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'Applied Welfare Economics' extends a cost-benefit analysis by using important results in welfare economics. Formal analysis is explained using diagrams to make it more adaptable to the different institutional arrangements encountered in applied work.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

Recommended readings (Machine generated): Paul A. Samuelson (1954), 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', Review of Economics and Statistics, 36 (4), November, 387-9 -- Francis M. Bator (1958), 'The Anatomy of Market Failure', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXII (3), August, 351-79 -- Kenneth J. Arrow (1970), 'The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation', in Julius Margolis (ed) and Robert H. Haveman (ed) (eds), Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis, Chapter 2, Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Company, 59-73 -- Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster (1997), 'The General Theory of Second Best', in Richard G. Lipsey (ed) (ed.), Microeconomics, Growth and Political Economy: The Selected Essays of Richard G. Lipsey, Volume One, Chapter 6, Cheltenham, UK and Lyme, US: Edward Elgar, 153-80. (A revised version of an article originally published in Review of Economic Studies, XXIV, 1956, 11-32) -- Otto A. Davis and Andrew B. Whinston (1965), 'Welfare Economics and the Theory of Second Best', Review of Economic Studies, 32(1), January, 1-14 -- J. R. Hicks (1943), 'The Four Consumer's Surpluses', Review of Economic Studies, 11 (1), Winter, 31-41 -- E. J. Mishan (1959), 'Rent as a Measure of Welfare Change', American Economic Review, 49 (3), June, 386-94 -- John Martin Currie, John A. Murphy and Andrew Schmitz (1971), 'The Concept of Economic Surplus and Its Use in Economic Analysis', Economic Journal, LXXXI (324), December, 741-99 -- Arnold C. Harberger (1971), 'Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay', Journal of Economic Literature, 9 (3), September, 785-97 -- Harold Hotelling (1938), 'The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates', Econometrica, 6 (3), July, 242-69 -- Nicholas Kaldor (1939), 'Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility', Economic Journal, XLIX (195), September, 549-52 -- J. R. Hicks (1939), 'The Foundations of Welfare Economics', Economic Journal, XLIX (196), December, 696-712 -- T. de Scitovszky (1941), 'A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics', Review of Economic Studies, 9 (1), November, 77-88 -- Paul A. Samuelson (1950), 'Evaluation of Real National Income', Oxford Economic Papers, 2 (1), New Series, January, 1-29 -- Paul A. Samuelson (1942), 'Constancy of the Marginal Utility of Income', in Oscar Lange (ed), Francis McIntyre (ed) and Theodore O. Yntema (ed) (eds), Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics: In Memory of Henry Schultz, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 75-91 -- Eugene Silberberg (1972), 'Duality and the Many Consumer's Surpluses', American Economic Review, LXII (5), December, 942-52 -- Robert D. Willig (1976), 'Consumer's Surplus Without Apology', American Economic Review, 66 (4), September, 589-97 -- Alan Randall and John R. Stoll (1980), 'Consumer's Surplus in Commodity Space', American Economic Review, 70 (3), June, 449-55 -- Jerry A. Hausman (1981), 'Exact Consumer's Surplus and Deadweight Loss', American Economic Review, 71 (4), September, 662-76