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Preliminary considerations -- Practical wisdom in the moral theory of Aristotle -- The moral theories of William of Auxerre and Philip the Chancellor -- The earliest medieval Latin commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics -- The early moral works of Albert the Great -- Happiness, prudence, and moral reasoning in the later works of Albert the Great -- Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure on the understanding of moral goodness -- Two commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics in the late thirteenth century

This chapter discusses the reception of the Aristotelian concept of 'political animal' in thirteenth and fourteenth century Latin philosophy. Aristotle thought that there are other political animals besides human beings, and his idea of what it means to be a political animal was partially based on biological needs and desires that lead animals to live together. By analysing what medieval philosophers thought of other political animals - such as ants, bees, and cranes - and of the biological basis of the political nature of humans, the chapter elaborates on the precise meaning of the concept of political animal. It is argued that biological aspects play a significant role in medieval views, but at the same time medieval authors tend to distance human beings from other political animals by emphasising rationality, choice, and language as central factors for the social and political life. ; peerReviewed

Abstract
With Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age, John Deely has written a truly revolutionary book. Both medieval historians and semioticians alike will gain a new perspective on their subject matter upon reading Medieval Philosophy Redefined. In it, Deely traces the history of the sign by going to its roots in the writings of Augustine, and following it through to the time of John Poinsot. John Poinsot, a previously marginalized philosopher from the late medieval period, factors greatly in Deely's book. Poinsot makes it possible to get through the "thicket" of nominalism and see beyond Renaissance Humanism. Perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that, by using the sign as the point of departure, Deely has found a constant thread that runs through the Medieval Ages, making it, the sign, a key to understanding medieval philosophy from its start to its finish.

In contemporary political discourse, the "clash of civilizations" rhetoric often undergirds philosophical analyses of "democracy" both at home and abroad. This is nowhere better articulated than in Jacques Derrida's Rogues, in which he describes Islam as the only religious or theocratic culture that would "inspire and declare any resistance to democracy" (Derrida 2005, 29). Curiously, Derrida attributes the failings of democracy in Islam to the lack of reference to Aristotle's Politics in the writings of the medieval Muslim philosophers. This paper aims to analyze this gross misconception of Islamic philosophy and illuminate the thoroughgoing influence the Muslim philosophers had on their Christian successors, those who are so often credited as foundations of Western political philosophy. In so doing, I compare the ideal states presented by Averroes and Dante – in which Aristotelian influence is intimately interlaced – and offer an analysis thereof as heralds of what we might call the secularization of the political, inspiring those democratic values that Derrida believes to be absent in the rich philosophy of the Middle Ages.

In contemporary political discourse, the "clash of civilizations" rhetoric often undergirds philosophical analyses of "democracy" both at home and abroad. This is nowhere better articulated than in Jacques Derrida's Rogues, in which he describes Islam as the only religious or theocratic culture that would "inspire and declare any resistance to democracy" (Derrida 2005, 29). Curiously, Derrida attributes the failings of democracy in Islam to the lack of reference to Aristotle's Politics in the writings of the medieval Muslim philosophers. This paper aims to analyze this gross misconception of Islamic philosophy and illuminate the thoroughgoing influence the Muslim philosophers had on their Christian successors, those who are so often credited as foundations of Western political philosophy. In so doing, I compare the ideal states presented by Averroes and Dante – in which Aristotelian influence is intimately interlaced – and offer an analysis thereof as heralds of what we might call the secularization of the political, inspiring those democratic values that Derrida believes to be absent in the rich philosophy of the Middle Ages.

In contemporary political discourse, the "clash of civilizations" rhetoric often undergirds philosophical analyses of "democracy" both at home and abroad. This is nowhere better articulated than in Jacques Derrida's Rogues, in which he describes Islam as the only religious or theocratic culture that would "inspire and declare any resistance to democracy" (Derrida 2005, 29). Curiously, Derrida attributes the failings of democracy in Islam to the lack of reference to Aristotle's Politics in the writings of the medieval Muslim philosophers. This paper aims to analyze this gross misconception of Islamic philosophy and illuminate the thoroughgoing influence the Muslim philosophers had on their Christian successors, those who are so often credited as foundations of Western political philosophy. In so doing, I compare the ideal states presented by Averroes and Dante – in which Aristotelian influence is intimately interlaced – and offer an analysis thereof as heralds of what we might call the secularization of the political, inspiring those democratic values that Derrida believes to be absent in the rich philosophy of the Middle Ages.

Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Historical Setting -- 2 Authors and Sources -- 3 Methodology -- 4 Contents in Brief -- 5 How to Use This Study? -- 6 A Note about Translations -- 1 Terminology -- 1 Basic Terminology: Political, Conjugal, and Domestic -- 2 Political or Social Animal? -- 3 Later Developments -- 2 Needs, Desires, and Natural Inclinations -- 1 Preservation of Oneself and the Species -- 2 Inclination and the Body That Makes Us Social -- 3 Reflections on Mirrors of Princes -- 4 Instrumental Role of the Community -- 5 Cities and beyond -- 3 Good Life, Virtue, and Human Sociability -- 1 Good Life and Virtue -- 2 Aims of Individuals and the Community -- 3 Social Role, Prudence, and Virtue -- 4 Is Practical Happiness for Everyone? Virtue and Prudence of Citizens -- 5 Prudence of Slaves (and Women) -- 6 Craftsman qua Craftsman qua Human -- 7 Happiness and Morality -- 4 Reason and Language -- 1 Naturalness of Language -- 2 Language and Justice -- 3 Creating Communities -- 4 Purpose of the Linguistic Argument -- 5 The Social and Political Nature of Animals -- 1 The Ant, the Bee, and the Crane -- 2 Forget the Bee: Truncating the Linguistic Argument -- 3 No Animal Is Political -- 6 Beasts, Gods, and Human Beings -- 1 Part/Whole Metaphysics -- 2 Solitary Humans -- 3 What Is It Like to Be a God? -- 4 Ways of Being Wild -- 5 The Normative Scale: Above and below Beasts -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- Bibliography -- Index.

This paper is devoted to the analysis and to the comparison of concepts on theodicy and on the nature of evil that was developed by two medieval Jewish philosophers. They are Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides or Ralbag, 1288-1344) and Hasdai Crescas (1340-1410/12). The sources of the analysis are the third chapter of the fourth book of the "Wars of the Lord" (1329) by Gersonides and the second chapter of the second book of the "Light of the Lord" (1410) by Crescas. Both philosophers assert that evil essentially cannot come from God. The causes of evil are the sinfulness of human beings, or the celestial bodies, or the breaking of the connection between human and God. The problem of evil and injustice in this world are closely related for Gersonides and Crescas to other problems, such as divine knowledge of future events, free will, reasons for reward and punishment. Gersonides and Crescas differ considerably on these issues. Gersonides demonstrates that God is not an essential source of evil. He proceeded to build on this statement with the fallacy of the opinion that divine providence extends to individuals. After all, said Gersonides, retribution would make God a source of evil. And in this case, righteous men would always be rewarded, and sinners would always be punished for their sins. But obviously this is not the case. Crescas, in contrast to Gersonides, claims that God knows individuals. This does not prevent him from agreeing with Ralbagh that God is not the source of evil. According to Crescas, any punishment or suffering (even for the righteous) always leads to good. It is obvious therefore that Crescas adheres to a more traditional position, trying, inter alia, to bring his thoughts as close as possible to the ideas expressed in the Torah. Gersonides adheres to a position close to the ideas of Maimonides. Gersonides, in the author's opinion, created a philosophical concept that is more consistent in comparison with Crescas' conception, however more distant from the Jewish teaching.