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SSRN
In: Competition and Trade Policies; Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy
In: Journal of economics and business, Band 48, Heft 5, S. 473-486
ISSN: 0148-6195
In: Global Dictionary of Competition Law (Deborah Healey, William E Kovacic, Pablo Trevisán and Richard Whish eds.)
SSRN
In: Markets and Organization, S. 557-575
In: Oxford review of economic policy, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 41-57
ISSN: 1460-2121
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 117-141
ISSN: 1930-7969
In: Mirovaja ėkonomika i meždunarodnye otnošenija: MĖMO, Band 66, Heft 5, S. 23-31
Vertical restraints applied by major operators of digital markets have become a serious challenge for international regulators and governments of leading world powers in recent years. Having new specific features in comparison with the restraints in force in traditional sales channels, they can lead to a rapid strengthening of the market power of dominant online platforms and to the subsequent monopolization of markets. The article is devoted to the study of business practices of applying various types of vertical restraints in global digital markets. Using the example of global leading companies (Apple Inc., Amazon, Booking.com., Microsoft, etc.), the market consequences of the introduction of exclusive and related contracts, cross-platform parity agreements, as well as a wide range of transaction bans are demonstrated. In particular, suppliers and dealers are significantly limited in their ability to sell competing products and brands and list them on major online marketplaces. Bans are introduced on the use of Internet sites for price aggregation and comparison, as well as certain e-commerce platforms and certain types of payment means. At the same time, there are significant penalties for non-compliance with the terms of vertical contracts. Buyers and users are limited by the possibilities of using software products of independent developers, connecting to competing online services. Technological solutions are being introduced that increase the costs of sharing hardware and software of competing operators. And such solutions are greatly simplified in the conditions of existing "closed" global digital ecosystems. It is shown that the norms of vertical contracts of major market players are able to effectively eliminate the cost advantages of both existing operators and new firms, significantly increasing the entry costs and reducing potential of entering firms to attract the target audience at the start of activity. The most vulnerable here are, first of all, small highly specialized companies using low-budget business models. The author proposes a theoretical model that reveals the mechanism that prevents new firms from achieving the minimum effective sales volume. Using the example of the distributor's retail price control strategy, it is proved that the use of vertical contracts allows both increasing the profits of existing operators and successfully preventing potential competitors from entering the market. At the same time, it is noted that the use of vertical restraints contributes to solving a number of current business problems of large digital companies: effective protection of investments in the development of e-commerce channels, limiting the turnover of counterfeit products, deepening the differentiation of market supply, reducing the risks of price wars and leveling the actual "stowaway problem". Therefore, the qualification of vertical restraints as good practices, or as abuses of market power, should be based on an analysis of the objectives of such restraints and a comprehensive assessment of their potential consequences. An important step towards solving this complex and very sensitive problem may be the adoption of the Digital Markets Act by the European Parliament in 2023.
This volume provides a survey of recent literature on certain aspects of vertical restraints. The book will make excellent supplementary reading for courses in industrial organization and other fields dealing with antitrust issues and will also be of interest to lawyers, researchers, and policy makers
In: Evans David S., Allan Fels, and Catherine Tucker, eds., The Evolution of Antitrust in the Digital Era: Essays on Competition Policy (Boston: Competition Policy International, 2020, Forthcoming).
SSRN
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 40, Heft 1, S. 120-143
ISSN: 1756-2171
This article considers vertical restraints in a setting in which duopoly retailers each sell more than one manufactured good. Vertical restraints by a dominant manufacturer enable the firm to acquire horizontal control over a competitively supplied retail good. The equilibrium contracts produce symptoms that are consistent with a variety of observed retail practices, including slotting fees paid to retailers by competitive suppliers, loss leadership, and predatory accommodation with below‐cost manufacturer pricing for the dominant brand(s). Applications are developed for supermarket retailing, where the manufacturer of a national brand seeks to control the retail pricing of a supermarket's private label, and for convenience stores, where a gasoline provider seeks to control the retail pricing of an in‐store composite consumption good.
In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 284
SSRN
Working paper
In: Legal issues of economic integration: law journal of the Europa Instituut and the Amsterdam Center for International Law, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 15-59
ISSN: 1566-6573, 1875-6433
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 143-197
ISSN: 1930-7969