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This book studies the unprecedented decision of 23 June 2016, which saw the UK electorate vote to leave the EU, turning David Cameron's referendum gamble into a great miscalculation. It analyzes the renegotiation that preceded the vote, before examining the campaign itself so as to understand why the government's strategy for winning foundered. It then evaluates the implications that this decision has for the country's international relations as well as for its domestic politics. The author's final reflections are on the political philosophy of Brexit, which is founded on a critique of representative democracy. Yet the use of direct democracy to trigger EU withdrawal leaves the supposedly sovereign British people at an impasse. For it is up to the people's representatives to negotiate the terms of Brexit. By engaging with a highly charged political debate in an accessible and non-partisan manner this book will appeal to a broad readership of academics, policy-makers, journalists, and interested citizens. Andrew Glencross is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Aston University, UK. He has published widely on the politics of European integration in journals such as Journal of Common Market Studies, International Affairs, Political Studies, and The Political Quarterly. He is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia.--

This paper applies theories of international socialization to examine the impact of European Union contact on the professional socialization of public officials in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on a survey of officials in seven new member states, the paper finds that daily work on European Union issues is associated with favourable attitudes towards merit-based civil service governance. The distinction between types of European Union contact shows that officials dealing with 'reception'-related European Union activities such as the transposition and implementation of European Union policies develop more meritocratic attitudes. By contrast, 'projection'-related activities that involve personal contact with European Union officials have no effect. The paper concludes that the small but consistent impact of European Union contact on professional socialization promotes the silent professionalization of public administration in Central and Eastern Europe.

From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, Euroscepticism is little more than a set of preferences by citizens, parties and interest groups about institutional design in Europe. If actors' expect policy outcomes to move closer to their ideal positions as a result of European integration, they will be Euro-enthusiastic (as many centrists are). But, if they feel that policies will move further away from their ideal positions, they will be Eurosceptic (as many extremists are). This simple idea has broad historical and geographical relevance, relating to how actors view the design of multilevel polities, and how these institutional preferences change in response to policy outcomes of the central institutions.

Previous studies predicted European Union attitudes using anti-immigrant attitudes, but without explicitly accounting for attitudes toward different out-groups. We propose that group-specific attitudes independently predict attitudes toward the European Union, but only when the out-group is linked to the European Union issue in question. We additionally argue that realistic or symbolic threat associated with specific out-groups determines whether utilitarian or identity considerations are more important in predicting European Union attitudes. Using a nationally representative Dutch sample ( N = 2347), we focus on attitudes toward Polish and Muslim immigrants to predict strengthening of European Union integration and Turkey's potential accession and find support for our hypotheses. The findings indicate the need to rethink the relationship between out-group perceptions and European Union attitudes.

Differentiation has become a durable feature of European integration but we know little about its effects on citizens. Does differentiated integration improve the democratic quality of the European Union and strengthen citizens' support – or does it promote political divides and foster citizens' alienation from European integration? This article develops a theoretical argument on the positive attitudinal effects of differentiated integration, contending that differentiation accommodates heterogeneous preferences in a diverse EU and strengthens citizens' ownership of European integration. A quasi-experimental analysis of public opinion of the 2015 Danish Justice and Home Affairs opt-out referendum demonstrates that the public vote increased citizens' EU efficacy, indeed. Eurosceptic voters in particular strengthen their belief that their individual voice counts in EU politics, suggesting that differentiation can have a positive effect on the perceived democratic quality of the EU.

AbstractThis article provides an overview of cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning contract law. The present issue covers the period between July 2017 and the beginning of January 2018.

The 'High Representative' speaks on behalf of the European Union in international organizations since 2010. The motivation for this reform has been to strengthen the European Union's foreign policy representation. It can be expected that this empowerment of the High Representative has affected the content of official European Union speeches held at the United Nations. Did the reform lead to a more coherent and cohesive representation of European Union foreign policy at the United Nations? To answer this question, I analyze the content of all speeches held on behalf of the European Union in the United Nations General Assembly between 1993 and 2021. I find that European Union foreign policy priorities are more coherently and cohesively represented since the Lisbon reforms took effect. I argue that the empowerment of the 'High Representatives' and their diplomats caused this effect. Today, European Union representatives are less likely to follow global trends but set their own thematic priorities by focusing on the areas of disarmament, sustainable development, and international law.

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- The EU as an International Negotiator -- Approach -- Case Selection -- Terminology -- Structure of the Book -- References -- Theorising the EU as an International Actor -- International Negotiations as a Two-Level Game with Principals and Agents -- The Negotiator in a Two-Level Game -- Principal-Agent Analysis-Domestic Dynamics -- Strategic Action by the International Negotiator -- Strategic Action by the Principals at the International Level -- Negotiating Context -- Two-Level Game and Principal-Agent Analysis of EU International Negotiations -- The EU Negotiators at the Centre: A Framework for Analysis -- References -- Development Negotiations -- Introduction -- Background -- From Yaoundé to Cotonou -- From Lomé to Cotonou -- The EU Institutional Set-Up: A Principal-Agent Relationship -- Agent Power -- Principal Control -- The College of Commissioners -- The Council of the EU -- The European Parliament -- Case Study-Negotiating the Partnership Agreement with the OACPS -- Preparation Phase -- The EU's Domestic Negotiations at Level Two-Identifying the Win-Set -- International Engagement at Level One -- Negotiation Phase -- The EU's Domestic Negotiations at Level Two -- International Negotiations at Level One -- Ratification Phase -- Conclusion -- References -- Trade Negotiations -- Introduction -- Background -- Entering the Multilateral Trading System -- Towards Bilateralism -- The EU Institutional Set-Up: A Principal-Agent Relationship -- Agent Power -- Principal Control -- The College of Commissioners -- The Council of the EU -- The European Parliament -- Case Study-Negotiating the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan -- Preparation Phase -- The EU's Domestic Negotiations at Level Two-Identifying the Win-Set -- International Engagement at Level One.

Competition Law has proved to be a dynamic legal institute of great economic, legal and social significance. Indeed, the over-all positive effect this institute has had in the United States of America since the Sherman Act (1890), and in Europe since the Treaty of Rome (1957), is plainly manifest. Other contending economic strategies have in the long run proved to be inconsequential. Fair Competition is paradoxically dominating the economic environment, at least, in democracies. Like all other legal institutes, this too naturally directly effects the well being of those falling within this regimen. Strategists therefore, have to be quite alert to avoid situations that rather than leading to the intended positive effects advocated by academic analysis instead lead in the opposite direction to the detriment of those that have to bear its weight. The emphasis within the European Community for prospective Member States to adopt this legal regime in their legal order has therefore to be treated with great circumspection. The pre-accession period does not consequentially necessitate a period of mere structural readjustment. It also demands a period of deep reflection for the redefinition and proper assimilation of the delicate issues involved. ; peer-reviewed