistic in a technological sense. This statement is partly based on the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) research, which has been driven by Nebojsa Nakicenovic, one of our colleagues, who is working on energy modeling. The perspective there is that we know which kind of technologies we need for the transformation into a low-carbon or even zero-carbon economy. We can even calculate the investment costs and structures of different countries and regions. But we do know relatively little about the transformation processes of entire societies, economies and, eventually, the international system towards low-carbon systems. The transformation towards a low-carbon society is a "great transformation". In the entire history of mankind there might be only two examples for such a profound change: the industrial revolution 250 years ago and the Neolithic revolution 10.000 years ago, which induced the practices of agriculture. Today, we thus witness the third great transformation: the decoupling from fossil resources, from high-carbon to zero-carbon. To achieve the 2° Celsius goal, a complete decarbonization of the basic infrastructures of the global economy (the energy systems, the urban infrastructures and systems, the land use systems) is required – within a very limited period of time, until 2070. Comprehensive knowledge is key to achieve this. Let me emphasize once more the significance of international cooperation in the field of science and technology research, particularly in the IPCC context. I am sure that politicians from China, India, or Brazil only accept what the IPCC is presenting as objective knowledge, as the stand of the art knowledge, because their national scientists are deeply involved. If this were a classical western-based knowledge project it would have resulted in a lack of legitimacy. In the case of global climate policy, it is obvious that investment in joint knowledge creation is also about creating legitimacy for joint action.





What are the main obstacles of the low-carbon transformation?



The first two great transformations have been evolutionary processes. No one "planned" the industrial revolution, not to mention the Neolithic revolution.  These have been evolutionary dynamics. The sustainability transformation instead needs to be a governed process right from the beginning. In our institute, we looked at different transformation dynamics, not only the really big ones, the Neolithic, industrial, and the current sustainability transformation. We also examined structural adjustment programs in Latin America and Africa, the collapse of communism at the end of the 80s, the abolition of slavery, and similar other key transformations of human societies. Based on this historical perspective, we have identified four main drivers of transformation: The first one is crisis, this is the most important one. Confronted with strong crises, society and probably also individuals react and change direction. The second important driver is very often technology and scientific (r)evolution. The third driver is vision: If you are confronted with a problem but you do not know where to go to, transformation becomes very difficult. The European Union is the product of a fresh vision among elites after World War II; the United Nations is a result of the disasters of the first half of the 20th century. Advancing a vision is an essential means to move or to transform in a goal-oriented manner. Sustainability, of course, is also a vision. The fourth and last driver of transformation is "knowledge": you know that you have a certain problem constellation, and though the crisis is still not there, you react based on your knowledge in a preventive way.



For the low-carbon transformation, the fourth driver currently is absolutely key. We are able to address problems which would otherwise become much worse in the future, although the climate crisis is latent still – in contrast to, for example, the financial crisis, which is more visible in its effects. The impacts of a global warming of 4 or 5 degrees are still not visible. This makes for a huge difference. In fact, humans are not very good at acting and transforming significantly based on knowledge only. In combination with visible, tangible crises, knowledge is a strong driver of change, but without crisis, it is merely sufficient. Transformations based on knowledge and preventive action only are rare. The ozone hole is one positive example; solving the problem was possible because it required less complex technological change, affecting few industries only. Human beings are risk-averse in a sense, we are conservative, we do not like to change rapidly; we are path-dependent. John Maynard Keynes once said: "It is easy to develop new concepts and ideas. The difficult thing is to forget the old ones". Therefore, scientific tools are needed in order to sketch out future scenarios. Based on scientific knowledge, we need to convince our societies, our political decision-makers that it is necessary and possible to transform societies and economies towards sustainability – in order to avoid disruptive change in the earth system. Pushing towards sustainability at a point where the crisis has not yet materialized implies a specific and new role for science in managing global dynamics. Organizing a deep transformation towards sustainability avoiding significant crises driven by Earth system changes would be a cultural learning process – a civilizational shift.





What are the effects of growing multipolarity for global governance processes?



To start optimistically, I would argue that in contrast to historical situations in which this kind of tectonic power shifts led to conflicts or even wars, the current situation is different. The world is highly interconnected and economic interdependencies are stronger than ever. Charles Kupchan is differentiating between "war", "cold peace" and "warm peace". I think that a big "war" is not very probable, and "cold peace" is what we are in actually. "Warm peace" would be cooperative global governance: we identify our problems, have a joint problem analysis, and subsequently start acting cooperatively on them. But this does not describe the contemporary situation. While there are no severe global conflicts, we do not solve many of the global interdependency problems.



There are many barriers to global cooperation and I would like to mention two or three of those. The first one consists of power conflicts and power struggles. Hopefully realists such as John Mearsheimer are not right in claiming that "a peaceful rise of China is not possible". But the fundamental point remains that the re-organization and shuffling of power resources is rendering cooperation extremely difficult. The second point is that all the important global actors currently have severe domestic challenges to manage. The European countries are coping with the European dept crisis. Similarly, the United States is concerned with financial turbulences and rising social inequalities. China has to keep its annual growth rate of about 8 to 12 per cent and meanwhile stabilize its rapid modernization process. In India, there is still a large group of people suffering from poverty. So, managing that and trying to be a responsible global actor at the same time is not easy at all. In brief, all actors that we would like to see taking on a more responsible role on the global level are overcommitted domestically.



There is consensus among different disciplines on what cooperation is actually about. At the Centre for Global Cooperation Research we did a study on The Behavioural Dimensions of International Cooperation (2013) based on insights of very different disciplines – evolutionary biology, social anthropology, cognitive sciences, psychology, political sciences, behavioral economics – to find out what the basic mechanisms are which help human beings to cooperate at any scale towards global corporation in a world of nine billion people. Finally, we identified seven factors promoting cooperation: trust, communication, joint we-identities, reputation, fairness, enforcement – and reciprocity, which is the most fundamental prerequisite. These factors form an enable environment for cooperation and they are manmade. In contexts, actor constellations, systems, in which these basic mechanisms of cooperation are strong, they help to embed power dynamics, to solve social dilemma problems and to manage interdependencies. In contrast, contexts, actor constellations, and systems in which theses basic mechanisms of cooperation are weak, will be driven mainly by power dynamics and struggles. By looking at these factors one immediately understands why the G20 context is so difficult. We have been able to create and to well establish these factors in our old settings; in the European Union, the Western world, the transatlantic community. But now we are sitting together with new actors rather unknown. The G7/G8 world – the OECD driven and the western driven global economy and global politics – has moved towards G20 since it was acknowledged that one cannot manage any global turbulence without emerging economies. The G20 was created or rather called to meet in 2008, a few days after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers when many feared the collapse of the world's financial markets. Most western economies were highly indebted, whereas the emerging economies, especially China, were holding large currency reserves. From a behavioral perspective we have to invest in these basic factors of cooperation in the G 20 context in order to create the essential preconditions of joint action to solve the big global problems. This represents a long-term project, and unfortunately many of these global problems are highly challenging from the time perspective: a tension derives from the gap between time pressure in many of these areas and the time it probably needs to build up these basic mechanisms of cooperation. In fact, the major feeling is that international cooperation is even weaker now than a decade ago. I usually visualize the current situation of the G20 as a round table with 20 seats but no one is sitting there. Charles Kupchan's "No one's world" or Ian Bremmer's "The G0 world" deal with the same problem: international cooperation, global governance is currently so difficult, although all these interdependency problems rendered the problem of managing the global commons fully obvious. If you talk to our Foreign Ministers or Finance Ministers or Chancellors and Presidents, they of course all know exactly what is out there in terms of globalization impacts. But organizing the necessary global consensus and the governance and cooperation structures is tremendously difficult.





How far is the discipline of development research affected by global change?



This is a complex question, to which I do not have a definite answer. The whole field of development research is currently about to get redefined. In the past, the concept of development was clear: On the one side, there was the developed world, the OECD-world, consisting of 35-40 countries and on the other side, the "underdeveloped" part of the world, all other countries. Understanding the differences between developed and developing, along with thinking about the basic drivers of modernization and wealth creation in less developed countries was at the core of development research for a long period. How can poor countries become rich and as developed as OECD countries already are?



Today, it is highly questionable if even the broader categories of "development research" still serve to analyze the new realities. Do we currently still need "development economists", and how would they differ from classical "economists" doing research in those European countries suffering most from the debt crisis, high unemployment and weak institutions? Situations in many OECD countries nowadays look like what one would expect from a still developing or emerging economy, and the other way around. So, what distinguishes development research? This is an important question. Studying non-OECD countries, do we still need development research based governance theories or democratization theories – thus, theories that are systematically different from those we apply in our research on OECD countries? The discipline of development research is under immense pressure. This debate is linked to the second wave of global change we talked about: the post-western world order, emerging economies catching up, convergence trends in the global economy.



If you look at the role of international technology transfer, the same scenario arises: the North-South, donor-recipient categories have dissolved. Technology transfer has lost its distinct direction, and it is much more reciprocal and diffuse than it used to be. There are several studies currently pointing to the fact that investment rates in R&D and in technology creation are growing fast in several regions around the globe, whereas in many OECD-countries, investment is stagnating, or even decreasing. The whole map of knowledge, if you like to say so, is about to undergo deep changes. This implies that the common assumption that knowledge is based in OECD countries and transferred to the South via development cooperation is just not working any longer. We need new patterns of cooperation between different countries in this area. And we need research on global development dynamics which will be different from classical development research which has been based on the assumption of a systemic North-South divide for a long time.







How do institutions such as the World Bank react to the emerging and redefined agenda of development?



The current reorientation of the World Bank as a Knowledge Bank originates from the assumption that knowledge is just as important as money for global development. The second point is that more and more of their partners in non-OECD countries, classical developing and emerging economies, are more and more interested in the knowledge pools of the World Bank and less in their experts. And: dynamic developing countries and emerging economies are even more interested in investments in their own knowledge systems and joint knowledge creation with the World Bank. The old North-South knowledge transfer model is eroding. You might say that there currently are two contradictory global trends: on the one hand via social media and the Internet, knowledge is being widely distributed – broader than ever before and actually, theoretically accessible at any point in the world –, on the other hand the proliferation of knowledge is accompanied with access restriction and control, and the growing privatization of knowledge. Aiming to play a constructive role in collaborative knowledge generation, the World Bank invests a lot in building up freely accessible data bases and open research tools, including the provision of governance or development indicators of any kind. However, this is a difficult process that is developing slowly.



The World Bank is currently undergoing several basic re-orientations. The structures inside of the World Bank are about to become less hierarchical and more horizontal. Originally, the World Bank has been a much more western dominated organization as the Bretton Woods institutions were formed by the United States and its allies. If you look into the governance structures of the World Bank today, it is still largely dominated by OECD countries, but you can notice that this is changing. It is a global organization but 90 % of people working there have been studying at Anglo-Saxon universities. Actors especially from emerging economies have been criticizing that for long, claiming that the World Bank as a global organization should have to be represented by a global citizenship. Although this had slowly started to change already, all the knowledge and all the qualification procedures still remained very western dominated. So they asked the World Bank to diversify its partner structures, to reach out and cooperate with research institutions from around the world. This is what the World Bank is trying to do at the moment, which is really a break with its culture. Because even though the World Bank is a global organization, it has always been a very inward-looking organization. The World Bank was strong, with fantastic professionals and researchers inside, but without cooperating tools. Now they are trying to broaden their cooperation structures and to learn from and together with other institutions.





What are the opportunities and difficulties of big data analysis for global development?



Access to any kind of data is important for any kind of knowledge creation. It has been very limited for many developing countries over a very long time. So, thinking about how to assure access to serious data is significant. This would be my first point. My second point is that, when it comes to big data and the question of managing large amounts of indicators on, for example, cross-country or cross-sector modeling, I think the new technologies are opening up new research possibilities and opportunities. Big data provides the opportunity to identify patterns. Looking for similar dynamics in very different systems is a very interesting exercise, because you get deeper insights into the basic dynamics of systems. This is what I have learned from my colleague Nakicenovic, whom I have mentioned before, and who is working on the Global Energy Assessment, or from Juergen Kurths, from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, who is studying basic structures and dynamics of very different complex systems like air traffic networks, global infrastructures and social media networks. Managing big data allows you to see patterns which cannot be seen if you only work with case studies. However, to understand the dynamics of countries and sectors, new actor constellations or communities, you need to go into detail and in this specific moment, big data is only the starting point, the background: you also need qualified, serious, very often qualitative data on the ground. Big data and qualified, specific data: they complement each other.



For sure, an important aspect of big data is that for the most part, it is gathered and stored by private businesses. We started this interview talking about global commons and we actually just defined a global commons: data on development should be a global commons, and we need standards and rules of managing those. Private actors could play a role, but within a set of rules defined by societies and policies, and not the private business sector.









Dirk Messner is the Director of the "German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)" since 2003 and teaches at the Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen. He is Co-Director of the "Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR)", University Duisburg-Essen, which was established in 2012. He furthermore is Co-Chair of the "German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)", member of the "China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development", member of the "Global Knowledge Advisory Commission" of the World Bank and member of the "European Commission's Scientific Advisory Board for EU development policy". Dirk Messner's research interests and work areas include globalisation and global governance, climate change, transformation towards low carbon economies, and development policy. He directed many international research programs and thus created a close international research network.



related links:


Profile at German Development Institute
Messner, Dirk / Guarín, Alejandro / Haun, Daniel (eds.) (2013): The Behavioural Dimensions of International Cooperation, Global Cooperation Research Papers 1, Centre for Global Cooperation Research (pdf)


Read Jing Gu, John Humphrey, and Dirk Messner's (2007) Global Governance and Developing Countries: The Implications of the Rise of China here (pdf)


Messner, Dirk (2007): The European Union: Protagonist in a
Multilateral World Order or Peripheral Power
in the »Asia-Pacific« Century? (pdf)


Print version of this Talk (pdf)