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AbstractIn this paper we precisely define the two types of simulations (terminating and steady‐state) with regard to analysis of simulation output and discuss some common measures of performance for each type. In addition, we conclude, on the basis of discussions with many simulation practitioners, that both types of simulations are important in practice. This is contrary to the impression one gets from reading the simulation literature, where the steady‐state case is almost exclusively considered.Although analyses of terminating simulations are considerably easier than are those of steady‐state simulations, they have not received a careful treatment in the literature. We discuss and give empirical results for fixed sample size, relative width, and absolute width procedures that can be used for constructing confidence intervals for measures of performance in the terminating case.

In the 1980s and 1990s, China devoted extensive resources to constructing a legal system, in part in the belief that legal institutions would enhance both stability and regime legitimacy. Why, then, did China's leadership retreat from using law when faced with perceived increases in protests, citizen complaints, and social discontent in the 2000s? This law-stability paradox suggests that party-state leaders do not trust legal institutions to play primary roles in addressing many of the most complex issues resulting from China's rapid social transformation. This signifies a retreat not only from legal reform, but also from the rule-based model of authoritarian governance that has contributed much to the resilience of the Chinese system. The law-stability paradox also highlights the diffculties facing efforts by China's new leadership to reinvigorate legal reform.