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The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War when other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more pressing. With the onset of the Global War on Terror in 2001 and the ensuing involvement of the U.S. military in counterinsurgency support in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency experienced renewed concern in both the defense and intelligence communities. The author argues that while exceptionally important, this relearning process focused on Cold War era nationalistic insurgencies rather than the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War security environment. To be successful at counterinsurgency, he contends, the U.S. military and defense community must rethink insurgency, which has profound implications for American strategy and military doctrine. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1677/thumbnail.jpg

This article present and discuss several of the key concepts in use when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines and rules), to describe the different forms of insurgency. One of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent wars are different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author has also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare also. We can also find in this article some of the key concepts and problems regarding insurgency, guerrilla warfare and methods of Insurgency as well

This article present and discuss several of the key concepts in use when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines and regulations), to describe the different forms of insurgency. One of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent wars are different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author has also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare. We can also find in this article some of the key concepts and problems regarding insurgency, guerrilla warfare and methods of insurgency as well.

This article is the second of three articles which present and discuss several of the key concepts in use when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines and regulations), to describe the different forms of insurgency. One of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent wars are different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author has also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare. We can also find in this article some of the key concepts and problems regarding insurgency, guerrilla warfare and methods of insurgency as well.

When originally published in 1985 this volume was the first scholarly and objective contribution available on Rhodesian counter-insurgency. It documents and explains why Rhodesia lost the war. The origins of the conflict are reviewed; each chapter examines a separate institution or counter-insurgency strategy directly related to the development of the conflict, concluding with a summary view of the Rhodesian security situation both past and present.

"Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" published on by Oxford University Press.

This book seeks to answer the "why" and "how" questions about the insurgency of the PKK, a militant left-wing group of Turkey's Kurds, in Turkey. The PKK has been inter-locked in an intermittent war against Turkey since 1984 in the name of Kurdish nationalism. The author combines insights of Strategy and IR - from strategy and tactics in irregular warfare to peace negotiations between state authorities and insurgents, with data from qualitative research, to achieve two inter-related objectives: first, assess the current state of affairs and predict the future course of the conflict and, secondly, draw general conclusions on how protracted conflicts can end and how

Why would an insurgent group turn away foreign fighters who volunteered to fight for its cause? To explain variation in foreign fighter usage, I present a novel perspective on what foreign fighters offer to militant groups. Because foreign fighters possess a different set of preferences from local fighters, integrated teams of foreign and local fighters can self-manage and mitigate the agency problems that are ubiquitous to insurgent groups. However, to create self-managing teams, insurgent leadership must oversee the teams' formation. When counterinsurgency pressure prevents this oversight, foreign fighters are less useful and the leadership may exclude them. This theory explains variation in foreign fighter use and agency problems within al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI; 2004 to 2010) and the Haqqani Network (2001–2018). Analysis of the targeting of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI's former leader, further supports the theory, suggesting that leadership targeting inhibited oversight and aggravated agency problems within the group.