INTELLIGENCE AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IN THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899-1902

In: Intelligence and national security, Volume 6, Issue 1, p. 90-114

Abstract

THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT DURING THE PHILIPPINE WAR BETWEEN 1899 AND 1902 HAD TO DISCOVER THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT THROUGH BITTER EXPERIENCE. FOR MUCH OF THE WAR, AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE WAS AS DIFFUSE, UNCONNECTED AND DISORGANIZED AS THE RESISTANCE SOLDIERS ENCOUNTERED IN THE FIELD. AS A RESULT OF INDIFFERENCE AND MISPLACED OPTIMISM AT HEADQUARTERS, THE U.S. ARMY FAILED TO CREATE A COHERENT PROGRAM TO GATHER AND DISPERSE INTELLIGENCE FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING. THIS NEGLECT, IN TURN, LED TO AN EXTENSIVE INTEREST IN LOCAL INTELLIGENCE BY FILED OFFICERS WHO, ALMOST BY ACCIDENT OBTAINED INFORMATION ON GUERRILLA LEADERS AND STRONGHOLDS OR FOCUSED ON THE VITAL GUERRILLA INFRASTRUCTURE. HOWEVER, THE LACK OF CENTRALIZATION BECAME A POSITIVE BOON AS UNKNOWN AND UNTRAINED OFFICERS WERE ABLE TO STEP INTO THE VOID AND DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT INTELLIGENCE METHODS SINGULARLY WELL ADAPTED TO DEAL WITH A GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION.