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"Born in 1879, Eugen Varga would become the most prominent Marxist economist in the Soviet Union - 'Stalin's economist'. This volume contains a wide and representative selection of his works, dating from his entry into the Hungarian Communist Party in 1919 through to his criticisms of John Maynard Keynes in the 1950s. It includes the entire text of his Economic Problems of the Proletarian Dictatorship, according to Lenin probably the best work on the collapse of the revolutionary government in Hungary. A detailed critical introduction by Varga's biographer, André Mommen, supplies valuable background detail on the circumstances of Varga's work, contextualising it in relation to political events and the development of orthodox economic theory in the USSR"--

In this paper I outline the theory of institutional economics developed by John R. Commons and contrast it with neoclassical economic theory. Key concepts in Commons' theory are bounded rationality, property rights, working rules, institutions, transactions and incomplete contracts. Although Commons' writings tend toward the obscure and descriptive, I demonstrate that on a deeper level of analysis his ideas and concepts provide the basis for an alternative body of economic theory. In certain respects, this body of theory complements neoclassical theory by fleshing-out the institutional infrastructure that governs and regulates market exchange. In other respects, however, Commons' theory of institutional economics is a heterodox substitute for neoclassical theory because it is built using a different methodology, replaces or modifies central theoretical pillars of neoclassical theory, and denies the validity of the 'Invisible Hand' theorem and other core neoclassical propositions. Commons' institutional economics also provides a theoretical framework for an integration of the economic and social dimensions of human behaviour. Adapted from the source document.

The last two decades have seen greater spatial polarization of the British electorate, with Labour becoming relatively stronger in the North & Conservatives in the South. Survey data from 1992 are drawn on to link spatial polarization to electors' evaluation of trends in regional economies. Findings indicate that voters who felt that their own & their region's economic situation had been in relative decline were less likely to vote Conservative in 1992, especially if they blamed government policy for those conditions. 7 Tables, 9 References. Adapted from the source document.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- CONTENTS -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Introduction to the 2003 Paperback Edition -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- CHAPTER 1 States, Markets, and Industrial Policy -- CHAPTER 2 The Rise of East Asia -- CHAPTER 3 The Neoclassical Explanation -- CHAPTER 4 State-led Industrialization, 1930s to 1980s -- CHAPTER 5 Management of Foreign Trade and Investment -- CHAPTER 6 Management of Domestic Investment -- CHAPTER 7 The Economic Bureaucracy -- CHAPTER 8 The Political System -- CHAPTER 9 Politics of Investment and Industrial Policy -- CHAPTER 10 Conclusions ( 1 ): Governing the Market in East Asia -- CHAPTER 11 Concusions (2): Lessons from East Asia -- APPENDIX A: Fiscal Incentives -- APPENDIX Β: Politics of the 1958-62 Economic Reforms -- References -- Index

The award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Professor Jean Tirole in 2014 has generated intense interest about his brainchild theory of two-sided markets. Against this background, this article explores whether there is such a thing as a unified theory of two-sided markets and whether the two-sided markets literature can readily be applied by antitrust agencies, regulatory authorities, and courts. This article vindicates caution. The buzz surrounding two-sided markets could mask the fact that, in many cases, the policy implications of the theory are not yet clear, and divergences among its proponents are often underplayed. In that regard, the article notably stresses that one of the key conditions of market two-sidedness identified by Rochet and Tirole in their seminal paper of 2003—the unavailability of Coasian bargaining between both sides of a platform—has often disappeared from subsequent scholarship. This omission threatens the coherent implementation of the theory of two-sided markets. Without this qualification, markets are often mischaracterized as two-sided, as soon as they display prima facie signs of indirect network externalities.

The award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Professor Jean Tirole in 2014 has generated intense interest about his brainchild theory of two-sided markets. Against this background, this paper explores whether there is such a thing as a unified theory of two-sided markets and whether the two-sided markets literature can readily be applied by antitrust agencies, regulatory authorities and courts. This paper vindicates caution. The buzz surrounding two-sided markets could mask the fact that, in many cases, the policy implications of the theory are not yet clear, and that divergences among its proponents are often underplayed. In that regard, the paper notably stresses that one of the key conditions of market two-sidedness identified by Rochet and Tirole in their seminal paper of 2003 – the unavailability of Coasian bargaining between both sides of a platform – has often disappeared from subsequent scholarship. This omission threatens the coherent implementation of the theory of two-sided markets. Without this qualification, markets are often mischaracterized as two-sided, as soon as they display prima facie signs of indirect network externalities.