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Рассматриваются вопросы становления н развития правового статуса Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации как специализированного органа конституционного контроля, самостоятельно и независимо осуществляющего судебную власть посредством конституционного судопроизводства. Анализ действующего Федерального конституционного закона "О Конституционном Суде РФ"*, принятого 21 июля 1994 г., приводит к выводу, что он в соответствии с Конституцией РФ 1993 г. сохранил за Конституционным Судом роль гаранта конституционной законности и вместе с тем внес значительные коррективы в его компетенцию и организационно-правовые формы деятельности по сравнению с прежним законодательством. ; The article is devoted to the problems concerned the process of formation and development of the Constitutional Courts legal status, as a specialized in the constitutional control body, which independently carries out the judicial authority through the constituonal proceeding. The analysis of the Federal Constitutional Law currently in force "About the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation" adopted in July, 21 st, 1994, leads to the conclusion, that under the Constituon of 1993, the Law provides the Constitution Court with a role of guaranter of the constitutional legality, and of the same time, the Law amends the considerable corrections into the organisational legal forms of its activity in comparison with the former legislation.

Global poverty and the politics of good intentions /Sundhya Pahuja --Human rights and development : a fragmented discourse /Issa G. Shivji --Rights and development : a social power perspective /Ananya Mukherjee-Reed --Is a new 'TREMF' human rights paradigm emerging? Evidence from Nigeria /Obiora Chinedu Okafor --The transformation of Africa : a critique of rights in transitional justice /Makau W. Mutua --Marks indicating conditions of origin in rights-based sustainable development /Nicole Aylwin and Rosemary J. Coombe --Rethinking the convergence of human rights and labour rights in international law : depoliticisation and excess /Vidya Kumar --Measuring the world : indicators, human rights and global governance /Sally Engle Merry --Governing by measuring : the millenium development goals in global governance /Kerry Rittich --Reparations and development /Naomi Roht-Arriaza --Making history or making peace : when prosecutions should give way to truth commissions and peace negotiations /Martha Minow --Transitional justice as global project : critical reflections /Rosemary Nagy --Holding up a mirror to the process of transition? The coercive sterilisation of Romani women in the Czech Republic post-1991 /Morag Goodwin --Symptoms of sovereignty? Apologies, indigenous rights and reconciliation in Australia and Canada /Kirsten Anker --Working through 'bitter experiences' towards a purified European identity? A critique of the disregard for history in European constitutional theory and practice /Christian Joerges --The trials of history : losing justice in the monstrous and the banal /Vasuki Nesiah --Sociological jurisprudence 2.0 : updating law's inter-disciplinarity in a global context /Peer Zumbansen --Epilogue:Progressive law versus the critique of law & development : strategies of double agency revisited /Bryant G. Garth.

Political rights are protected by law, both internationally and nationally. Internationally, political rights are regulated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Political rights are also protected by our constitution and several other laws and regulations, especially Law No. 39 of 1999 concerning Human Rights. There is a provision which is a requirement to run for election which clearly limits and even negates a person's right to participate in exercising their human rights. This is clearly a violation of a person's human rights, which in this case the political rights of an ex-convict, especially in cases of corruption. If we look at the provisions of the 1945 Constitution, an ex-convict is also a citizen who has the same political rights as other citizens. The right to judicial review of regulations that are contrary to the 1945 Constitution, the authority of the right to examine lies with the Constitutional Court (MK). The Constitutional Court's decision provides legal certainty that a former convict in a corruption case is still allowed to run for regional head elections because ex-convicts still have political rights as citizens. To be able to run for regional head elections, ex-convicts after passing through a period of 5 (five) years have finished serving their sentence and have returned to community life as other people's lives. Respect the political rights of ex-convicts of corruption cases as an acknowledgment of human rights in the Republic of Indonesia which are constitutional rights regulated in the 1945 Constitution.Keywords: Prisoners, Judicial Review, Rights, Constitutional Court Decisions Abstrak:Hak Politik dilindungi hukum, baik secara internasional maupun nsional. secara internasional, hak politik diatur Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) dan International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Hak politik juga dilindungi konsitusi kita dan beberapa peraturan Perundang-Undangan lainnya, ...

With the transfer of government shares in 17 electricity generation and distribution companies in November 2013, Nigeria crossed the Rubicon in the privatization process. This process began in earnest in 2003 with the liberalization of the telecom sector as part of a strategic reform to improve efficiency in these utility sectors. So far, privatization has not improved the quality of service in these sectors. The problem has been traced to the failure of regulation. The major problem is that the regulatory regime had not matured before privatization. This immaturity manifests mostly in the failure to protect consumer interests. This article reviews regulatory deficits post-privatization. It assesses potential conflict between principles of market orthodoxy and those of constitutional governance and argues for a rule-of-law approach to regulation post-privatization that is focused on blending of promotion of market efficiency and protection of fundamental rights.Keywords: Liberalization, Privatization, Regulation, Market Efficiency, Rule of Law

Government's ever-increasing participation in communication processes, Mark Yudof argues, threatens key democratic values that the First Amendment was designed to protect. Government control over the exchange of ideas and information would be inconsistent with citizen autonomy, informed consent, and a balanced and mutually responsive relationship between citizens and their government. Yet the danger of government dominance must be weighed against the necessary role of government in furthering democratic values by proposing and promotion policies and by disseminating information and educating citizens. Restraints on government's ability to control communications processes are desirable, but excessive or inappropriate restrictions threaten democracy. Professor Yudof identifies a number of formal and informal checks on government as disseminator, withholder, and controller of ideas and information. Where more controls are needed, the strengthening of pluralism and legislative oversight is generally the answer. Constitutional redress in the courts should be sought only in extreme instances, he cautions, to avoid judicial interference with legitimate policy objectives.

In contemporary debates over copyright, the figure of the author is too-often absent. As a result, these discussions tend to lose sight of copyright's role in fostering creativity. I believe that refocusing discussion on authors – the constitutional subjects of copyright – should restore a proper perspective on copyright law, as a system designed to advance the public goal of expanding knowledge, by means of stimulating the efforts and imaginations of private creative actors. Copyright cannot be understood merely as a grudgingly tolerated way-station on the road to the public domain. Nor does a view of copyright as a necessary incentive to invest in dissemination of copy-vulnerable productions adequately account for the nature and scope of legal protections. Much of copyright law in the US and abroad makes sense only if one recognizes the centrality of the author, the human creator of the work. Because copyright arises out of the act of creating a work, authors have moral claims that neither corporate intermediaries nor consumer end-users can (straightfacedly) assert. This makes it all the important to attempt to discern just what authorship means in today's copyright systems. This Article endeavors to explore the concept of authorship in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. It considers legislative, judicial and secondary authorities in the US, the UK, Canada and Australia, as well as in the civil law countries of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The legal systems here examined appear to agree that an author is a human being who exercises subjective judgment in composing the work and who controls its execution. But that description may neither fully capture nor exhaust the category of "authors." Contending additional or alternative authorial characteristics range from sweat of the ordinary brow, to highly skilled labor, to intent to be a creative author, to investment. The under- or over-inclusiveness of the subjective judgment criterion depends on which of these other characteristics national laws credit. Despite these variations, I nonetheless conclude that in copyright law, an author is (or should be) a human creator who, notwithstanding the constraints of her task, succeeds in exercising minimal personal autonomy in her fashioning of the work. Because, and to the extent that, she molds the work to her vision (be it even a myopic one), she is entitled not only to recognition and payment, but to exert some artistic control over it. If copyright laws do not derive their authority from human creativity, but instead seek merely to compensate investment, then the scope of protection should be rethought and perhaps reduced.

"Economic debates about markets and freedom from the late 1940s onwards focused increasingly on how laws and regulation affected economic behavior, and how economics influenced legal decision-making. By the late 1950s the term "law and economics" came into use to refer to the application of economic analysis to legal problems. The overlap between legal and political systems also led to issues in law and economics being raised in political economy, constitutional economics, and political science. Concepts in Law and Economics: A Guide for the Curious provides a comprehensive integration of the fields of law and economics. In clear prose, Jim Leitzel challenges traditional approaches to law and economics and uncovers common themes that cut across the two fields, providing readers with a means of integrating their knowledge to examine problems through both a legal and economic lens. This book covers the major methods of law and economics and applies those methods to various issues, including art vandalism, sales of human kidneys, and the ownership of meteorites. Compact yet comprehensive, this is an ideal introduction to a vast number of concepts and controversies in the fields of law and economics. Economics students, law students, and those with a general interest in the social sciences will find Concepts in Law and Economics an interesting and engaging read, and will emerge with the necessary skills for thinking like a law and economics practitioner"--

The constitutional doctrine of the legislative omission has developed gradually. At the beginning of its activity, the Constitutional Court considered that it did not have legal powers to examine legal gaps. Later, the doctrine was reinterpreted to the effect that the Constitutional Court has powers not only to state that an examined law (part thereof) contains a legislative omission, but also to declare such a legal regulation unconstitutional by its ruling passed in the corresponding constitutional justice case. In its decision of 8 August 2006, the Constitutional Court held that "a legal gap, inter alia, legislative omission, always means that the legal regulation of certain social relations is established neither explicitly nor implicitly, neither in a particular legal act (part thereof) nor in any other legal act at all, even though there exists a need for a legal regulation of these social relations, as well as that, in the case of legislative omission, the said legal regulation must, by focusing on the imperatives of the consistency and inner non-discrepancy of the legal system and by taking into account the content of social relations, be established precisely in the said particular legal act (in particular part thereof), because this is required by a certain higherranking legal act, inter alia, the Constitution itself". The powers of the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of legal gaps are not laid down expressis verbis in the Constitution, but they arise from the overall legal regulation entrenched in the Constitution, whereby there may not be any such a law or another legal act that could escape the possibility of examining its constitutionality, including the cases where such a law or another legal act fails to establish something that is required under the Constitution. Questions arise as to the doctrine of the Constitutional Court according to which, in cases where the powers of a public administration are not laid down in a law explicitly (expressis verbis), but are derived from the overall legal regulation (they are consolidated implicitly), despite the fact that they are not defined clearly, precisely, comprehensibly, and consistently, there is no legislative omission and such a legal regulation is not in conflict with the Constitution.

The constitutional doctrine of the legislative omission has developed gradually. At the beginning of its activity, the Constitutional Court considered that it did not have legal powers to examine legal gaps. Later, the doctrine was reinterpreted to the effect that the Constitutional Court has powers not only to state that an examined law (part thereof) contains a legislative omission, but also to declare such a legal regulation unconstitutional by its ruling passed in the corresponding constitutional justice case. In its decision of 8 August 2006, the Constitutional Court held that "a legal gap, inter alia, legislative omission, always means that the legal regulation of certain social relations is established neither explicitly nor implicitly, neither in a particular legal act (part thereof) nor in any other legal act at all, even though there exists a need for a legal regulation of these social relations, as well as that, in the case of legislative omission, the said legal regulation must, by focusing on the imperatives of the consistency and inner non-discrepancy of the legal system and by taking into account the content of social relations, be established precisely in the said particular legal act (in particular part thereof), because this is required by a certain higherranking legal act, inter alia, the Constitution itself". The powers of the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of legal gaps are not laid down expressis verbis in the Constitution, but they arise from the overall legal regulation entrenched in the Constitution, whereby there may not be any such a law or another legal act that could escape the possibility of examining its constitutionality, including the cases where such a law or another legal act fails to establish something that is required under the Constitution. Questions arise as to the doctrine of the Constitutional Court according to which, in cases where the powers of a public administration are not laid down in a law explicitly (expressis verbis), but are derived from the overall legal regulation (they are consolidated implicitly), despite the fact that they are not defined clearly, precisely, comprehensibly, and consistently, there is no legislative omission and such a legal regulation is not in conflict with the Constitution.

Cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Subject Index -- Table of Cases -- MWATELA AND OTHERS V EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY -- ANYANG' NYONG'O AND OTHERS V ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA AND OTHERS -- NANGALE AND OTHERS V ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA AND OTHERS -- ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA V ANYANG' NYONG'O AND OTHERS -- ANYANG' NYONG'O AND OTHERS V ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA AND OTHERS -- THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA AND COMMISSIONER OF LANDS V COASTAL ACQUACULTURE -- EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE AND OTHERS V MARTIN OGANG -- INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS -- CAESAR V TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO -- INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE YEAR 2004 -- THE PROSECUTOR V JEAN-PAUL AKAYESU -- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT V COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES -- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT V COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES -- EAST AFRICAN LAW SOCIETY AND OTHERS V ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA AND OTHERS -- Back cover.

Professor Merrill ably demonstrates that Supreme Court decisions should be examined as the product of an inherently political institution. Observers who assert that Justices are best understood as prophets of the law are practicing an intellectual sleight of hand that allows them to ignore the non­ doctrinal factors that affect judicial behavior. Such an effort is understandable. The Court is a much more complicated subject if its rulings reflect nonlegal factors as well as legal ones. The desire, however, to ignore the true character of the Court produces accounts of its behavior that are inadequate, incorrect, or wholly without content. Legal scholars who want to explain court decisions must consider closely the analysis offered by Merrill as well as his methodology. Moreover, scholars who wish to prescribe legal rules without understanding Merrill's arguments risk folly for they fail to consider how rules are adopted and applied by courts.