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Since the downfall of Suharto's authoritarian government in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed a variety of violent conflicts, intergroup tensions and Islamist radicalism, which in turn pose threats to the country's security, safety and peace. This article examines various forms of religious violence, particularly Islamist violence, and ways of overcoming them tactically or strategically in post-Suharto Indonesia. This article underscores the need to go beyond the liberal peace framework, underlines the significance of the implementation of tactical peacebuilding and highlights the central roles of domestic religious actors in the peace and reconciliation processes. This article suggests that tactical peacebuilding requires multiple approaches that utilise various sources, including religion and culture, and needs a strategic collaboration among manifold actors—religious and secular, state and society, domestic and foreign. The Indonesian case shows that religion is not only a source of conflict, violence and 'violence-building' but also a useful resource for reconciliation, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

The 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan in 2010 transferred powers to the country's provinces and removed articles inserted by the previous military regimes which facilitated military influence. However, the reform failed to reverse the material roots of the Pakistani military's structural dominance, especially its multi-billion-dollar business empire. Instead, it pushed the military to develop new ways of (re)producing its influence by strategically appropriating the separatist conflict in Balochistan as the most serious threat facing the country and one that required the military's continuing role in policymaking. These counter-processes rendered the constitutional reform inadequate and kept the ethnic conflict alive, while also enabling the military to perpetuate a militarised regime at the national level. Using primary evidence, the article shows how a civil-military institutional imbalance favouring the military can impede ethnic conflict resolution even when the constitution offers autonomy to ethnic groups. (Asian Aff/GIGA)

AbstractThe goal of 'learning' from peace processes is widely expressed in conflict resolution scholarship and practice but inadequately understood. This article investigates what kinds of knowledge can be learned from a peace process, the theoretical and methodological bases of such learning, and what impact it may have. The article begins with an interdisciplinary discussion of reasons to learn, the kinds of lessons proposed in the peace process literature and how theories of learning may be applied to a peace process. Following this is a case study of the sharing of the Northern Ireland peacemaking experience with other conflict-affected societies, especially through facilitated dialogues between decision-makers. This contributes to a comprehensive ideal model of learning from peace processes – something which, it is argued, may result in 'transformative learning' and a 'policy paradigm shift' towards de-escalatory conflict management. A definition of a peace process 'lesson' is offered to guide future research.

Much of the quantitative conflict resolution literature focuses on mediation between states or on efforts to end a civil war through a comprehensive peace agreement that brings peace to the entire country. This article instead analyses the effectiveness of mediation between a wide range of armed actors on a subnational level. Utilizing unique data on Darfur covering the January 2008–August 2009 period, this article finds that mediation efforts following armed clashes in a given area significantly prolong local lulls in fighting in this area. This finding remains robust when controlling for the presence of a peacekeeping base, battle-deaths and the type of armed actors engaged in armed clashes. In addition, the finding remains robust when accounting for the non-random assignment of mediation efforts through matching similar observations in the dataset. Finally, anecdotal evidence from sites of armed conflict beyond Darfur suggest that the findings from this study might also hold in other armed conflicts.

Since the mid-1990s the international discussion about the role of natural resources in financing conflict has been prominent in the analysis of civil wars, particularly in the so-called 'Third World'. However, only recently the question has been asked what the international state community as well as civil society could do to curb these kinds of conflicts. The article gives an overview about recent trends in the development of regulatory mechanisms short of armed 'humanitarian' intervention. Roughly, there are three kinds of initiatives: Those which aim to change the behavior of private consumers & corporations through the development of codes of conducts, sanctions imposed by the international community, & the attempt to put income generated by certain sectors under international supervision. Whereas the weakness of many of these mechanisms lies in their largely voluntary nature, a new dimension of conflict resolution could stem from the increasing cooperation between state institutions & civil society. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

PurposeThe paper seeks to investigate the characteristics of irresolvable interpersonal conflicts by comparing irresolvable conflicts to resolvable and resolved conflicts on each of Coleman's common social psychological factors associated with intractable conflicts.Design/methodology/approachUndergraduate students were randomly assigned to complete questionnaires about an irresolvable conflict, a resolvable conflict, or a resolved conflict. Participants reported on conflicts in romantic or parental relationships.FindingsThree of Coleman's factors distinguished irresolvable interpersonal conflicts: length of conflict; hopelessness; and resistance to resolution. Three factors did not: issue centrality; conflict pervasiveness; and motivation to harm.Research limitations/implicationsThe participants in this study were college undergraduates. Because we asked participants to report on conflicts in romantic or parental relationships, this study does not include irresolvable conflicts that might occur in other relationships. The measures employed in this study were self‐created and tested for the first time in this investigation. Future research should replicate this study with a more representative sample, focus on the role of communication or individual sense‐making processes, and investigate how, if ever, these conflicts end or are resolved.Practical implicationsThis study indicates that similarities exist between intractable and irresolvable interpersonal conflicts. However, irresolvable interpersonal conflicts in ongoing relationships have unique identifying processes associated relational maintenance despite conflict.Originality/valueTo the authors' knowledge, no other research has thoroughly investigated irresolvable interpersonal conflicts. Research on intractable conflicts provides some insight into these conflicts, but our preliminary results indicate that irresolvable interpersonal conflicts likely should not be categorized with other types of intractable conflicts.

Based on 46 interviews conducted in a 2-month period, this article explored the identity narrative of three generations of the Hutu Diaspora community living in Belgium. Through a analysis of the Rwanda's National Identity policy and political categories, the research aimed to explore important themes such as sense of self and other, victimhood, and homeland through the lenses of the perpetrator group. Moreover, it was essential to investigate the trans-generational impact the perpetrator label has on the next generations. By looking at the Hutu population, the study was opening the door to the exploration of contested memories of survival for the perpetrator group. The complexity of the Hutu identity and their contested and competing narratives offered a fascinating approach to the study of mass atrocity as well as the field of conflict Resolution. This new generation of well educated, young Hutu has the power to shape the future of Rwanda in a very important way.

Based on 46 interviews conducted in a 2-month period, this article explored the identity narrative of three generations of the Hutu Diaspora community living in Belgium. Through a analysis of the Rwanda's National Identity policy and political categories, the research aimed to explore important themes such as sense of self and other, victimhood, and homeland through the lenses of the perpetrator group. Moreover, it was essential to investigate the trans-generational impact the perpetrator label has on the next generations. By looking at the Hutu population, the study was opening the door to the exploration of contested memories of survival for the perpetrator group. The complexity of the Hutu identity and their contested and competing narratives offered a fascinating approach to the study of mass atrocity as well as the field of conflict Resolution. This new generation of well educated, young Hutu has the power to shape the future of Rwanda in a very important way.

FIERCE IN ITS INTENSITY, THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT HAS NOW RESISTED RESOLUTION FOR MORE THAN THIRTY-FIVE YEARS AND, INDEED, HAS EXPLODED INTO LARGE-SCALE WAR SIX TIMES. TO THOSE OUTSIDE THE ARENA OF CONFRONTATION, THE FAILURE TO ATTENUATE THE CONFLICT IS AS PUZZLING AS THE SOLUTIONS ARE OBVIOUS. IT GENERALLY TAKES NO MORE THAN A FEW MOMENTS FOR 'ARMCHAIR CARTOGRAPHERS' TO REDRAW THE MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND SPECIFY THE COMPONENTS OF SETTLEMENT: MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION BY ISRAELIS AND PALESTININANS, A TERRITORIAL BASE WHICH GIVES EXPRESSION TO THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE TWO PEOPLES, ACCEPTANCE BY ARAB GOVERNMENTS OF THE LEGITIMACY OF ISRAEL, CREATION OF APPROPRIATE SECURITY REGIMES, AND A RICH FLOW OF IDEAS, PEOPLE, GOODS, AND SERVICES ACROSS PERMEABLE BORDERS BECAUSE THE SOLUTIONS APPEAR SO OBVIOUS, SO PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND LOGICALLY SALIENT, IT SEEMS DIFFICULT AT TIMES TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE DISPUTE RESIST CONCESSION SO TENACIOUSLY AND AT SUCH EXORBITANT COST. WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO NEGOTIATE ACCOMMODATION OR REACH AGREEMENT. AND WHAT IS MORE DISTURBING, IT IS NOT FOR WANT OF TRYING. BUT THE PASSIONS, THE DEEPLY FELT GRIEVANCES, THE VIVID HISTORICAL MEMORIES,THE INTENSE ATTACHMENT TO THE SAME LAND, THE RECIPROCAL AND REINFORCING FEARS, THE RELIGIOUS COMMITMENTS ALL THESE HAVE DEFEATED REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE THE INCOMPATIBLE CLAIMS TO PALESTINE MADE BY THE JEWISH AND ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENTSPY: 1983

"In diesem Beitrag wird die Möglichkeit einer ASEAN-Friedenstruppe und einer regionalen Sicherheitskooperation betrachtet. Ich argumentiere, dass Fortschritte bei 'weichen' Sicherheitsfragen eine stetige Vertiefung der 'harten' Sicherheitszusammenarbeit auf ASEAN-Ebene ermöglichen. Noch zögern die Regierungen der ASEAN-Staaten, einen regionalen Konfliktlösungsmechanismus zu entwickeln, da sie diesen als Infragestellung der Normen der Nichteinmischung und der staatlichen Souveränität sehen. Diese Normen hängen jedoch von dynamischen Veränderungen in der Sicherheitsumgebung ab, mit welchen die Regierungen konfrontiert sind. Die Einrichtung von Mechanismen um politisch weniger umstrittene, nicht-traditionelle Sicherheitsthemen anzugehen, wie z.B. Umweltherausforderungen, ist ein erster Schritt dahin, militärische Kooperationen weiter zu entwickeln, zu festigen sowie das politische Vertrauen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten zu vertiefen. Eine ASEAN-Abruftruppe für Notfall- und Katastrophenhilfe ist bereits eine politisch akzeptable Initiative geworden. Dies könnte den Weg für die Entwicklung einer ASEAN-Friedenstruppe festlegen." (Autorenreferat)

In the aftermath of the Cold War the hope for a more stable and just international order rapidly dissolved underneath the pressure of internecine conflicts raging on all continents. The Rwanda and Srebrenica genocides especially proved that promoting peace is a particularly fraught challenge in the face of intra-state conflict and sub-national groups that boldy confront nation-states. Tim Murithi investigates the role that ethics plays in promoting and consolidating peacebuilding, synthesizing the fields of moral philosophy and international relations through an analysis of the ethics of negotiation, mediation, forgiveness, and reconciliation. In its exploration of the extent to which ethical concerns influence and inform peacebuilding, this book contributes to a growing body of literature on ethics and international relations that enable students, scholars, and practitioners to contextualize their understanding of a principled peacebuilding.

La construction de la paix fait depuis le milieu des années 1980 l'objet d'une intervention croissante des organisations agissant à l'échelle internationale. Parmi les dispositifs " post-conflit " proposés par les agents des gouvernements, organisations inter-gouvernementales et ONG, figurent des programmes qui ciblent la réconciliation du grand nombre plutôt que la réforme des structures sociales et politiques. Ces programmes sont en général présentés comme une modalité de pacification alternative par rapport aux négociations d'accords de paix, opérations de maintien de la paix et autres formes d'intervention qui visent une " paix libérale " par l'intermédiaire des élites. Une analyse prosopographique des acteurs de la paix " par le bas " et la reconstitution de la genèse historique des organisations spécialisées amènent à nuancer cette portée d'alternative, en montrant comment les programmes internationaux sont des ressources pour des jeux sociaux dans les pays du " Nord " qui exportent ces recettes, en même temps que les vecteurs de la diffusion de mécanismes de résolution des litiges et de conceptions du fonctionnement social particuliers.

La construction de la paix fait depuis le milieu des années 1980 l'objet d'une intervention croissante des organisations agissant à l'échelle internationale. Parmi les dispositifs " post-conflit " proposés par les agents des gouvernements, organisations inter-gouvernementales et ONG, figurent des programmes qui ciblent la réconciliation du grand nombre plutôt que la réforme des structures sociales et politiques. Ces programmes sont en général présentés comme une modalité de pacification alternative par rapport aux négociations d'accords de paix, opérations de maintien de la paix et autres formes d'intervention qui visent une " paix libérale " par l'intermédiaire des élites. Une analyse prosopographique des acteurs de la paix " par le bas " et la reconstitution de la genèse historique des organisations spécialisées amènent à nuancer cette portée d'alternative, en montrant comment les programmes internationaux sont des ressources pour des jeux sociaux dans les pays du " Nord " qui exportent ces recettes, en même temps que les vecteurs de la diffusion de mécanismes de résolution des litiges et de conceptions du fonctionnement social particuliers.

La construction de la paix fait depuis le milieu des années 1980 l'objet d'une intervention croissante des organisations agissant à l'échelle internationale. Parmi les dispositifs " post-conflit " proposés par les agents des gouvernements, organisations inter-gouvernementales et ONG, figurent des programmes qui ciblent la réconciliation du grand nombre plutôt que la réforme des structures sociales et politiques. Ces programmes sont en général présentés comme une modalité de pacification alternative par rapport aux négociations d'accords de paix, opérations de maintien de la paix et autres formes d'intervention qui visent une " paix libérale " par l'intermédiaire des élites. Une analyse prosopographique des acteurs de la paix " par le bas " et la reconstitution de la genèse historique des organisations spécialisées amènent à nuancer cette portée d'alternative, en montrant comment les programmes internationaux sont des ressources pour des jeux sociaux dans les pays du " Nord " qui exportent ces recettes, en même temps que les vecteurs de la diffusion de mécanismes de résolution des litiges et de conceptions du fonctionnement social particuliers.

Human need for land has influenced land use behavior and is an acute problem in many regions. Many areas have changed their original function in order to sustain human life, one of which causes forests to be converted into settlements, plantation and agricultural areas as well as mining areas. However, often the converted land is customary land in the form of forests and not a few that have long been disputed. In the era of independence, the government recognized that customary land belonged to the state. In its implementation, customary land is recognized by the government but its ownership rights are not. The indigenous people are only allowed to manage it. This study aims to categorize solutions that can be used in resolving land-use conflicts over customary lands. This study used the traditional review method with secondary data obtained from appropriate and relevant sources. Customary land is recognized in Indonesian law through UUPA No. 5 of 1960. The highest right to land owned or controlled by community members and its implementation is regulated by customary / village elders called ulayat rights, but provided that its existence and implementation still exist. In cases that occur in various countries, there are various kinds of implementation irregularities caused by excessive usage patterns or not according to the main purpose of their use. In Indonesia, irregularities in the implementation of the Law on indigenous peoples to manage their land are often found. Even some government policies are still detrimental to society. Therefore, in resolving customary land conflicts, one must look at various angles and see the history of disputed land, and can refer to several cases that have occurred in other countries. The categorization of land-use conflict solutions can be viewed from the point of view of the resolution process, the distribution of use of customary land use for indigenous peoples in conflict, what changes in land use have occurred according to procedures or not, mapping is needed to avoid ...