Game theory is a branch of mathematics that studies strategic interactions, i.e., interactions which involve more than one agent and in which each agent makes her/his decision while striving to predict the decisions of other agents. Game theory has been successfully applied in many areas of both the natural and social sciences, and it is the belief of this book's author that it can also be gainfully invoked in the area of legal philosophy. In this book, Wojciech Zaluski analyzes legal-philosophical concepts - such as legal interpretation, justice, legal rights, contract law, tort law, and prop
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Game theory and contemporary decision theory provide the mathematical foundation of economics. Neuroeconomics, which principally concerns itself with the integrative study of brain, mind and behavior, builds on this mathematical foundation while also drawing heavily from the repository of experimental paradigms that have grown out of economic game theory and behavioral economics. Game theory is central to neuroeconomics primarily because it constitutes a formal mathematical framework with which to bridge insights occurring at different levels of neuroeconomic analysis. In particular, game theoretic principles can be used to express neuroscientific ideas about the brain, psychological concepts regarding the human mind, and economic predictions of human behavior, thereby making these different ideas more rigorously relatable to each other. In this chapter we provide a nontechnical introduction to game theory and its relation to neuroeconomics. It has been written as an overview of the basic concepts most likely to be encountered in neuroeconomic research. The first part of the chapter introduces the reader to the basic concepts and philosophical underpinnings of game theory in relation to neuroeconomics. The second part is an introduction and discussion of common games, including the games featured in the other chapters of this book.
This book primarily addresses various game theory phenomena in the context of management practice. As such, it helps readers identify the profound game theory principles behind these phenomena. At the same time, the game theory principles in the book can also provide a degree of guidance for solving practical problems. As one of the main areas in management research, there is already an extensive body of literature on game theory. However, it remains mainly theoretical, focusing on abstract arguments and purely numerical examples purely. This book addresses that gap, helping readers apply game theory in their actual management or research work.
Equilibrium points in n-person games ; The bargaining problem / John F. Nash, Jr. -- Non-cooperative games / John Nash -- An iterative method of solving a game / Julia Robinson -- Equivalence of games in extensive form / F.B. Thompson -- Extensive games and the problem of information / H.W. Kuhn -- A value for n-person games ; Stochastic games / L.S. Shapley -- Recursive games / H. Everett -- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments / R.J. Aumann and B. Peleg -- A limit theorem on the core of an economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf -- The bargaining set for cooperative games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler -- Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders / Robert J. Aumann -- The core of an n-person game / Herbert E. Scarf -- Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players. pt. 1. The basic model ; pt. 2. Bayesian equilibrium points ; pt. 3. The basic probability distribution of the game / John C. Harsanyi -- The big match / David Blackwell and T.S. Ferguson -- On market games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik -- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / R. Selten.
1. Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories -- 2. On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Cooperative Games -- 3. A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game -- 4. Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points -- 5. Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof -- 6. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model -- 7. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points -- 8. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game -- 9. Uses of Bayesian Probability Models in Game Theory -- 10. An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition -- 11. A New General Solution Concept for Both Cooperative and Noncooperative Games -- 12. Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior.
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