Article(print)1990

A Social Custom Model of Collective Action

In: European journal of political economy, Volume 6, Issue 2, p. 201-216

Naylor, Robin

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Abstract

Conventional economic analysis does not explain satisfactorily the logic of collective action when the outcomes of such action possess public good characteristics. Here, a social custom model of collective action is developed that generalizes the analysis of collective action & allows for individual heterogeneity. The degree of heterogeneity among the population has important implications for the level of critical mass required before collective action can be sustained. The empirical content of the theoretical models is considered. 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

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