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The position of small states in international relations is traditionally described in terms of vulnerability and dependence. This dominant perspective is largely incomplete and inaccurate, because it disregards the element of exchange that characterizes the international linkages between many small and large states. In this article, I aim to outline and motivate an alternative model on the basis of which such relationships can be understood, which has been referred to as the international patron–client framework. After providing an overview of the contemporary academic literature on the role of small states in international politics, two sections follow in which I motivate the applicability of the patron–client framework to the field of international relations, and in which I explain the motives of both patron and client states. Subsequently, the accuracy and usefulness of the framework is examined on the basis of interview data gathered during field research in the three small client states of St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and Palau. The findings of this analysis indicate that the patron–client linkage offers a more fruitful model to study the relations between small and large states than the existing literature does, because it recognizes the element of exchange that such relationships entail.

This article discusses the customs regulators and the trend of the emergence of primary standards in the field of customs, the history of the introduction of international customs standards in the Republic of Uzbekistan. In particular, the current international standards in the customs system of the country and international standards that ca n be implemented in the future in our national legislation were highlighted. The author puts forward the problems of harmonization of the customs legislation of the country with international standards, its causes, as well as recommendations and comments on the improvement of customs procedures on the basis of international standards.

We use the PISA student-level achievement database to estimate international education production functions. Student characteristics, family backgrounds, home inputs, resources, teachers and institutions are all significantly related to math, science and reading achievement. Our models account for more than 85% of the between-country performance variation, with roughly 25% accruing to institutional variation. Student performance is higher with external exams and budget formulation, but also with school autonomy in textbook choice, hiring teachers and within-school budget allocations. School autonomy is more beneficial in systems with external exit exams. Students perform better in privately operated schools, but private funding is not decisive.

Why do leaders draw attention to some cooperative security negotiations but shroud others in secrecy? Previous scholarship focuses on leaders' efforts to gain better terms of agreement either by playing their cards close to the vest at the bargaining table or by leveraging/avoiding aroused public opinion at home. Yet, in many cases, it is neither dyadic nor domestic political pressures that motivate leaders' decisions to publicly acknowledge or conceal the occurrence of talks. This article suggests, instead, that third-party states often constitute the primary targets of official secrecy and that a state's international power position shapes its decision to conceal or acknowledge military cooperation by affecting the size and attentiveness of international audiences, the types of assets it brings to the relationship and the benefits it seeks from cooperation. I test five hypotheses about leaders' use of secrecy and acknowledgment through a statistical analysis of an original dataset on US overseas military basing negotiations. This analysis produces strong support for my argument.

An important international security question is whether nations in an anarchic competitive world system are more likely to ensure their security by pursuing policies of complete independence or of alliance building. The question is addressed using the paradigm that "strong chaos" in an arms-race model is equivalent to crisis instability and war in the international system being modeled. Nonlinear recursion relation models of competitive arms procurement are constructed for independent arming and for alliance building policies in a world system of three symmetric nations. The results are that alliance building always preserves a peaceful world from perturbations in the relationships between the competing member states whereas independent courses of action may allow such perturbations to build up to strong chaos and presumably war.

AbstractHigh and sustained levels of migration of health professionals from labour‐short health services in low‐income countries to the health services of rich countries create a perverse subsidy from poor to rich, flowing across national boundaries. This subsidy worsens international inequality, and creates an obligation, both ethical and legal, for the payment of restitution. Drawing on the case of the migration of health professionals from Sub‐Saharan Africa to the UK, we argue that this obligation in turn constitutes an opportunity to shift development aid relationships away from a framework of charity towards a less neo‐colonial commitment to progressive international fiscal transfers. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.