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Recent Western literature concerning the political determinants of economic and social outcomes has primarily concentrated on regime types and the effectiveness of state institutions. While this literature has been influential among scholars of and in the Middle East and North Africa, there has also been an emphasis in the region on the interests and networks of economic and political elites—the interactions between rulers, elites, and the broader citizenry—to explain divergent policy outcomes. This is largely due to the inability of dominant mainstream institutional and structural theories to explain much of what has been observed in the region, viewing it as exceptional in its authoritarianism and resistance to global trends. In fact, the seeds for a more sophisticated understanding can be found in the literature on the Arab world that emphasizes relational dynamics between political and economic actors. Synthesizing the insights of scholars of the region has the potential to contribute more broadly to global debates on how political factors and conditions within states shape the quality of life experienced by their residents. Such a shift to viewing regimes as networks provides a useful framework for bridging the broader trends in political science with the work emanating from scholarship on the Middle East and North Africa.

Überblick über die Entwicklung der Politischen Wissenschaft in Griechenland, über Forschungsschwerpunkte und aktuelle Forschungsfragen

That an animal, presumably a cousin of the simians and certainly very similar to them, has developed societies in which millions and even hundreds of millions of individuals live and act together in orderly relation to each other is one of the astounding facts of history; and an impartial observer would hardly be surprised if the incredibly intricate network of cooperation, overstrained, should suddenly tear apart.The aggregation of men into huge organized groups is, of course, relatively recent. For a million years or longer men or near-men lived an animal-like existence, scattered in small groups. It was not until fifteen or twenty thousand years ago that men, perhaps as a consequence of unprecedented pressure from the environment, organized groups of any considerable size; it is only within the last three or four thousand years that large-scale societies have existed; and it is only in the last three or four hundred years that complex orderly interplay and interaction among individuals and subgroups in societies have been developed.

Few persons who look at the world thoughtfully are complacent. It is difficult to believe that the balance of power will become more stable. Quite the contrary! A degree of bi-polarity in world politics has been reached which compels each of the opposing groups to bend its efforts to bring the remaining neutrals into its orbit and to augment its power. If the war which each regards as a possibility should come, each wants to be sure that it will not be the loser. The race in atomic weapons and armaments of all kinds is on and experience suggests, as in the rivalries between sections before the American Civil War and the rivalries between alliances before the first World War, that such a race will eventuate in war.There is no balancer in a bi-polar world, nor are there uncommitted powers which may cast their lot on one side or the other in a crisis. The process of nucleation about the two poles makes prediction of the power potential of each more and more feasible. It becomes increasingly clear to one side that time is with it and to the other that time is against it. Under such circumstances each expects war and it can be anticipated that the side which becomes convinced that time is against it will start the war. Fortunately there are still many unknown variables in the present situation. No precise calculation is yet possible, though it may be in the course of a few years. However, if war comes, there are few who doubt that atomic weapons would be used and that the human race would face disaster.

Contents -- Acknowledgement -- Chapter One: Problem, Purpose, Plan -- Chapter Two: James Coleman: Educational Policy for Youth and High Schools -- Chapter Three: Eli Ginzberg: Manpower and Human Resources Policy -- Chapter Four: Morris Janowitz: Military Institutions, the Draft, and the Volunteer Army -- Chapter Five: Joseph A. Pechman: Comprehensive Income Taxation -- Chapter Six: Merton J. Peck: Deregulation of the Transportation Industry -- Chapter Seven: Peter Rossi: Unemployment Insurance Payments and Recidivism Among Released Prisoners

This address advances three ideas. First, political science as a discipline has a mandate to help human beings govern themselves. Second, within this mandate we should be focusing, more than we do now, on creating legitimate coercion. In a world of increasing interdependence we now face an almost infinite number of collective action problems created when something we need or want involves a "free-access good." We need coercion to solve these collective action problems. The best coercion is normatively legitimate coercion. Democratic theory, however, has focused more on preventing tyranny than on how to legitimate coercion. Finally, our discipline has neglected an important source of legitimate coercion: negotiation to agreement. Recognizing the central role of negotiation in politics would shed a different light on our relatively unexamined democratic commitments to transparency in process and contested elections. This analysis is overall both descriptive and aspirational, arguing that helping human beings to govern themselves has been in the DNA of our profession since its inception.

Abstract. The article presents an attempt to make sense of Adolf Bibič's
oeuvre as a whole. It reveals his broader intellectual (and also political)
project along with his coherent and systematic analysis of what may also
be understood as the 'possibilities' of political science. We claim that Bibič's
various analyses and interventions actually pivot on the question of the
future or, even better, the role and position of political science in it. We
name this aspect of Bibič's oeuvre the 'political science of the future', which
necessarily returns to the history of political ideas and political history to
even be able to understand the current political relations and their contradictions. The ambition and capacity of the 'political science of the future'
is not merely an explanation of what exists since, as Bibič states, political
science is the key science for facing the challenges of the future and, accordingly, vital for our existence – political and physical.
Keywords: Adolf Bibič, political science, future, state, democracy, citizenship.