AbstractThe aim is to examine the contribution which economic and quantitative analysis can make to a better understanding of the law. I concentrate on the common law action of negligence and how it is related to the optimal deterrence of accidents, rather than to the compensation of all accident victims. A critique is made of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission's proposal to prohibit negligence actions for motor vehicle accidents and to introduce a compulsory 'no‐fault' scheme. An econometric analysis of new Zealand and Australian 'no‐fault' schemes finds that the negligence system appears to have some deterrent effect on motor vehicle accidents.
Legal and economic analyses overlap and interact in many areas. Recent U.S. Supreme Court and lower court decisions on class action lawsuits clearly focus on the critical role that economic analysis plays in determining the outcome of class actions. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend have made national headlines, raising the bar in class certification for showing common impact and preponderance through expert testimony. These decisions have turned on the adequacy of the analyses put forth by expert economists, finding the analyses of the plaintiffs' economists to be insufficient. The decisions will have significant implications for use of expert testifiers in class certification and in estimation of monetary damages, presenting challenges to both attorneys and economists in antitrust and other class actions. This book focuses on the changing landscape of class action law and its interaction with the economic analysis of key issues in class actions. Articles examine the elements of class action law from diverse viewpoints, featuring defendant and plaintiff perspectives, concerning domestic and international law, and written by lawyers and economists.
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Interest in international law has increased greatly over the past decade, largely because of its central place in discussions such as the Iraq War and Guantanamo, the World Trade Organisation, the anti-capitalist movement, the Kyoto Convention on climate change, and the apparent failure of the international system to deal with the situations in Palestine and Darfur, and the plights of refugees and illegal immigrants around the world. This Very Short Introduction explains what international law is, what its role in international society is, and how it operates. Vaughan Lowe examines what international law can and cannot do and what it is and what it isn't doing to make the world a better place. Focussing on the problems the world faces, Lowe uses terrorism, environmental change, poverty, and international violence to demonstrate the theories and practice of international law, and how the principles can be used for international co-operation
Introduction -- Environmentally sound management of wastes (ESM) -- Wastes -- Transboundary movements of wastes -- Ship-source pollution -- The sea/land interface waste management dilemma -- The ESM of ship wastes : the sea/land interface -- The management of ship wastes : the sea-land interface -- International law and (ship) waste management.
The paper aims to clarify the sense of contemporary fascism, particularly from the example of the Brazilian Bonsolarism, defining it as an anti-systemic, anti-institucional, anti-juridical and infralegal perspective with a personalist, devoted, voluntarist, spontaneous and militant character which starts from inside judiciary and in terms of subversion of the relation among law, politics and moral, and that, by means of politicization and partisanship of law, branches to the political system, serving as instrument to the fratricide political war among parties, from there linking to civil society in the form of constitution of a digital-social mass-militia of acclamation oriented to an anti-systemic posture. In this dynamic, the fascism has two constitutive and streamlining cores: on one side, it subverts the correlation of human rights and law, delegitimizing and truly destroying the ontogenetic primacy, the separation, the differentiation, the self-referentiality and the overposition of law in relation to politics and moral, as the subsidiarity of them regarding law; on other, it leads to the deconstruction from inside to judiciary and political system of the highly institutionalist, legalist, technical, formal and depersonalized perspective which is proper to them, eliminating the centrality of the judiciary and, them, delegitimizing its regulator role regarding to political system and to the social dialectics, normalizing the totalizing regression caused by political-moral colonization of the democratic law. By reconstructing the pluralist and universalist democracy's meta-normative and generative basis as a public system of law, that is, the co-originality of universality of human rights, pluralism and law, the condition of ontogenetic primacy, independence, self-subsistence and overposition of law in relation to politics and moral, as the subsidiarity of these regarding to law, we will point to the renewal of this systemic, systematic, procedural, mediated, instancial, progressive and publicized perspective of the public system of law, in the interrelation, separation and overposition of judiciary and political system, demarcated by a strong ideal of methodological-procedural-axiological institutionality, legality, technicality, formality and depersonalization, which eradicates the politicization and partisanship of law and, by devolving the complete integrality to law-judiciary, confines the democracy's political system and civil society to their true limits which are its structural basis: the human rights, the legal process and the public system of law, with the necessity of full translation of politics and moral to law, delimitating the pluralist and universalist democracy as a public system of law oriented to the production of universality in/as/by legality.
The Covid-19 crisis in Spain has led to the adoption of several pieces of legislation with labour law and social security content. The main priority of this fast-changing and frequently adapted legislation has been to avoid a sharp rise in unemployment. To do so, the legislator facilitated the use of the already existing procedures to temporarily suspend contracts (Expedientes Temporales de Regulacion de Empleo) ´ and prohibited certain kinds of dismissals (those based on economic circumstances and force majeure). To further develop a social shield with the ambition to protect the most vulnerable workers and families several measures that can be classified as income support have been adopted.
In: 2021, Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna, and Simon Drugda (eds) '2020 Global Review of Constitutional Law' (I·CONnect-Clough Center), 8-12
La rhétorique romaine voyait dans la coutume la base de toute loi sauf celles quiavaient été déterminées par une législation, alors que les écrits juridiques, à l'origine, n'accordaient de valeur qu'à la coutume locale dans la mesure où cette dernière complétait la loi générate. Julien le légiste soutenait que le consensus populaire qui est à la base de la législation pouvait s'exprimer aussi à travers les pratiques coutumières; au contraire, l'empereur Constantin estimait que la coutume n'était valable que si elle ne s'opposait ni au bon sens ni à la loi écrite. Les juristes du Moyen Age durent arbitrer entre ces deux positions. C'est à la faveur de ces débats que les juristes anglais trouveront de quoi justifier la nouvelle Common Law.
On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court sent shockwaves through the bedrock of trademark law with its decision in Matal v. Tam. Justice Alito's majority opinion declared the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act unconstitutional due to viewpoint discrimination. Two years later, on June 24, 2019, in Iancu v. Brunetti, the Court continued to shake the foundation of trademark law by declaring the immoral and scandalous clause of the Lanham Act unconstitutional due to viewpoint discrimination. Both the Tam and the Brunetti Courts, however, provided no enlightenment for practitioners regarding whether trademarks are commercial speech. By failing to answer this crucial question, the Court left open the issue of available limits on the government's restrictions on speech, or if there are even limits at all. This Note argues that the law should treat trademarks as commercial speech. The Central Hudson test for intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for identifying a compelling government interest that is related to trademark restrictions at issue. Otherwise, a strict scrutiny analysis of trademarks jeopardizes a vast majority of the United States' signature trademark act: the Lanham Act.
