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Lack of government intervention in South Africa's mining industry has worsened conflicts associated with limited water resources. With the advent of democracy, new legislation demands that all South African citizens have the right to a clean, safe environment, including access to potable water, and that the country develop in a sustainable manner. But conflict remains due to the historical partnership between the government and the mining industry, as well as due to cumulative impacts associated with mining, which has polluted natural ground water sources. In this article, an historical overview of the mining industry in South Africa is presented, along with a simple economic model to describe behavior of the mining industry over time. Legislative frameworks used to address mine waste and mine water management are evaluated and suggestions are made for how to use an understanding of resource driven conflict to improve the outlook of mining and access to water for all in South Africa.

In dyadic ultimatum bargaining proposers, who are privately informed about the pie size, can exploit their "moral wiggle room" by engaging in unfairness which is unobservable by responders. Our setup instead assumes better informed responders and, as a consequence, limits ultimatum power and questions conflict resolution via acceptance of ultimatum proposals. In addition to testing the game theoretic solution, based on common opportunism, we assess whether two different market framings boost benchmark behavior. Our results confirm nearly universal responder opportunism. Although the benchmark proposer demand is modal, proposer choices display substantial variation, even in later rounds and even in the range in which lower demands would let both parties expect to earn more. Nevertheless, such inefficiently large demands become less frequent across rounds. Our results also show that market framing is insignificant and more so in later rounds.

In dyadic ultimatum bargaining proposers, who are privately informed about the pie size, can exploit their "moral wiggle room" by engaging in unfairness which is unobservable by responders. Our setup instead assumes better informed responders and, as a consequence, limits ultimatum power and questions conflict resolution via acceptance of ultimatum proposals. In addition to testing the game theoretic solution, based on common opportunism, we assess whether two different market framings boost benchmark behavior. Our results confirm nearly universal responder opportunism. Although the benchmark proposer demand is modal, proposer choices display substantial variation, even in later rounds and even in the range in which lower demands would let both parties expect to earn more. Nevertheless, such inefficiently large demands become less frequent across rounds. Our results also show that market framing is insignificant and more so in later rounds.

TO PREDICT COMPARATIVE LEVELS OF VIOLENCE IN 2 SETS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, 2 SYSTEMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DYADIC INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS ARE USED: POWER RELATIONSHIP & SD. THE DATA CONSIST OF 29 DYADS FROM R. J. RUMMEL ("A SOCIAL FIELD THEORY OF FOREIGN CONFLICT BEHAVIOR," PEACE RESEARCH SOCIETY, PAPERS, 1965, 4, 131-150) WHICH HAD CONFLICT DURING 1955-57 & 15 CONFLICTS FROM B. FITZSIMMONS ("THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT," TECHNICAL REPORT #1, U OF SOTHERN CALIFORNIA, 1969, JAN) WHICH HAD SIMILAR CONFLICT. 4 MEASURES OF CONFLICT ARE USED IN THE RUMMEL DATA: (1) AN ORDINAL RANKING FROM 1 TO 6, (2) 4 FACTORS EXTRACTED FROM THE 12 DISCRETE CONFLICT MEASURES, (3) A MAGNITUDE RATING OF ALL 4 FACTORS, & (4) A WEIGHTED SCORE FOR EACH DYAD. 4 CONFLICT MEASURES ARE USED IN THE FITZSIMMONS DATA: (A) BATTLE CASUALTIES FROM BOTH COUNTRIES, (B) PHYSICALLY VIOLENT INTERACTIONS, (C) VERBALLY VIOLENT INTERACTIONS, & (D) A SCALED CONFLICT SCORE. LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN THE 'CONFLICT SYSTEMS' IS MEASURED BY EVENTS OCCURRING BETWEEN THE 2 COUNTRIES IN CONFLICT; POWER RELATIONSHIP IS MEASURED BY POPULATION & ENERGY PRODUCTION; & SD IS MEASURED BY TRADE & MUTUAL MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. BY USING REGRESSION ANALYSES, MODERATE PROPORTIONS OF THE VARIATION IN OVERALL CONFLICT & DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONFLICT CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE 2 SYSTEMIC CHARACTERISTICS. THESE FINDINGS APPEAR IN ONLY 1 SET OF 15 CONFLICTS. 3 TABLES. MODIFIED HA.

Nordirland lebt mit der paradoxen Situation, mit dem am 10. April 1998 abgeschlossenen Belfast- oder Karfreitagsabkommen zwar ein weltweit gepriesenes Lösungsmodell für festgefahrene Konflikte in Nachbürgerkriegsgesellschaften zu haben, aber dessen Realisierung vor sich herzuschieben. Vor diesem Hintergrund befasst sich der Beitrag mit der Rolle der Kirchen in diesem Friedensprozess. Im ersten Schritt untersucht der Report, wie sich die Kirchen in Nordirland mit dem ihnen von ihrem Bekenntnis eingeschriebenen Friedensauftrag in einer Konstellation verhalten, die wenig mit ihren Vorstellungen von Frieden, wie sie alle christlichen Konfessionen mehr oder weniger teilen, gemein hat, und wie sie Chancen nutzen oder Fehlschläge hinnehmen, den Gang der Dinge in ihrem Sinne zu beeinflussen. Der zweite Schritt widmet sich den sozialen Leistungen der Kirchen in einer gespaltenen nordirischen Gesellschaft. Dabei werden die Kirchen als (1) Ansammlung von Opfern der Geschichte, (2) als identitätsstiftende Heimat bzw. (3) als Institutionen inmitten gesellschaftlicher Konfrontationen behandelt. Der dritte Schritt erörtert schließlich die Rolle der Kirchen als Teilbetrieb zur Reparatur des Sozialen, also das Verhältnis von Kirche und Zivilgesellschaft sowie den Aspekt der Versöhnung und die damit einher gehenden Schwierigkeiten. In einem abschließenden Fazit merkt der Autor an, dass die Kirchen als strategische und konfliktfähige Gruppen, die in den religiös markierten Auseinandersetzungen eine wichtige Rolle bei der Identitätsbildung, aber auch bei der Mäßigung von Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen, und eine Rolle als Hoffnungsträger einer besseren Zukunft spielen, sich nun Veränderungen gegenüber sehen, die sie unvorbereitet treffen. Hierbei erscheinen die Kirchen einerseits als Teil des Problems, aber auch als Teil der Lösung. (ICG2)

While the concept of issue area in foreign policy has received wide theoretical attention, there has been little empirical research on it. This analysis tests five propositions derived from Rosenau's pre-theory in order to assess the role of issues in foreign policy cooperation-conflict. The findings show that the tangibility of issues is a potent variable in analyzing cooperation-conflict when combined with other intervening variables such as the number of actors, the costliness of employed resources, the frequency of contention, persistence, and linkages to other issues. The findings are then used to reformulate Rosenau's analysis into five new propositions which stipulate the conditions under which the tangibility of issues will lead to cooperation-conflict and the kinds of behavior associated with each of Rosenau's four issue areas.

Two studies in the context of English‐French relations in Québec suggest that individuals who strongly identify with a group derive the individual‐level costs and benefits that drive expectancy‐value processes (rational decision‐making) from group‐level costs and benefits. In Study 1, high identifiers linked group‐ and individual‐level outcomes of conflict choices whereas low identifiers did not. Group‐level expectancy‐value processes, in Study 2, mediated the relationship between social identity and perceptions that collective action benefits the individual actor and between social identity and intentions to act. These findings suggest the rational underpinnings of identity‐driven political behavior, a relationship sometimes obscured in intergroup theory that focuses on cognitive processes of self‐stereotyping. But the results also challenge the view that individuals' cost‐benefit analyses are independent of identity processes. The findings suggest the importance of modeling the relationship of group and individual levels of expectancy‐value processes as both hierarchical and contingent on social identity processes.

Within a traditional planned-behavior framework, the conditions remain ambiguous under which moral norms add to the overall intention to act. In this paper, we aim to provide insights into the circumstances that foster the impact of moral norms. Based on a minimal effort strategy, we predict that moral information is considered more strongly and, thus, is relatively more significant for people's motivation if a person's attitude is at odds with his or her subjective norms. To test our beliefs-conflict hypothesis, we conducted two surveys, one concerning organ donation (N = 639) and another concerning conservation behavior (N = 328). Structural equation analyses confirm that moral considerations have a stronger effect on a person's behavioral intention in cases of attitude-subjective norms conflicts compared to cases of harmonic attitudes and subjective norms.

Having assumed the burden of understanding political life in two-and-a-half dozen unruly countries, political scientists who study the new states of tropical Africa must leap with assurance where angels fear to tread. We have borrowed, adapted, or invented an array of frameworks designed to guide perceptions of disparate events, and Africa is now uniformly viewed through the best lenses of contemporary comparative politics with a focus on political modernization, development and integration. Unfortunately, it appears that when we rely exclusively on these tools in order to accomplish our task, the aspects of political life which we, as well as non-specialists, see most clearly with the naked eye of informed common sense, remain beyond the range of our scientific vision. In our pursuit of scientific progress, we have learned to discern such forms as regular patterns of behavior which constitute structures and institutions; but the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features.In recent years, almost every new African state has experienced more or less successful military or civilian coups, insurrections, mutinies, severe riots, and significant political assassinations. Some of them appear to be permanently on the brink of disintegration into several new political units. With little regard for the comfort of social scientists, the incidence of conflict and disorder appears unrelated to such variables as type of colonial experience, size, number of parties, absolute level or rate of economic and social development, as well as to the overall characteristics of regimes. The downfall of what was widely regarded as the continent's most promising democracy in January, 1966, was followed in February by the demise of what many thought to be the continent's harshest authoritarian regime.

An emerging literature points to the heterogeneous effects of violence on social norms and preferences in conflict-ridden societies. This article considers how responses to violence could be affected by in-group/out-group divisions. The research uses lab-in-the-field experiments to gauge norms for pro-social behavior in the aftermath of ethnic violence in post-war Kosovo. The study finds that one set of treatments (ethnicity) captures a negative legacy of violence on parochialism, while another (local/non-local) shows stronger evidence of pro-sociality and norm recovery. Examining individual variation in conflict exposure, it finds that victims of violence are more biased against ethnic out-groups and less pro-social to others outside of their local community. Balancing and matching on observables helps alleviate concerns that the results are driven by selection bias on victimization. Overall, the results suggest that the effects of violence may be contingent on the salience of in-group/out-group cues and boundaries.

AbstractIn the second of two articles the authors show what integrationist critics of consociational theory can learn from the case of Northern Ireland, namely, that consociation may be more realistic than integration, that a 'grand coalition' may have more virtue than the 'minimum-winning' variety, that consociations can be both liberal and democratic, and that PR-STV has considerable advantages over integrationists' preferred electoral system, the Alternative Vote.

This paper builds a new dataset with detailed information on the universe of foreign government bonds issued in New York in the 1920s and uses these data to describe the behavior of the financial intermediaries which operated in the New York market during the period leading to the interwar debt crisis. The paper starts by showing that concerns over reputation played an important role in intermediaries' underwriting choices. Next, the paper checks whether banks managed to charge abnormal underwriting fees on bonds that would eventually default and finds no evidence of such practice (banksterism). The paper concludes by discussing some parallels between the experience of the 1920s and the current debate on the originate and distribute model.

Recent publications indicate a continuing interest among political scientists in both the aggregating of discrete acts of legislative behavior into underlying dimensions and the empirical specification of voting blocs. The latter interest is served by the former, as aggregation often producs sets of dimensions useful for descriptive purposes, as well as aiding other types of analysis. Recent studies include MacRae's work on the House of Representatives using various forms of scaling, Alker's paper on voting patterns in the sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations using factor analysis, and Grumm's work on the Kansas legislature using another form of factor analysis (Q-technique).As these papers have described in some detail, the technique of factor analysis is particularly useful in producing empirical dimensions which are unitary, stable, exhaustive and parsimonious.

International conflict has profoundly influenced election outcomes in some cases, and in other cases has had a minimal impact. This article develops a theory that the increased salience of foreign policy issues following periods of international hostilities increases the variance of government parties' vote shares. In elections following conflict, the ability to accurately predict election outcomes using traditional economic voting models is reduced. The article provides evidence from advanced democracies in the post-World War II era that being involved in international disputes increases the predictive error of vote shares. More substantively, vote choice models should model the role of exogenous shocks such as international conflict in order to avoid making misleading inferences. The study concludes by discussing the meaningful implications for various theories of voting behavior and international conflict.